

A Student Anti-War Quarterly

anvil

And Student Partisan

Roosevelt as a Man of Ideas

Study in Failure of Personal Politics



Sex, Class and Family in Russia

The Twentieth Century Political Novel

Balance Sheet of the Korean War

Security Screening: New Threat to Labor

The Non-Violent Strategy for Peace

The Legal Basis of the Garrison State

Philip Wylie: Preacher vs. Society

Editorial • Reviews • Poetry • Student News

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ANVIL AND STUDENT PARTISAN editorials reflect the views of the majority of its editors. However, no single publishing club necessarily endorses all of the views expressed in the editorials. The magazine is published by the following student organizations:

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BUSINESS COLUMN

OUR FRIENDS and regular readers will have noticed the unusually long summer that ran its course between last Spring's issue and the present Fall number. In briefest terms, our problem has been one of achieving speedy recovery of the money collected by Anvil and Student Partisan agents from their bundle sales. Anvil and Student Partisan has a circulation more than sufficient to maintain itself, but until a major portion of the returns on one issue are received at the office, it is unfeasible to come out with another. Once again we wish to urge all agents: please send in all monies collected from sales immediately.

In the interval since last publication we hoped to solve our chronic financial disorder by appealing to everyone on our mailing list for contributions toward a goal equal to the cost of a single publication. Without the advantages of a regular edition of Anvil and Student Partisan to carry the appeal and without busy campuses where personal collections could be made, the responses to our mere letter requests fell, of course, short of the goal. Of our agents, writers, and friends aware of the need for a magazine like ours, whose dollar and five dollar contributions brought us, however, 65 dollars closer to this issue, we send our warmest thanks. For our wider readership unreached by mail, and for those who heard but perhaps forgot, it's not yet too late to guarantee the regular appearance of our magazine.

The most encouraging sort of proof that Anvil and Student Partisan serves its basic purpose of organizing student anti-war, anti-imperialist opinion is contained in the establishment of the Southern California Youth Federation Against War and its affiliation with the older publishers of Anvil. SCYFAW consists of nine member socialist and pacifist clubs and units in the Los Angeles region. All students in that area who are interested in Anvil, its organization and work, should write to Box 7324, Los Angeles 23, California. Other socialist and anti-war clubs throughout the country have been supporting Anvil and Student Partisan by distributing it. Now is the time for them to make it their own organ by helping to edit and publish it. Now they can join a growing nationwide student anti-war movement by affiliating with Anvil and Student Partisan.

The editors of Anvil and Student Partisan are grateful for the permission granted by the University of Chicago Press to reprint the article by Mr. Lewis Coser which first appeared in the May, 1951, issue of the *American Journal of Sociology* under the title *Some Aspects of Soviet Family Policy*.

anvil and student partisan

Fall Quarter

1951

Editorials:

Balance Sheet of the Korean War

MANY ELEMENTS OF the intrigue taking place at Kaesong will continue to mystify us—as they are intended to. We suspect that at least a few of the American negotiators are themselves confused by their own maneuvers and excessively befuddled by those of the Stalinists.

Whatever additional details may come to light, the known developments of these most peculiar truce negotiations have already proven not only the insincerity of all parties at Kaesong, but the grotesque cynicism and hypocrisy of the war itself. Whatever the final outcome of the now twice-interrupted “peace talks,” it is clear that real peace can never be established as long as the decision rests in the hands of parties less concerned with the desires of Koreans than in their own international position.

While the military and civilian casualties on both sides continue to mount, the Stalinists and the American-led negotiators are battling over the conference table for strategic political and propagandistic advantages. Instead of Kaesong becoming a truce discussion area, it has become a staging area for a succession of accusations and counter-charges, maneuvers and self-righteous protestations from both sides, followed by long adjournments and suspended talks.

A truce in this nightmare war has become a secondary objective.

The extent to which the Kaesong talks have been used for irrelevant political ends can be fully appreciated if we bear in mind the ostensible purpose of the talks, which is not even to conclude a peace, but merely to conclude a cease-fire order on the basis of which peace negotiators can actually begin. Yet, at this preliminary stage, incidents have been provoked and issues injected by both sides which not only endanger the immediate truce objective, but actually threaten an extension of the war to new areas. The introduction of non-Asian Stalinist military forces, even if only in token strength, is enough to seriously threaten the tenuous international balance.

The Stalinists have been unusually clumsy in their efforts to make political capital out of

Kaesong; above all, in their initial attempt to bar United Nations newsmen from the neutral zone, followed by their demand for the withdrawal of all foreign troops as a condition for truce. The move to keep out newsmen could only be an attempt to gain a monopoly of propaganda rights and show the world that the Stalinists are “boss.” The latter demand can only be considered as designed to win support in Asia: surely nobody could be so sanguine as to suppose that the United States would leave itself in a militarily untenable position.

The American truce team on the other hand has been presenting a “firm” front. Its very pugnaciousness and readiness to prolong the talks is cause to suspect Washington’s motives. The insistence of the American negotiators on maintaining the present battle zone as the truce line, because of its military advantages, gives some credence to the Stalinist accusation that the Americans are not interested in immediate peace so much as in “saving face” (not exclusively a Chinese trait). The charge is buttressed by the fact that for months before Kaesong, American diplomats made it clear that they considered the 38th parallel the proper truce line.

The continuation of the war in Korea is senseless from every point of view. The American-led forces have no clear political objective, and cannot defeat the Stalinists militarily except through an enormous expenditure of men and materiel. And if America does win the war it is faced with the problem of what to do with a charred nation of little military significance and devoid of economic

worth. The Stalinists, despite the transparent nature of their tactics, have made important gains in Asia through their maneuvers in Korea. But they are reaching their optimum political advantage. It is clear that the Chinese and North Koreans cannot throw the allied armies into the sea. There are many indications that this military factor has brought dissension within the Stalinist camp. Discordant notes are disturbing the harmony between Russia, China and North Korea, each of which has a unique interest in the conduct of the war. The latter is anxious to continue the war at all costs

NOTICE

Just as our last issue listed the name of a new organization which had affiliated with ANVIL AND STUDENT PARTISAN, Focal Point of Yale, so this issue contains the names of two more organizations. The two are the Socialist Study Club at the University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas, and the Southern California Youth Federation Against War. The SCYFAW has published an attractive statement of principles which includes a list of the nine participating organizations in the Federation: Campus Committee of the Libertarian Socialist League; Chapman College Fellowship of Reconciliation; Los Angeles Circle; Young People’s Socialist League; Regional Youth Committee of the Fellowship of Reconciliation; Socialist Youth League; Westwood Fellowship of Reconciliation; Westwood Socialist Club; Wilshire Socialist Club; Woolman House Fellowship of Reconciliation. — The Editors

since it has most to lose by defeat: China is reluctant to pursue a struggle which cannot bring military success and which is an enormous drain on her manpower, economy and morale; the Kremlin, nominal master of the entire transaction, is prepared to see Chinese and North Koreans slaughtered but hesitates to supply these armies, disquieted by the increasing prestige of Chinese Stalinism in Asia.

Despite the fact that the war in Korea is becoming increasingly pointless for all participants (not to mention the Korean people—for whom the war has been a disaster from the very beginning), the military leaders are so enmeshed in their own maneuvers and hypocrisy that peace appears to be an almost inaccessible goal, especially at the present moment.

But the bluff, guff and confusion of Kaesong are not merely the products of fortuitous circumstance. The tragic dilemma of the negotiations has its roots in past history and climaxes a long series of events. From the vantage point of Kaesong, these events assume retrospective importance which justify review.

Background of Struggle

In its Autumn, 1950 editorial, *Anvil and Student Partisan* traced the immediate origin of the conflict in Korea to the Russo-American agreement of 1945 which arbitrarily divided into two parts this culturally homogeneous nation—and allowed its occupation by foreign troops without regard for the long-expressed desire of Koreans for national independence and freedom. Each section of the dismembered nation was saddled with a government which faithfully mirrored the social and political outlook of its respective occupying power. In the North, a replica of the Russian police state was created; in the South, there arose with American support a landlord-ruled “democracy” which crushed the free trade unions, massacred peasants and executed even conservative oppositionists. Although the occupation armies eventually withdrew, the Kim regime of the North and the Rhee government below the 38th parallel remained intact, with Russia and the United States maintaining their influence via economic pressure, threats and political surveillance.

The conflicts between the Kim and Rhee dictatorships grew in exaggerated ratio to the intensity of the cold war. With the incorporation of Manchuria into the Russian empire and the victory of Stalinism in China, the southern part of Korea was isolated and surrounded. Its apparently hopeless position, militarily, combined with its minor economic and military value for American strategy led Dean Acheson in January 1950, to declare South Korea as being outside the defense interest of the United States. It was this attitude which undoubtedly encouraged the Stalinists to move North Korean troops across the 38th parallel. Had Russia decided to intervene directly at this point, or had the U.S. followed the advice of Senator Paul Douglas to drop atom bombs indiscriminately, total war might now be a reality. This forbearance by the two world powers signifies only that neither nation was prepared for total war at this time. But the Korean War also demonstrates that both Russia and the United States are willing to risk a general war in the pursuit of secondary and even minor considerations.

In the light of having practically written-off Korea six months before the outbreak of hostilities, it is not clear what motivated Truman's decision to intervene on behalf of Syngman Rhee. Perhaps the Democratic Party administration feared Republican charges of “vacillation” or “appeasement”. The haste with which Truman acted left both Congress and the United Nations confronted with a *fait accompli* and these bodies had no alternative but to approve Truman's action.

From the perspective of American national interests, it appears that Truman blundered in sending a full military expedition to Korea. (But it was only in the light of military developments that the Republicans have seen fit to criticize the action, all but attributing it to the machinations of Kremlin agents in the State Department.) Certainly, America had few economic interests to secure in Korea. American investments are insignificant and the economy so closely integrated with Japan's that it represented practically no outlet for trade expansion. As a military base, South Korea alone had no value at all, being difficult both to supply and defend.

Korea — a Symbol of Failure

The most bitter initial military defeats suffered by the American forces were political in origin: —the inability of South Korea to maintain the loyalty of its own population and the non-existent morale of the Rhee army. With the outbreak of hostilities not only were many peasants prepared to welcome the invading Stalinist armies, but a substantial section of the elected assembly demonstratively joined the Northern regime. And neither the bolting deputies nor the peasants can be adequately characterized as Stalinist dupes. They were faced with the choice of supporting a regime which they justifiably hated from personal experience or throwing their lot in with a vicious totalitarian system, which dishonestly posed as a democratic and liberating force.

In South Korean disillusionment with the American-backed Rhee regime is summed up the chief failure of American capitalism — its inability to win popular support for itself or to effectively counter the active Stalinist propaganda machine in Asia. It is an unavoidable and fatal weakness.

America's Aims in Asia

We have been informed by Dean Acheson and H. V. Kaltenborn that America's guiding principle in Korea is to defend the integrity of a small nation and to secure its people in peace and freedom. But the actual conduct of the Korean campaign belies such pretensions. America's stated aims have undergone peculiar transformations with changing military fortunes. When the G.I.s were retreating in the summer of 1950, the goal in Korea was limited to the restoration of the 38th parallel. With the buildup of U.N. forces and the Inchon landing, however, the public press echoed Washington, informing the nation that the 38th parallel had no real significance, that its maintenance prevented the achievement of national unification, so ardently desired by all Koreans—and that it was also difficult to defend.

Proclaiming these lofty aims the reinforced allied troops crossed the 38th parallel despite the open and covert op-

position of many of the U.N. nations. To overcome suspicions, Washington then added the aim of land reform to its "social program." Rhee declared that the first task of his government in recaptured territory and North Korea would be to democratize agriculture by giving it back to the landlords! Since this measure met with some resistance, his troops found it necessary to carry out wholesale executions of "communist peasants."

The North Korean army, badly battered, was replaced by well armed, well trained Chinese "volunteer" armies. The fortunes of war were reversed and the American-led forces, some of whom had already reached the Manchurian border were flung back across the 38th parallel. The retreat was halted deep in South Korea and once again the military pendulum began to swing in America's favor. The military aim of the "democratic forces" became to "kill gooks." Unfortunately, it was never adequately clarified who was to be considered a "gook." Many overzealous field commanders, took it to mean all non-white, non-Protestant Koreans located North of U.N. lines. Thus originated the infamous "Operation Killer" that inflicted tremendous casualties on civilians. The Air Force's boast that not a single building in North Korea stands today in the same condition as before the war, can hardly be considered compatible with the declared aim of protecting the existence of a small nation.

The killing of civilians and the wanton destruction of Korean towns has inevitable political and psychological effects. In the first place, it is not calculated to win the enduring love of the Korean people—whether they be pro-Rhee, pro-Kim or just innocent bystanders. And it is a fact that America's technical superiority enables her to kill more people and destroy more property than can the Stalinist armies. Among Asia's peoples, America's cold-blooded, casual attitude toward the value of human life only reinforces their belief that American foreign policy for Asia is based on the same attitudes that underlie the lynching of a Southern Negro.

International Repercussions

The Korean war provided the first occasion for serious disagreement within the American bloc. America's original crossing of the old boundary was opposed by England and, even more vigorously, by India. Doubtlessly, different interests motivated them, but in each case, the official attitude of the governments reflected the feelings of the vast majority of people that nothing should be done which might lead to spreading the war. Lightminded proposals by American politicians to use the atom bomb were viewed with such universal horror in England that Attlee made a special trip to Washington to dissuade Truman from using it.

India is a case even more to the point. An economically backward country, only recently having gained independence from colonial domination, India's leaders remain basically suspicious of Western imperialism. That its own capitalist economy places India within the Western bloc does not prevent her leaders from speaking for other colonial lands oppressed by England, France and the Netherlands.

In Europe, the Korean war has served to make Wash-

ington's allies suspicious of America's ability to defend Europe *successfully*. A usual estimate is that it would take Russian armies no more than thirty days to reach the Pyrenees and the English Channel. And how would America proceed after such an invasion? That question must be in the mind of every European, whatever his class, whatever his nationality. Any Russian attack on Western Europe would, of course, be answered by American atomic bombing of Russia's industrial centers. So much is understood. Yet it is impossible to believe that such bombings would automatically end the war. With military control over all of Europe, at least of Germany, France, Italy and the Benelux nations, Stalinism would have a new base of social power. Russian armies could be supplied from industries in Alsace and the Ruhr as well as from Leningrad and the Urals. How would America *then* proceed? Would military necessity be invoked as legitimate reason for transferring our bombing missions to Western Europe? Would there ensue a new "Operation Devastation" against Russian occupied France or Sweden, . . . or England? After Hiroshima and Hanjue, few can doubt the answer. These are not pleasant thoughts, nor are they calculated to inspire enthusiasm for Washington's cause. Undoubtedly, it is considerations such as these which are causing even among Europe's ruling circles, the strong currents of "neutralism" which look toward taking Europe out of America's orbit while at the same time remaining independent of Russia.

Neutralism Not the Answer

Yet this would not solve the problem. It does not guarantee Europe against Russian conquest nor preserve for her the privileged position of silent onlooker. It is difficult, moreover, to see how either Russia or America could permit any large group of nations to remain neutral. As the case of India shows, Washington demands either subservience or hostility—neutrality is not recognized as a legitimate status. And Russia could not be expected to forego the military and political opportunities to be realized by a relatively painless conquest of an advanced economy.

Yet neutralism is not a completely utopian ideal. Limited to bourgeois aims, seeking only a way to preserve European capitalism through appeasing Russia, it expresses the wish-fulfilling fantasies of a ruling class intent on preserving a dying social order. It contains, however, the decisive element of a solution which, despite the lateness of the hour, could serve to open up a new international perspective—a realistic perspective through which a new world war could be avoided and the way opened for the solution of all social and political problems on a progressive basis.

The Way to Defeat Stalinism

The beginning of such a solution lies in the formation of movements which can challenge Stalinism's ideological hegemony over Europe's working classes and large numbers of Asia's nationalist organizations. Such movements, experience has shown, can only be built by struggling independently against both Stalinism and dollar diplomacy. That this policy has empirical validity can be demonstrated by the fact that in those countries which today have labor and democratic movements which are revolutionary

and anti-capitalist, Stalinism is isolated and politically weak. India and Ceylon have flourishing socialist parties which have been able to defeat Stalinism precisely because they are anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist organizations. Where no such movement exists, as in China and Indo-China, the anti-imperialist sentiments of the people are channelized along Stalinist lines.

The extension of such movements to other countries, and the creation of sympathy for their aims here, in America, this is part of the task which could bring into existence a Third Camp of the colonial peoples and working classes of all countries. The organized Third Camp would have the ability to defeat native Stalinist movements, as well as being able to appeal successfully to democratic forces within the Iron Curtain countries, something that capitalist America is unable to do for obvious reasons. Were such a Third Camp in existence today, it could demand that the colonial countries of Asia have a decisive voice in a Korean settlement.

We have seen how, as a result of America's participation in the Korean war its position vis-a-vis Stalinism has been weakened. Not only has Washington continued to alienate friendly peoples and governments, but by virtue of its policies has facilitated the consolidation of Stalinist forces. Some might conclude that the political and moral reverses the U.S. has suffered might deter it from going further in the direction of World War III. Actually, the opposite is the case. The Korean experience has tremendously speeded up the tempo of developments, both at home and on the international scene.

Korea: An Excuse for Repression

The Administration may have originally calculated that by intervening in Korea it would create sufficient unity at home so as to be able to enforce mobilization measures without opposition. In this it was at least partially mistaken. Not only is the Korean war unpopular, but confusion as to America's aims, disappointment with her allies and disillusionment over a lack of success have all combined to make Truman the scapegoat of wide sections of the population. Last November's elections were only

one revealing sign. Another was the temporary "revolt" of the trade unions against a mobilization program deliberately slanted in favor of big business. These signs of discontent disclose the resistance, even if only latent, which the war drive meets among the people. Another is the spontaneous opposition to the 18 year old draft measure. Finally, the tremendous popular demonstrations on the occasion of Proconsul MacArthur's dismissal proved not to be based on a sentiment to follow his aggressive policy, but more on the desire for some action which promised to bring an end to the war.

Yet if Korea was not the Pearl Harbor of World War III, neither was it a total failure in the eyes of the war-makers. The re-armament program, already underway, was increased fourfold. The draft was restored, and for the first time in American peace time history Universal Military Training has been instituted. The anti-red hysteria, having previously reached the height of its fury, was extended to ludicrous and sometimes comic proportions. And, on the international scene, the Korean "incident" facilitated the establishment of a consolidated European military force, under the direction of an American commander. The reactionary implications of the Atlantic Pact were quickly developed, with arms and economic aid being extended to fascist Spain.

The Anti-War Struggle Remains

Thus, Korea has set the stage for World War III. In June, 1950 America was not ready for war. Today, it is well on the road to being prepared. America can not sustain too many more Koreas, with their tremendous cost. Nor can she afford to go on re-arming indefinitely. The forces calling for a total war are becoming stronger and more insistent, and they have recently been joined by such outstanding "liberals" as Henry Wallace who now believes that the next instance of Stalinist aggression should be met with an atomic attack on Moscow. These are weighty words, and the danger is that they may be acted upon. But while the chances of peace grow dimmer, the need does not grow less. The struggle against war remains, and to it we must continue to devote our efforts.

Truman vs. Civil Liberties

THE NATIONAL Student Association, at its convention this Summer in Minneapolis, passed a resolution denouncing something called "McCarthyism." Some of the more "militant" delegates wanted to go further than that, and specifically denounce McCarthy the individual for his techniques of slander, villification and innuendo. But the stolid convention voted by overwhelming majority in favor of a final resolution which laid the blame for the fear which pervades today's campus on the disease of "McCarthyism."

This denunciation of McCarthyism has almost reached the proportions of a popular pastime. President Truman initiated the fad when he cited the results of a poll conducted by the *Madison Capitol Times*, which has since be-

come known as "the poll of fear." A couple newspaper reporters succeeded in persuading only a handful of people to sign a petition containing excerpts from the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights. Despite the efforts of newspaper columnists to prove otherwise, Mr. Truman and his followers are perfectly correct when they say that such a result is a symptom of the stifling atmosphere in which civil rights are succumbing to repressive measures, distrust, and fear.

What the NSA refuses to do, beyond passing a resolution "deploring" the current situation, is to trace the causes of this fear to their real roots. Certainly the blame cannot be placed exclusively at the doorstep of a wild-eyed Senator whose attacks on "Communists" in the administration

touch only a handful of government officials. The people who refused to sign the petitions were far more afraid of . . . a government loyalty board, the Immigration Department, and the FBI. Whose FBI? Whose Loyalty Boards? Whose Immigration Service? Truman's, not McCarthy's.

It is Truman, as head of the Democratic Party administration, who executes in deed what McCarthy only rants about. This is not in any way to equate the two men. Aside from personal factors, McCarthy's reactionary, pro-Catholic, anti-labor views—openly espoused and defended—place him in a unique category. Yet it is still Truman who has done more harm to our civil liberties through the efforts of his agencies and bureaus. And certainly no one can claim that it is not Truman's wish to have the FBI arrest Stalinists, and the Justice Department prosecute them. Truman is not powerless over efforts of the Immigration Department to deport "subversive aliens." It is by his administrative order that Loyalty Boards, nominated by him personally, make life a constant hazard for government employees and set a pattern for state government and private employers to follow.

On this score we must declare that Truman has gone McCarthy one better. The operation of the subversive list and loyalty procedure have a Kafka-like quality. Once a person is accused of being disloyal, he is never permitted to confront his accuser who remains anonymous. An organization on the subversive list is allowed to prepare a defense of its point of view *without* being informed of the evidence against it. Once on the subversive list, there is no legal way of getting off, for the list has the status of an executive order. In a court decision reversing the conviction of William Remington, the judge ruled that the subversive list could not be introduced as evidence, yet the government can use the list against its employees and it has wide unofficial use by employers in defense industries.

Perhaps the most dangerous aspect of these repressive actions is that the Truman administration wants to set up punitive procedures outside the arena of legal recourse. The

objections that Truman raised to the infamous McCarran Act ended any doubt about his concern for democratic procedure. In fact, compared to Truman, McCarran is a democrat for he wishes to provide for the right to a public hearing and a review procedure.

Truman, in his veto message, objected to this because it would tie the government up in legal red tape. Instead he counterposed a system that can not be reached by law, the system of legislation by executive decree. In regard to the specific undemocratic sections of the law that McCarran wanted to legislate, Truman argued that the government was already carrying them out or that too much legal procedure was required.

It is important to clearly distinguish the difference between the police-state features of legislation by executive decree and anti-democratic legislation. We can not be blinded by the consideration that McCarthy or McCarran would be worse if they were in power, but must point straight to the danger that exists today—that of the Truman administration carrying out acts that are qualitatively of a police state character.

It is in the name of democracy that these anti-democratic acts are being carried out. At a time when the United States points to the reactionary character of Stalinism, at home the Trumans and the McCarthys embark upon a series of undemocratic and repressive actions.

The government now is effectively outlawing the Communist Party by jailing its leadership under the Smith Act. We do not protest the conviction of CP leaders out of any conception that the CP is a democratic or progressive force. We recognize Stalinism for the brutal totalitarianism it is. Our opposition to the use of the Smith Act and the wave of hysteria and anti-democratic actions is motivated by our concern for democracy. Democracy in the hands of the people is their greatest weapon for the achievement of democratic and progressive social goals. We do not want to see it destroyed by a form of reaction at home in the name of fighting another reactionary force abroad.

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Roosevelt as a Man of Ideas

Portrait of the Failure of Personal Politics

AMONG TWENTIETH century political figures, the name of Franklin D. Roosevelt stands out from those of his American contemporaries and presidential predecessors. Roosevelt's personality, enhanced by his infirmity, and climaxed by his death in office, regained for the White House a respect lost through a succession of drab occupants during the Republican era of Harding, Coolidge and Hoover. Woodrow Wilson, his only rival in the preceding period, is remembered more for his alleged failure in international politics than for his personal talents or achievements.

The vitriol of Roosevelt's reactionary opponents fades into uninspired malice when compared with the impressive reverence he evoked among his followers. Innumerable laudatory biographies and *mémoires* by aides and secretaries attest to his personal magnetism. He inspired able men to accept low paying government positions and secured support from business men and labor leaders, liberals and reactionaries, poll tax Democrats and advocates of Negro rights. His talent lay in his ability to mediate conflicts between such disparate elements in the same way that he settled "family disputes" within the administrative bureaucracy — by relying on his personal charm and his capacity to convince all sides that they could trust him. This ability to manipulate people in the pursuit of political objectives expanded into greatness by comparison with all other presidents of this century. It was first manifested during his apprenticeship in the Wilson administration. One of his extra-curricular tasks as Assistant Secretary of the Navy was to mollify grievances of state committeemen. Unlike Wilson he was affable and convivial with these gentlemen, "as easy and natural as with old friends and neighbors."

His success in getting people to see things his way was primarily due to the ostensibly open-handed, and generous manner he had of treating them, a manner which simulated democratic acceptance of everyone. John L. Lewis once testified that "Sidney [Hillman] often told me that I could never understand what it means to a person who was an immigrant not only to be welcome in the White House, but to have the President call him by his first name."¹

Confidence Inspired by Roosevelt

The impact of FDR's personality was not limited to his intimate associates. Roosevelt inaugurated radio as an effective mass political medium; for millions he became a charismatic figure unequalled since Lincoln. In the depths of the depression he brought hope, and in war he inspired faith. And if the people received neither the economic prosperity he promised, nor the peace of which he assured them, it can at least be said that he provided the psy-

chological security of his leadership. Upon his death a soldier wept outside of the White House: "I felt as if I knew him. I felt as if he knew me and liked me."

The strength of the Roosevelt legend can only be understood by referring to the era in which he served. He was a crisis president, his years in office characterized by the insecurity of depression and anxiety of war. It was a period when millions throughout the world were disposed to seek in leaders the faith and solace they lacked in their own lives. And Roosevelt's personality was eminently suited for the role he was called upon to play. His advocacy and promotion of relief and public works in the early thirties made him appear as the dispenser of the basic pre-requisites of life. This initial parental image was accentuated by his carefully emphasized role as a family man, the cozy quality of his fireside chats, his firmness and unruffled buoyancy at critical moments. He appeared as a country squire; rich without vulgarity; a man of genteel hobbies, sympathetic, fair and benevolent with his children; a paragon among fathers.

The political portrait of Roosevelt cherished by his liberal supporters corresponds to the above picture: a man who championed the rights of labor against capital, a friend of oppressed minorities, a world leader in the struggle of democracy against fascism. Unfortunately, there are jarring lines in this portrait. FDR's espousal of labor conscription during the war, his tolerance of a Jim Crow army, the growing tendency in the last years of his administration to gather around him open representatives of Big Business, and his application of the Neutrality Act against Loyalist Spain reveal that he frequently pursued one policy while assuring people of exactly opposite intentions.

The Social Context of New Deal

The frustration of many liberals grew out of such "inconsistencies." They often felt dismayed at the administration, but believed that if it were only possible to explain the situation to FDR, personally, he could be relied upon to steer the administration back to the true liberal path. The deficiency in this liberal analysis of Roosevelt is its failure to understand the New Deal as a social phenomenon. It is only from this viewpoint that the coincidence of Roosevelt's reversals in his reform policies with America's emergence from the depression can be interpreted.

The rise of the Roosevelt era was no accidental episode in American history. The methods and the social reforms which Roosevelt espoused were designed to resolve the immediate problems which threatened American capitalism with total collapse. The years following 1929 were a period of widespread unemployment, mass demonstrations and growing class consciousness. America might have followed the road of Italy and Germany. On the other hand, had

¹ John L. Lewis — *An Unauthorized Biography* by Saul Alinsky, p. 184.

growing social discontent impelled the rise of mass radical organization, it would have presented a decisive threat to American capitalism. Roosevelt, however, helped avert both potential developments. The economic revival which resulted in large part from his New Deal program never reached the level of 1929, but did succeed in blunting the sharp edge of the crisis, thereby warding off the threat of upheaval.

By initiating long-awaited reforms, stimulating the growth of trade union organization, curbing financial speculation and supporting measures which benefitted millions of farmers, workers and unemployed, Roosevelt gained wide support from the underprivileged sections of the population. At the same time, through his revival of profits, promotion of light industry, and orientation toward foreign markets and rearmament, he also won adherents among powerful, though relatively inarticulate sections of the capitalist class. Thus, through a bold social, economic and political program, the New Deal was able to rise above and mediate conflicting interests which were driving toward social chaos, thereby preserving and stabilizing the existing social structure.

A perusal of the political literature of the period indicates that Roosevelt's reforms were neither a unique contribution nor proof of idealism and superior intellect; all were being advocated by many contemporaries as steps to restore prosperity to a declining economy. The stimulation of business with the restoration of profits, the promotion of monopoly concentration, and governmental underwriting of the banking and insurance empires were all measures to help big business out of its slump. That he was not unaware of their effects is shown by his later disappointment at being so viciously attacked by those who benefitted most from his ministrations. It was his cognizance of the interests of capitalism as a whole system of inter-related interests which brought Roosevelt into conflict with groups of businessmen whose perspective was limited by their separate profit and loss statements. The growth of the labor movement aided by the Wagner act, was an anathema for big business but it facilitated the development of labor into controllable and relatively stable channels.

With the advent of "war prosperity," reforms were no longer a necessity for insuring social equilibrium. Roosevelt gradually abandoned reforms for rearmament, with its increased benefits for industry and management. It was then that FDR's real class loyalties became apparent. Labor's influence in the administration declined sharply with the steady influx of businessmen to posts in Washington. Similarly, labor's share in the prosperity of the war boom appeared in sharp contrast to the unprecedented profits of the government blessed cost-plus contracts. The labor movement, bound to a no-strike pledge, could do little more than protest the administration's attitude.

Yet even then, Roosevelt was able to keep the loyalty of the labor leadership. By exerting the power of his personal influence, by appealing to patriotism, and by promulgating the misleading idea of an "equality of sacrifice" program, he was able to ward off all serious opposition. He was a master at playing one group off against another, and on one occasion, did not hesitate to threaten even

Philip Murray. In response to Murray's complaints, he waved a telegram from a prominent "left-wing" (Stalinist) spokesman promising the President complete support in whatever he did.

Through this manipulative technique Roosevelt scored many triumphs, probably securing for himself a lasting place as a popular figure. Yet, when he attempted to transfer directly to the field of international politics these same personal techniques which had served him so well domestically, he suffered a tragic defeat.

The problems which Roosevelt faced when he took office were, it is true, difficult and severe. On the other hand, the available resources for coping with them were also large. America's vast physical resources, accumulated wealth and great productive plants allowed for internal developments like TVA. The myth of an open-class system, made most Americans shun the socialist movement and seek solutions through the traditional two-party system. These physical and social factors allowed Roosevelt great latitude for experimentation and pragmatic manipulations of the economic system. And for the problems involved, this was sufficient, at least temporarily.

FDR as Statesman and Intellectual

But politics on the international scene requires a far higher order of intelligence, based on wide historical knowledge and the capacity to understand the dynamic forces in world politics.

Roosevelt cannot be considered to have fulfilled these requirements for world statesmanship. He was neither an intellectual nor interested in ideas. His major contributions to American culture are limited to an incompleting American history. Otherwise, the Roosevelt literary heritages is comprised mainly of notes, speeches and letters. Though he was a consummate master at utilizing the ideas of others, he himself never displayed a grasp of abstract notions. The depth of his understanding of broad historical phenomena can be gleaned from his statement that feudalism and fascism are essentially the same. John Maynard Keynes, on his trip to visit the President, remarked that he had "supposed the President was more literate, economically speaking." Roosevelt, in describing the visit later said to Perkins, "I saw your friend Keynes. He left a whole rigamarole of figures. He must be a mathematician rather than a political economist."²

Like others, his was the mind of the school in which he was trained—the school of practical politics and maneuvering. In this he was supreme, but the legislative antechambers of New York State, and the smoke-filled rooms of Tammany cannot be claimed as the ideal academy for world statesmanship. Certainly, the ideological struggles which racked the labor movement of Europe, and found their repercussions in American intellectual circles, never aroused enough interest in Roosevelt to cause him to give serious thought to the nature of capitalism. The only radical book he ever read, according to Perkins, was the socialist handbook of 1912, which he came across by accident. He expressed surprise at the similarity of the socialists' im-

² The Roosevelt I Knew by Frances Perkins, pp. 225-226.

mediate demands with that of "our own Bull Moose Party." Neither was he one of those who concerned himself with the cause of Sacco and Vanzetti — nor did he protest Wilson's refusal to pardon the ailing Debs in Atlanta prison. His interests were entirely in accord with the practical, pedestrian pursuits of the American country squire and gentleman: collecting stamps, first editions and Christmas cards; sailing boats; and reading detective stories. His personal leanings fitted neatly into his ideologically barren surroundings. A reporter once asked Roosevelt what his philosophy was. "Philosophy," asked the President, puzzled, "Philosophy? I am a Christian and a Democrat — that's all."

Prior to his assumption of the presidency he had for but a brief period concerned himself with foreign policy. As Assistant Secretary of the Navy he spoke like a typical Yankee patriot. When American investments in Mexico were threatened he said: "If it means war, we are ready." He directed the Marine intervention in Haiti in 1915, and while campaigning in 1920 he referred to this in a speech at Butte, Montana. "You know, I have had something to do with the running of a couple little republics. The facts are that I wrote Haiti's constitution myself, and if I do say so, I think its a pretty good constitution." It is typical of the man that when criticized for this publicly-recorded statement, he denied its accuracy.

Roosevelt was one of those who as early as 1915 pressed for America's entry into the war. One of his first projects as President was to pamper his life-long passion for a big navy, which fitted his traditional enthusiasm for protecting American investments abroad.

These precedents foretold his advocacy of post-war military training, and indicate his predilection for militarism.

Roosevelt's Background in Foreign Affairs

Roosevelt's record on foreign policy is marked by a whole series of opportunistic and contradictory actions. In 1920 he crusaded for the League of Nations, arguing that with American membership and support the League could have stopped the Bolshevik armies. His internationalism was explosive but short-lived. After his defeat for the vice-presidency in 1920 and the rejection of the League by the American voting public, he dropped easily into the isolationist tenor of the times. His fervor for the League (to whose support he had pledged himself in the presence of the dying Wilson) cooled to open opposition.³ His isolationism was climaxed when as President he signed the Neutrality Act.

Roosevelt's supporters frequently apologize for his foreign policy record on the basis of "the need to compromise in politics." He was, they argue, compelled by "practical considerations" to withhold aid from the anti-fascist forces in Spain. But such arguments are self-defeating. They fail to explain the contradiction between the idolatrous portrait of Roosevelt as a humanitarian and his *repeated* sacrifice of principles. What his supporters do not mention is that

wherever these compromises were made, Roosevelt never presented them as such, never apologized for yielding principle to expediency, and never intimated at the time that he was doing anything in the least distasteful to him. In other words, he never properly used the occasion to educate people to the point where compromises would not be necessary. In the case of Spain, for example, he willingly invoked the Neutrality Act the consequences of which were to cut off shipments of military equipment to the Loyalist armies, while their opponents were supplied regularly from the arsenals of Italy and Hitler Germany. Fearing the enmity of the Catholic Church, and the loss of Catholic votes, Roosevelt readily acceded to the importunities of reaction. For this act, FDR bears personal responsibility, since the Neutrality Act left it up to the President to determine whether or not a state of war existed. Anyone viewing the cold record might assume that Roosevelt *preferred* the victory of Franco as a "lesser evil" to a further disturbance of world equilibrium that would follow a victory of the anti-fascist armies in Spain. Certainly his later willingness to deal with Russian totalitarianism does not contradict this interpretation.

In distinct contrast to his swift action against Spain stands his failure to invoke the provisions of the Neutrality against Japan's aggressive war on China, or to act against Mussolini's attack on Abyssinia. The fact that American businessmen found a lucrative market in Japan was evidently a more decisive factor than democratic principles for Roosevelt.

Ambition Without Ability in World Politics

FDR was determined that before his death, his reputation as a great humanitarian should be consummated through his efforts as world peace-maker. The chief problem as he saw it lay in establishing the basis for a permanent peace by winning Russia to peacetime cooperation. He believed that Russia sought only to guarantee her safety against future aggression and the opportunity to peacefully develop her internal resources. If he could only convince Stalin of American sincerity, using all the charm and affability which had served him so well in his domestic political career, the groundwork for world peace would be laid. It was at this point that his intellectual limitations, coupled with his complete reliance on his powers of personal persuasion, terminated in a diplomatic debacle.

That he could even contemplate such a perspective shows that Roosevelt had never given much attention to studying the phenomena of Stalinism, and as a consequence understood neither its internal workings nor international aims. The history of the Third International, the defeat of the Left Opposition in Russia, the Stalin-Hitler pact were lessons without meaning for him. All he could do was to apply his own limited experience in an attempt to interpret events of world importance. On the occasion of the Moscow trials he revealed his limitation of vision to that of the typical machine politician when he remarked to Perkins, "I just can't make it out. Why would they want to get rid of people in their own party?"⁴

³ Public Papers of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Forty Eighth Governor of the State of New York, Second Term 1932, p. 551.

⁴ The Roosevelt I Knew by Frances Perkins, p. 156.

It is obvious that he accepted, at least in part, the myth that the Russian regime was genuinely concerned with the democratic rights of small nations. He believed that the lack of democracy manifested by Western powers towards colonial peoples was one of the barriers between the Kremlin and the West. Accordingly, he took great pains to impress upon Stalin his belief in self-government. "He pointed with pride to the American record in helping the peoples of the Philippines to prepare themselves for independence."⁵ And in discussing the subject of Philippine independence he exclaimed to his son Elliott, "think what that will mean to Stalin!"⁶

During the war Roosevelt rejected the advice of men like William Bullitt whose reactionary viewpoint was accompanied by a clearer picture of Stalinism. "Bill," the President said, "I don't dispute your facts. They are accurate. I don't dispute the logic of your reasoning. I just have a hunch that Stalin is not that kind of a man. Harry [Hopkins] says he's not and that he doesn't want anything but security for his country. And I think that if I give him everything I possibly can and ask for nothing from him in return, noblesse oblige, he won't try to annex anything and will work with me for a world of democracy and peace."⁷

Harry Hopkins, the affable ex-social worker, was easily able to convince Roosevelt that he could win over Stalin. Roosevelt's closest adviser during the war, Hopkins, personified those liberals who then and now seek world peace through collaboration with Stalinist totalitarianism. He convinced FDR that many difficulties were caused simply by Stalin's "misunderstanding" of America's motives and aims, and that all it was necessary to do was to disabuse Stalin of his misconceptions about capitalist imperialism.* At the Teheran conference, Roosevelt took it upon himself in a private talk with Stalin and Molotov to put them "in possession of certain essential facts concerning American politics." When Roosevelt explained that there were "six or seven million Americans of Polish extraction and others of Lithuanian and Estonian origin who had the same rights and the same votes as anyone else, and whose opinions must be respected," Stalin replied that "he understood this, but he subsequently suggested that some 'propaganda work' should be done among these people."

⁵ Roosevelt and Hopkins, *An Intimate History* by Robert Sherwood, p. 777.

⁶ *As He Saw It* by Elliott Roosevelt, p. 224.

⁷ *America's Second Crusade* by William Henry Chamberlin, p. 186.

* The misinformation received by Stalin would have had to be very extensive to parallel the amount Roosevelt received from some of his emissaries, notable among whom was Joseph E. Davies. Davies, who achieved acclaim by the Stalinist world for his account of the Moscow trials in "Mission to Moscow," supplied Harry Hopkins with a memorandum on Russia shortly after the German invasion. He listed as one of the two contingencies which might prevent Russian resistance, "an internal revolution which would overthrow Stalin and by a coup d'etat put a Trotskyite Pro-German in power, who would make a Hitler Peace." (Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 307).

How Roosevelt Handled Stalin

It was with the idea of demonstrating America's good will that Roosevelt approached the conferences at Teheran in 1943 and Yalta a year later. The decisions reached were of far-reaching importance, paving the way for significant post-war developments. Roosevelt and Churchill acceded to Stalin's demands that Eastern Poland and the Baltic States be incorporated into the Russian empire.**

In order to insure Russian entry into the war against Japan (an affair which lasted six days) it was agreed that Stalin should be given the southern part of Sakhalin, the Kurile Islands, a lease on Port Arthur, recognition of a pre-eminent interest in Darien, and joint operation of the Chinese-Eastern and South Manchurian railroads. Stalin "justified" the demands on the basis that these territories had been wrested from Tsarist Russia in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904. None of the parties to this agreement considered it necessary to consult with the victims of these transfers.***

While Stalin's ambitions for empire were being readily fulfilled, Roosevelt concentrated on making friends with Stalin and winning his good graces. He believed himself easily capable of thawing out the Russian dictator, "Stalin," he exclaimed, "I can handle that old buzzard."⁸ He found it "a pleasure working with him. There's nothing devious."⁹

Roosevelt's account of his foreign diplomacy as told to Miss Perkins reveals a startling combination of naivete, ignorance and shallow provinciality:

"You know, the Russians are interesting people. For the first three days I made absolutely no progress. I couldn't get any personal connection with Stalin, although I had done everything he asked me to do. I had stayed at his Embassy, gone to his dinners, been introduced to his ministers and generals. He was correct, stiff, solemn, not smiling, nothing human to get hold of. . . . I had come there to accommodate Stalin. I felt pretty discouraged because I thought I was making no personal headway. What we were doing could have been done by the foreign ministers. I thought it over all night and made up my mind I had to do something desperate. I couldn't stay in Teheran forever. I had to cut through this icy surface so that later I could talk by telephone or letter in a personal way. I had scarcely seen Churchill alone during the conference. I had a feeling that the Russians did not feel right about seeing us conferring together in a language which we understood and they didn't.

On my way to the conference room that morning we caught up with Winston and I had just a moment to say to him,

** A candid note was injected into the conferences when at a dinner with Stalin, a Russian eulogized Roosevelt as "one who through his courage and foresighted action in 1933 had indeed prevented a revolution in the United States," to which Churchill responded in a different round, and with less candor than malevolence, by toasting the proletarian masses of the world.

*** The British treated the matter of the Baltic countries with singular aplomb. Using the paper shortage as an excuse they dropped the names of the exiled representatives of the former governments from the diplomatic register in London.

⁸ *Roosevelt in Retrospect, A Profile in History* by John Gunther, p. 356.

⁹ *As He Saw It* by Elliott Roosevelt, p. 183.

'Winston, I hope you won't be sore at me for what I am going to do.'

Winston just shifted his cigar and grunted. I must say he behaved very decently afterward.

I began almost as soon as we got into the conference room. I talked privately with Stalin. I didn't say anything that I hadn't said before, but it appeared quite chummy and confidential, enough so that the other Russians joined us to listen. Still no smile.

Then I said, lifting my hand to cover a whisper (which of course had to be interpreted) 'Winston is cranky this morning, he got up on the wrong side of the bed.'

A vague smile passed over Stalin's eyes, and I decided I was on the right track. As soon as I sat down at the conference table, I began to tease Churchill about his Britishness, about John Bull, about his cigars, about his habits. It began to register with Stalin. Winston got red and scowled, and the more he did so, the more Stalin smiled. Finally Stalin broke out into a deep hearty guffaw, and for the first time in three days I saw light. I kept it up until Stalin was laughing with me and it was then that I called him 'Uncle Joe.' He would have thought me fresh the day before, but that day he laughed and came over and shook my hand.

From that time on our relations were personal, and Stalin himself indulged in an occasional witticism. The ice was broken and we talked like men and brothers.¹⁰

Stalin as a Man of Elegance, Good Humor. . .

If we can say, at least with the benefit of hindsight, that Roosevelt was not successful with Stalin, it is nonetheless true that Stalin made an indelible impression on Roosevelt:

He is a very interesting man. They say he is a peasant from one of the least progressive parts of Russia but let me tell you he had an elegance of manner that none of the rest of us had.¹¹

He found the Russian dictator to be

"a man who combines a tremendous, relentless determination with a stalwart good humor. I believe he is truly representative of the heart and soul of Russia."¹²

Slave labor camps and party purges were not on FDR's mind when he thought of Stalin's life. He remarked about Stalin's early career in a theological seminary:

Don't you suppose that made some kind of a difference in Stalin? Doesn't that explain part of the sympathetic quality in his nature which we all feel?¹³

Sometimes Roosevelt's optimism was punctured by doubts as on the occasion when he remarked to Perkins:

I wish I understood the Russians better. Frances, you know the Russians, don't you? . . . I wish someone would tell me about the Russians. I don't know a good Russian from a bad Russian. I can tell a good Frenchman from a bad Frenchman. I can tell a good Italian from a bad Italian. I know a good Greek when I see one. But I don't understand the Russians. I just don't know what makes them tick. I wish I could study them. Frances, see if you can find out what makes them tick.¹⁴

¹⁰ *The Roosevelt I Knew* by Frances Perkins, pp. 83-85.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 85.

¹² *Roosevelt and Hopkins, An Intimate History* by Robert Sherwood, p. 804.

¹³ *The Roosevelt I Knew* by Frances Perkins, p. 142.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 85-86.

These digressions were infrequent, however. Roosevelt was confident that Stalin was "getatable," and that Russian foreign policy could be changed by charming the Russian dictator. Sophomoric as this idea seems, Roosevelt actually thought that his scheme had worked. Only a few doubts remained — *and they were not about Stalin*:

We were absolutely certain we had won the first great victory of the peace. . . . The Russians had proved that they could be reasonable and farseeing and there wasn't any doubt in the minds of the President or any of us that we could live with them and get along with them peacefully for as far into the future as any of us could imagine. But I have to make one amendment to that — I think we all had in our minds the reservation that we could not foretell what the results would be if anything happened to Stalin. We felt sure that we could count on him to be reasonable and understanding — but we never could be sure who or what might be back of him there in the Kremlin.¹⁵

Even after Russia's post-war course was being defined by her maneuvers with the Polish government in exile, Roosevelt still could not believe that he had been deceived. Till the end he remained confident that he had succeeded in winning Stalin's good will. When incontrovertable evidence proved Stalin's defection from the Yalta agreement, he could only exclaim to a close acquaintance, "All this proved one of two things. Either Stalin has been deceiving me all along, or he has not got the power I thought he had."¹⁶

Roosevelt's Role at Yalta

To assess Roosevelt's role at Yalta as a professed democrat and humanitarian it is necessary to at least cursorily discuss the significance of the agreement. So far, we have presented Roosevelt mainly on a personal-political level, in order to substantiate the thesis that FDR was neither a great thinker nor perspicacious world politician. But the political significance of Yalta provides us with additional insight into the historical role of Roosevelt, as well as with an understanding of the character of World War II.

Those who created the war slogans and sold the war ideologically, insistently pointed to the declarations of the Roosevelt-Churchill Atlantic Conference in August 1941. The doctrine which came out of this early conference was vague but, nonetheless, democratic. It was to guide Roosevelt and Churchill as leaders of their respective nations in the prosecution of the war. It was agreed at this conference that the allies would seek no territorial gains; no territorial changes were to be tolerated which did not meet with the expressed desires of the peoples involved; self-government and self-determination were sacred rights; freedom from want and fear was to be secured; disarmament was to be encouraged as a step toward world peace.

But the Atlantic conference remained nothing more than just that — a conference. The fine words of the press releases and the subsequent highly flavored verbal phrases justifying the militant crusade for democracy, were

¹⁵ *Roosevelt and Hopkins, An Intimate History* by Robert Sherwood, p. 870.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

obliterated at Yalta. *In fact, every democratic principle enunciated in the Atlantic Charter was buried in the power politics at Yalta.*

In abandoning the Atlantic Charter at the conference table, Roosevelt approved the redivision of Europe without consulting the peoples involved. Whole sections of the European continent were placed under Russian control. The thought that perhaps it was only fair to consult the new victims of Stalinist despotism apparently never disturbed Roosevelt. The European war had been set off by England's solemn vow to protect the independence of Poland which had been invaded by the Nazi armies. But at Yalta, the Polish people "saved" from one dictator were cavalierly "granted," to Russian totalitarian supervision, with Roosevelt's approval.

At Yalta, Roosevelt gave his approval to the barbarous principle of "reparations in kind." This meant the transfer of German industries and consumer goods to victor nations. The hardships pursuant to this policy were felt not so much by the Nazi leaders as by the German people who were deprived of their means of livelihood. The Russians included human beings as part of the "reparations in kind" to be imported from Germany. Roosevelt could hardly have honestly disapproved of this export of people, since he advocated the use of forced labor as part of German reparations payment in the earlier Morgenthau Plan.*

The Yalta agreement revealed the real imperialist objectives of the allied nations and its consequences have confirmed most of the dire predictions of the socialists and pacifists who opposed the war. Yalta facilitated the replacement of Nazi terror by an even larger totalitarian empire of the East. Its redivision of Europe led to the imprisonment and execution by the Stalinists of thousands of anti-Stalinists and anti-fascists who suddenly found themselves within the Russian empire.

If we look upon the last war as a democratic crusade these consequences become incomprehensible. The fact that dictatorship in the world today is stronger than before the war can only be adequately explained if it is understood that "democracy," "freedom," etc. were not motivating concepts in the war.

If democracy and freedom had been the principles which had actually guided the allied powers, then despite all criticism, Roosevelt's role as an architect of Victory would have assured him a place in history as a great humanitarian, selflessly and courageously devoted to world peace and freedom.

The Question of Personal Responsibility

Was Roosevelt, however, actually responsible for Yalta and its consequences? This question is raised rhetorically by reactionary critics, who attribute all evil in the world to "That Man's" natural sympathy for Russian Communism. The task of evaluating his role is a fascinating one which has already attracted the energies of a host of commentators. As frequently happens, the commentaries reveal more about their authors than the subject. In the case of

* In discussing the Morgenthau plan, Roosevelt later stated that he had been persuaded by the importunities of "an old and trusted friend."

FDR, this is doubly true because of the powerful influence which the Roosevelt myth still plays in American politics. In attempting either to claim the Roosevelt heritage as their own or to discredit it, political writers are only reacting to the potent effect of the Roosevelt name and legend.

Next to the out-and-out reactionaries, liberal evaluations are the most dogmatic, for liberals have the greatest stake in preserving Roosevelt as a man of great stature. But it is more than tradition which is at stake, for despite major deviations from liberal ideology, Roosevelt's main affiliations are clear. He accomplished major social reforms without drastic revision of the private property system. He appealed to practically all of the middle class prejudices so current in American society. He sought to balance the main forces of capital and labor, and by mediating through their bureaucracies, to secure class peace. His approach was moderate, pragmatic, devoid of theory — all virtues highly espoused by liberals. And in addition he was eminently practical, forceful and talented — his death creating a crisis of leadership which liberalism has yet to overcome. At first glance, it would appear that liberals might have to abandon their defense of FDR's dealings with Stalinism. For it is not difficult to show that Roosevelt's mistaken conception of Stalinism, and the erroneous policies which flowed therefrom, facilitated the expansion of Russian power.

It is true that many liberals, completely occupied with the task of convincing themselves of the necessity of a new world war, frankly admit that Roosevelt erred, and bewail the fact that if only he had been "firm," and kept Stalin behind the Curzon line, all would be well today.

Others like Averill Harriman, defend our policy at Yalta by claiming that under the given circumstances, no other course of action was possible. Pleading concern over "military necessity," and arguing that it was necessary to keep Stalin in the war against Germany, and involve him in the war against Japan, Harriman credits the President with adroit diplomacy and skillful bargaining. The argument of "historical inevitability" has in its favor only the fact that no one is able to prove it false in the absence of absolute evidence to the contrary. Yet retrospectively, it would seem apparent that even from the viewpoint of long-range American interests other alternatives lay open. Russia's entry into the war in the East gave her Manchuria as well as North Korea, and these in turn facilitated the Stalinist victory in China and made possible the Korean war.

All attempts to defend Roosevelt's policy at Yalta appear doomed to failure. For if it is not possible to believe that he intended to assist Russian aggrandizement, still it can be shown that this was the actual consequence of the Yalta decisions.

But the real indictment of Roosevelt does not rest on how much he "granted" to Russia but on something much more fundamental: his amenability to the idea of a Yalta conference, i.e., his willingness to bargain away the rights of people, to shift nations as if they were so much real estate, to conveniently ignore all verbal commitments to democratic principles.

The Dilemma of Liberalism

Roosevelt's idea was that he could, by giving Stalin those concessions he demanded, gain peace for the world. If this is accepted as a valid idea, there is little reason to suppose that Roosevelt carried it out with less than his usual skill. Despite the consequences which we see have followed from this plan, there are some who still advocate "coming to an agreement with Stalin," as a method of securing world peace. Liberals above all are prey to its reasoning since for the most part they are willing to grasp any opportunity to turn aside from what they occasionally see will turn out to be political disaster. This dilemma of liberalism will continue for as long as it fails to look for any solution which goes beyond the bounds of the present international power structure.

Yalta, however, is continual reminder of what follows from such a policy. Agreements arrived at without the peoples, and contrary to their interests and desires, can only rest on force to effectuate their execution. But to rely on force means to disregard all concern with democracy — the prerequisite for secure and lasting peace. Today it is only the stalinists who defend unambiguously the agreements reached at Yalta — precisely because they are not concerned with democracy. For the same reason they call upon the great powers today to "negotiate at top levels" and to "amicably settle their disputes through mutual compromise." But to compromise with Stalin means only to accede further to his demands.

FDR's Failure to Withstand Test of Greatness

We are sure that had Roosevelt lived — and been elected to a fifth term — he would have modified, with his customary aplomb, his views on Russia to fit the new situation. For Roosevelt could learn from his own mistakes

better than most. And, likely as not he would be running the new mobilization program with about as much success, if with more flamboyance, than his colorless successor. The test of greatness, however, lies not so much in the ability to profit from error, as to be able to predict and consequently influence the course of history. What shall we say of Roosevelt who, whatever his talents along certain lines, was unable to perceive when he was being made the chief butt of one of the most tragic jokes in human history. Or of Roosevelt, the only man who ever perceived the sympathetic nature of Stalin — the man who successfully accomplished the near insuperable feat of catching up with and surpassing Hitler as the greatest mass-murderer of modern times. One is appalled at the vanity of Roosevelt's belief that he "could handle" Stalin with his little tricks and petty deceptions, whereas all the time Stalin was preparing to "handle" (and not gently) a few hundred million people who were about to fall his hands as a result of this quiet game.

But we are saved from having to delve into abnormal psychology by the knowledge that Roosevelt's understanding of the problem he faced was hardly less than that of brilliant opponents. Upon publication of the Yalta communiques, he received a flood of congratulatory messages, including an exceptionally exuberant one by the estimable Herbert Hoover. And it must be remembered, that all during this period our minority party was unable to find any significant issue over which to break the bi-partisan foreign policy. For all of the criticisms which have been made of Yalta, few go beyond claiming that "we gave too much for what we got."

Actually, it is not the rate of exchange, but the whole auction that needs attention.

GLADYS INGERSOLL

The Encirclement

Within circle of *sovkhazy* the smoke
falls on factoryhand, on boy
with plow who after "the shortest
working day in the world"
turns to the meal. Gathered
enchantedly about the board
they mind not the guiltless rain
imprisoned in paper thought.
After food talk of forage,
Feuerbach, polar owl.
Over them, fear.

Within circle of New England towns
dusk and steel smoke settling

men turn (hands washed)
to hot food they destroy, to
confluence of kin. — Their words?
— their words are smoke,
bolted and bulletined,
of self-weather flowing to steam
— the shape of fear.

What spell binds these
in toils that can be crashed only by all —
you reaching through space to me
saying *I love* —

HOWARD GRIFFIN

The 20th Century Political Novel

A Discussion of Malraux, Silone, Koestler, Serge

THE CENTRAL EVENT of the past fifty years was the Russian Revolution, and for a while it stirred the hope in millions of people that mankind had at last begun to lift itself from necessity into freedom. That hope, like the heroic phase of the revolution from which it sprang, did not last long, and in the literature of our time there are few direct reflections of its original quality. Apparently, a "law" of history requires that a considerable time elapse before a great event can be appropriated by the creative imagination—and in this case the event had been fatally transfigured before the novelist or poet could reach it. Only in two books, each superb for its kind, is the Russian Revolution seen in its pristine enthusiasm: John Reed's *Ten Days that Shook the World* and Leon Trotsky's *History of the Russian Revolution*. But there is no novel of comparable stature which deals with the same subject-matter.

The Russian Revolution had, of course, a lasting effect on the contemporary novel, as on every other phase of our life, but the effect was indirect and belated. In the mainstream of western literature there have been far more novels about the terrible termination of the revolution than about its original ardor. The contrast between early hope and later disillusion becomes a major theme of the twentieth century novel: Malraux, Silone, Koestler, Serge—all are obsessed by the failure, or betrayal, of the revolution.

Differences in Perspective

Where Dostoevsky looked upon radicalism as a marginal conspiracy, a disease that had infected parts of the intelligentsia and the *lumpen-proletariat*, Malraux and Silone, at least in their important books, recognize it as the occasion for the first independent entry of the masses into history. For Dostoevsky and Conrad the very possibility of revolution meant a catastrophic breakdown of order and an imminent collapse into moral barbarism; for Malraux and Silone the breakdown of society is a long-accomplished fact, and what matters is the heroism and pathos of the effort to achieve socialism. The view of human nature shared by Dostoevsky and Conrad is one of radical pessimism: man must be controlled by an external moral law to keep the chaos within him from breaking loose. The view of human nature suggested by *Man's Fate* is, in some respects, existentialist: man is whatever he makes of himself, either in victory or defeat, and only through willed action can he fulfil the limitless possibilities of his being. For the Malraux who wrote *Man's Fate* it is the appearance of millions of speechless men on the stage of history that is the most remarkable fact about twentieth century political life. From the feeble conspiracies of *The Princess Casamassima* and the desultory chatter of Peter Ivanovitch's circle in *Under Western Eyes* to the desperate revolt of Shanghai workers in *Man's Fate*—that is the distance

which the political novel, as indeed our world itself, has traveled.

Ideology, for the twentieth century political novelist, is a far more pressing and intimate preoccupation than for most of his nineteenth century predecessors. He sees it not as a symptom of intellectual disease but as a burden of history: necessary in times of social crisis, frightening in its rigor, and precisely because it can be put to such powerful uses, a temptation most dangerous to those who employ it. Between the nineteenth and twentieth century political novel there is a remarkable difference in perspective, in the distance established between author and materials: the nineteenth century political novelist peers beneath the surface of society to measure from afar the plebeian threat, while the twentieth century political novelist is himself directly engaged in the struggles he portrays. The result of this shift is at once a gain in political authority and a loss in subtlety and complexity of character analysis. In the novels of Malraux, Silone and Koestler there is far less curiosity about individual behavior than in the novels of, say, Conrad and James—and the difference is due not merely to the superiority in talent of the nineteenth century writers, nor even to the fact that Conrad and James worked within a cultural tradition of great resource while Malraux and Silone venture into unexplored domains of mass consciousness and mass revolt; it is due, rather, to the fact that Conrad and James wrote from positions of isolated comfort while Malraux and Silone are *in* their tragedies, their blood and hope ground into the defeated revolutions over which they mourn.

Malraux As a Communist

It is therefore all the more remarkable that Malraux's *Man's Fate* has for one of its major themes the complications and temptations attendant to an ideology he fervently accepts: communism. *Man's Fate*, which is concerned with the disastrous Chinese Revolution of 1927, is one of the very few novels of our time in which a conscious effort is made to reach the plane of heroic action. Its protagonist, Kyo, is the best kind of pre-Stalinist revolutionary: dedicated, idealistic, humane enough to be concerned about the relation between his individuality and the movement to which he has gladly consigned it. So far as heroic action is possible to our time, Kyo is a hero: he confronts his fate despite a foreknowledge of doom, he believes that in the twentieth century death can take on heroic dimensions only through revolt. His life significantly exists for him only in terms of certain minimal conditions for survival. When asked by the Shanghai chief of police, "You want to live?" Kyo replies, "It depends how."

Despite occasional drops into melodrama, *Man's Fate* is a remarkably authentic account of civil war; it is difficult to think of another novel which so superbly gathers

into itself the fervor and tension, so fully observes the abrasive interlocking of private wills and their momentary communion in struggle, which a revolution can bring forth. *Man's Fate* becomes a paean to revolution, not so much as a political act but as an assertion of the human will, the stirring to consciousness of previously dormant millions. That this consciousness must here be acquired at the price of death seems insignificant in comparison to the possibility of giving "to each of these men whom famine, at this very moment, was killing like a slow plague, the sense of his own dignity." What matters most, Malraux has written, is "to tie one-self to a great action of some kind, not to let go of it, to be haunted and intoxicated by it"—and in this view the revolution becomes a deliberate engagement with death in order to assert the possibility of freedom.

Malraux's infatuation with action is not without its dangers; it tends to exalt the will at the expense of the mind, leading to a dubious sort of adventurism and, in his later novel, *Man's Hope*, to a shabby rationale for the brutalities of Stalinism in Loyalist Spain. But in *Man's Fate*, the one genuinely important novel Malraux has written, there is a delicate, often poignant counterposition of commitment and temptation, morality and politics, the individual and the collective, emotion and ideology. A counterposition, but not a canceling out—for even as he places his hope in socialism, the author of *Man's Fate* sees human life as essentially tragic; Man and Fate are the unbalanced terms in the equation of existence.

"The Highest Possible Plane"

In the novel these terms are brought into clash through a hierarchy of characters. Ch'en, the revolutionary terrorist, cannot content himself with anonymous acts of destruction: he longs for intimate contact with his victims. But he finds that the life of terrorism imposes upon him its own psychic economy: he is separated from other men, including the workers in whose name he acts. When Ch'en commits his deeds, he feels horror at the blood he has let, "but not *only* horror." Death soon seems to him the only release, for he realizes that there is a chasm between himself and all other men; useful as the destructive agent of the revolution, he cannot savor even the dream of the future which sustains his comrades. He hopes only that he will "die on the highest possible plane."

Kyo, the hero of the book, wishes, however, to *live* on the highest possible plane, and for him death can have meaning only if it is an act of dedicated life. Though he consciously chooses to be a martyr, he is not driven by a death-wish; he acts from his sense of responsibility to his cause and his self, and not only to these but to the men whom he has aroused to political consciousness. And precisely because he lives on "the highest possible plane" of consciousness available to him, his inner life is beset by uncertainty and anguish.

On the simplest level Kyo must face an inner clash between his conviction and the traditions in which he was raised. When he learns, on the very day the workers' revolt is to begin, that his wife has been unfaithful, his response is an "enlightened" shrug. But within himself he is deeply

wounded and, though he is irritated at succumbing to what he considers bourgeois standards, he feels himself exposed to "solitude, the inescapable aloneness."

Kyo is also troubled by political doubts: he rejects the "line" of the party leadership. His independent personality is brought into strong contrast with Vologin, the Russian representative in whom one sees the revolutionary movement as it is rapidly becoming Stalinized. When Vologin urges that obedience is "the only logical attitude" for a revolutionist, Kyo's inner reply is voiced by Ch'en: "it's not through obedience that men go out of their way to get killed—not through obedience that they kill . . . Except cowards."

But Kyo suffers at deeper levels than those involving private unhappiness or political disagreement. By nature he is a reflective man: part of him responds to Katov, the completely involved revolutionary, but another part is tied to his father, a man whose knowledge of suffering has driven him to the passivity of opium. Kyo is endowed with the gift of being able to surrender himself to history while observing it, in some part of himself, as if he were outside time. His humanist disposition and hunger for dignity lead him to political struggle, but also to the despairing realization that political struggle is not the true end of man's life and that he will not live to see anything else.

But while Malraux admits the deprivations enforced by the ideological life, he insists that without it man is nothing. Through the character of Katov, who surrenders his pinch of cyanide to another imprisoned comrade though he knows it means being burned alive, Malraux attempts to justify this belief. Here ideology, because it is selfless and pure in motivation, rises to a supreme humanity; Katov in action realizes Kyo's conceptions. It is as if Malraux, in the twilight of the revolution, were saying that at the very least Kyo's Marxism provides modern man with a proper way of dying.

Revolutionary Saints and Peasant Life

If *Man's Fate* is a tribute to the heroism which can be salvaged from a defeated revolution, Silone's *Bread and Wine* is the sort of book that could be written only in a post-heroic mood. Silone had himself been an underground radical leader in fascist Italy during the mid-1920's, and had left the country only when it became clear that to remain would result in his death. *Fontamara*, a first novel which has the aura of a folk tale, is the story of a peasant revolt against the fascist regime; though it ends in defeat, the book still exudes revolutionary hope and élan. Silone's next novel, *Bread and Wine*, is entirely different in tone: defeat is now complete, the period of underground struggle at an end, and all that remains is resignation, despair and obeisance before authority. The novel's protagonist, Pietro Spina, who partly reflects the opinions of his creator, is a revolutionary leader who from exile has returned to the peasant areas of his native Abruzzi in order to reestablish ties with his people and see whether his Marxist theories will hold up in experience. As he wanders about the countryside, the sick and hunted Spina gradually abandons his Marxism, but not his social rebelliousness: he becomes a revolutionary Christian saint.

Soon after arriving in the Abruzzi, Spina decides that the usual kinds of political propaganda are entirely irrelevant in fascist Italy. People have been misled by slogans too long and too often; they instinctively distrust all phrases. To refute the government propaganda is pointless since no one, least of all its authors, believes it. Something more drastic, more radical than any kind of political action, even the most revolutionary kind of political action, is needed to cope with the demoralization and corruption Spina finds in Italy.

Before coming to these conclusions Spina had already been uneasy about his political allegiance: "Has not truth, for me, become party truth? . . . Have not party interests ended by deadening all my discrimination between moral values?" The political doubts prompting these questions, together with his feeling that the Marxists in exile have lost touch with the realities of Italian life, lead Spina to a new outlook. He embraces the ethical ideal, the love concept, of primitive Christianity, which for him becomes "a Christianity denuded of all religion and all church control," and he accepts the view that a precondition for social freedom is individual ethical regeneration rather than mass political action. Spina rejects that duality between means and ends which is common to all political movements; unwilling to stake anything on the future, he insists that the only way to realize the good life, no matter what the circumstances, is to live it. "No word and no gesture can be more persuasive than the life and, if necessary, the death of a man who strives to be free, loyal, just, sincere, disinterested. A man who shows what a man can be."

If we abstract this political view from its context in the novel, as Silone virtually invites us to, we reach mixed conclusions about its value. Much of what Silone says about a political approach in a totalitarian country is undoubtedly true: anyone trying to organize an underground would have to demonstrate his worthiness not only as a leader but as a friend and confidant. But here we reach a difficulty. Once Silone's militant and saintly rebels acquired followers, they would have to be organized into some sort of movement, even if it appeared to be non-ideological and were not called a party; and then that movement would be open to bureaucratic perils similar to those of the Marxist party which Spina has rejected—particularly in view of the temptations inherent in saintly Messianism. Has not something of the sort happened to Christianity itself, in its transition from primitive rebelliousness to several accredited institutions?

Political Novelist and Political Leader

Silone has here come up against a central dilemma of all political action: the only certain way of preventing bureaucracy is to refrain from organization, but the refusal to organize with one's fellow men can lead only to acquiescence in detested power or to isolated and futile acts of martyrdom. This is not, of course, to deny the validity of specific organizational rejections; it is merely to question Silone's belief, as it appears in *Bread and Wine*, that political goals can be reached without political organization. In his own practise as an Italian Socialist, Silone has been forced to

modify this belief and to recognize that the vexatious problem of means and ends involves a constant tension between morality and expediency which can be resolved only in practise, and that, in any case, it helps very little to issue grandiose declarations, of the sort so popular and easy these days, that the end does not justify the means.

Yet it is precisely from such scrupulous examination of conscience and commitment that so much of the impact of *Bread and Wine* derives; no other twentieth century novelist has so fully conveyed the pathos behind the failure of socialism. *Bread and Wine* is a book of misery and doubt; it moves slowly, painfully, in a weary spiral that traces the spiritual and intellectual anguish of its hero. The characteristic turning of the political novelist to some apolitical temptation is, in Silone's case, a wistful search for the lost conditions of simple life where may be found the moral resources which politics can no longer yield. This pastoral theme, which winds quietly through the book and reaches full expression only in its sequel, *The Seed Beneath the Snow*, is a difficult one for the modern reader to take at face value. But in Silone's work it acquires a unique validity: he knows peasant life intimately and does not stoop to pseudofolk romanticizing; he is aware that a return to simplicity by a man like Spina must have its painful and ironic aspects; and his turn to pastoral does not indicate social resignation but is on the contrary buttressed by a still active sense of social rebelliousness. *Bread and Wine* is a work of humility, unmarred by the adventurism or the occasional obsession with violence and death which disfigures the political novels of Malraux and Koestler. Whatever the ideological fluctuations of Silone's books, they remain faithful to the essential experience of modern Europe; and to the harsh milieu of political struggle they bring a cleansing freshness, a warmth of fraternity.

The twentieth century political novel moves along a line of descent, an increasingly precipitous slide into despair. To turn from the revolutionary ardor of *Man's Fate* to the rebellious doubt of *Bread and Wine*, and then from these to the symbolic triumph of Stalinism in *Darkness at Noon*, is to see in miniature a history of our epoch.

A Further Descent Into Despair

Since it is itself in the grip of a fixed idea, *Darkness at Noon* has little of the intellectual fluidity, the complex interplay of emotion and ideology, which distinguishes other political novels. Koestler is the sort of writer who manipulates his characters with a ruthless insistence that they conform to his preconceptions. Only intermittently does he do the novelist's job and, as one might expect, it is then that he is at his best, relaxing his ideological hold and letting his imagination work freely. *Darkness at Noon* is a blunt account of the arrest of an Old Bolshevik, Rubashov, by the Stalin government and his gradual capitulation to its inquisitors; but it also carries a superimposed intellectual framework intended as an explanation of why the Old Bolsheviks confessed in the Moscow Trials of 1936-38. In the first regard, the novel is often superb. Confined to one locale, one line of action, one dominating character, it accumulates great dramatic intensity, and in a climactic scene, where the prisoners drum an anguished threnody

on their cell walls as an old oppositionist is taken out to be killed, it reaches a concentrated expression of all the horror of modern politics.

But the novel is crucially flawed, and Rubashov thinned into abstractness, by Koestler's overly simple theorizing about the moral premises which, he claims, were the basis of the Old Bolshevik capitulation to Stalin. Koestler makes the error of discussing the entire problem in abstract moral categories: the Old Bolsheviks like Rubashov believed that "the end justifies the means" and once they decide that because of "the immaturity of the masses" Stalin's terroristic regime is unavoidable, they feel obliged to suppress their "own conviction when there is no prospect of materializing it." Since, argues Rubashov to himself, "the only moral criterion which we recognize is that of social utility, the public disavowal of one's conviction in order to remain in the party's ranks is obviously more honorable than the quixoticism of carrying on a hopeless struggle." And thus Rubashov comes to hope that his confession and death may even form a gesture in behalf of the socialism which he believes Stalin is betraying.

Koestler's Dubious Analysis

Either in or out of the novel's context, Koestler's explanation of Rubashov's behavior is open to question. The capitulation of some, though by no means all, of the Old Bolsheviks is hardly to be explained by attributing to them a series of rigid deductions from a moral precept which, in the crude form Koestler employs it, they would have rejected and considered malicious. For it is not necessary to accept the political views of the Old Bolsheviks to realize that, as men of intellectual sophistication, they understood the interpenetration of means and ends, the way in which a means can itself become an end, and the great difficulty or impossibility of ever arriving at moral precepts satisfactory for all situations. Fully to understand the Rubashov type, it would be necessary to place him, as Koestler hardly does, against the background of a gradual counter-revolution in which conflicting social forces are at work, social forces which cannot be reduced to moral categories. Nor is Koestler's pious rejection of the formula, "the end justifies the means," to be taken too seriously, for in his own life he, like everyone else, has occasionally had to act according to it: in his book *Scum of the Earth* he tells how he resorted to lies and deceptions in order to escape the Gestapo, and more recently he was an active supporter of a war which, like all wars, could be justified only in terms of a proclaimed end, certainly not in terms of actual means. But most questionable of all in Koestler's novel is the assumption that a sophisticated man like Rubashov, supposedly modelled after Karl Radek, could convince himself that he was helping socialism by "confessing" to preposterous crimes. Such a notion gives far too much credence to the pretensions of Stalinism.

Koestler's analysis of Rubashov is unsatisfactory not so much because it is wrong but because it is coarse in intellectual quality. One can reject the political conclusions of *Bread and Wine* and still be moved by Spina's experience in reaching them; but reject Koestler's essential thesis and Rubashov has no reality whatever—all that

remains, and that of course is considerable, is an excellent evocation of the Stalinist milieu and its new "Neanderthal" type of leader. At the end of the book Rubashov is convinced of the need to return to what he once considered a mere "grammatical fiction," the *I*, but it is a curious irony, and a mark of Koestler's inferiority as a novelist to Silone, that this claim for the *I* remains impersonal and abstract.

Serge's Larger View of Stalinism

Together with *Darkness at Noon*, Victor Serge's *The Case of Comrade Tulayev* completes the descent of the political novel into despair. Though not nearly so dramatically tense as Koestler's novel, *Comrade Tulayev* has a more spacious social background, a larger view of the Stalinist scene. Like Koestler, Serge is essentially a journalistic chronicler who is best at the composition of an impressionistic memoir or an indignant pamphlet. His strength: a nostalgic warmth, a genuine humaneness, a Jacobin enthusiasm. His weakness: a "softness" of feeling, a blurring of effects, an inclination to *Schwärmerei*. Though both strength and weakness can be found in *Comrade Tulayev*, the novel is distinguished among Serge's books by a conscious effort to surmount journalism and reach the level of creative writing.

Comrade Tulayev is written in the conventional multiple-strand form of the European social novel, a form presupposing a society in which the things most worth observation are the relations between conflicting social groups and the gradations within social manners. Today, however, the "slice of life" novel can seldom cope with the vertiginous extremities of our experience; it is too slow, too stately, too rationalistic; the world of orderly competitiveness which it has been designed to reflect no longer exists. And for Serge it is a particularly dangerous form: it requires too much from him in terms of craft, particularly in transitional passages, and it exposes him to the temptation to fill in the holes of narrative with the putty of rhetoric. The novel thus comes to seem too schematic: each character illustrates a social type in Stalinist Russia and you then get the famous "gallery of characters" about which middlebrow reviewers like to talk but which is quite inadequate to a first-rate novel.

Ideology and Affection

Yet there are a few places in *Comrade Tulayev* where Serge achieves a striking success, suggestive of what the political novel in our time can do. In one remarkable scene Rublev, a Bolshevik leader who has been slowly broken by the Stalin regime, arranges a meeting with two old comrades, veterans of the revolution and distinguished intellectuals, in the woods near Moscow. In desultory terms they discuss what can be done, quarrel a bit, and reach no particular conclusion. Suddenly their spontaneous life-force is stirred by the coldness and purity of the snow, by the warmth and pathos of this, their final meeting—and they begin . . . not to talk about purges, programs or politics; it is too late for that, they are doomed. *They begin throwing snowballs at each other*, laughing like boys and for an unbearably pathetic moment innocent and forgetful. "They leaped, laughed, sank into snow up to

their waists, hid behind trees to make their ammunition and take aim before they let fly. Something of the nimbleness of their boyhood came back to them. . . . Wladek stood where he was, firmly planted, methodically making snowballs to catch Rublev from the flank, laughing until the tears came to his eyes, showering him with abuse: 'Take that you theoretician, you moralist, to hell with you' and never once hitting him. . . ."

The second incident concerns another Old Bolshevik, Ryzhik, who has, however, not capitulated; a political veteran, hard and strong, who in his moral steadfastness against the Stalin regime shows what a revolutionist can be. In distant exile he lives faithfully by the original passion of the revolution, hardly caring whether or not he survives. As he is being brought back to Moscow for a confession he will not make, Ryzhik encounters in a cell another old oppositionist, Makarenko. They embrace in a flare of excitement, talk for a while; Ryzhik begins a political discussion; the other man listens—yes, he agrees; but he is restless, it is too late for such talk. "Our meeting," Makarenko bursts out, "is extraordinary. . . . An inconceivable piece of negligence on the part of the services. . . . We are living through an apocalypse of Socialism. . . . Why

are you alive, why am I—I ask you!" Rather unimaginatively, Ryzhik answers this rhetorical question in routine political terms, and the other man, full of affectionate impatience, must insist: "I am a Marxist, too. But shut your eyes for a minute, listen to the earth, listen to your nerves." Here is the direct counterposition of ideology and emotion—in a dialogue between two men who are surrendering their lives in behalf of their ideological conviction.

Neither of these two incidents could have been conceived by anyone but a writer intimately related to modern politics; the political knowledge never appears on the surface but the surface would be impossible without the political knowledge. In both of these incidents the tragedy of politics is counterposed to the possibilities of experience, the commitment to an idea shown as it brushes against the commitment to compassion—the capitulators, brilliant but futile dialecticians, throwing snowballs; the oppositionists, secure in their belief, reaching for a moment of rapport before death.

IRVING HOWE

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The Non-Violent Strategy for Peace

A Pacifist Proposal for Defeating Totalitarianism

WAR BOILS DOWN TO THIS, that, all issues aside, it is a worker or his family who crouches on either side of the unfeeling bayonet. And leftists who out of a sense of fear or futility in a crisis give support, no matter how grudging or critical, to military expenditures—currently against Communists, tomorrow against whom?—betray the workers of all lands and play into the hands first of the colonial powers and native reactionaries, who are outfitted and entrenched under the guise of military necessity, and secondly of the Communists themselves, who make political capital out of these blunders.

When the Korean crisis erupted, Nehru strove for world recognition of the underlying issues. "The common features of Asia today are a reaction from the previous colonial regime, a resurgent nationalism, agrarian movements, a desire to get rid of our economic backwardness and a passionate urge for freedom," he told a press conference in October. The reaction of the West was to cry "appeasement" and to intensify military preparations.

Unfortunately, the kind of "pragmatic" reasoning behind rearmament which tries to divorce military from political measures on the assumption that the reforms can rest while the business of stopping Communism is expedited, is not only fallacious but disastrous. It ignores one of the most powerful weapons in the Communist arsenal. Every regiment of mercenaries put into the field by the colonial

powers in Southeast Asia, for example, has been outmatched by the thousands of native patriots thrown into the waiting arms of the Communist guerrillas, whose methods they dislike but who champion needed reforms and furnish the weapons with which to overthrow their masters.

In Malaya—to which world attention may shift after the Korean debacle—the *New York Times* admitted, "After 2½ years of large scale military operations, frustrated authorities acknowledge a hit and run war that is baffling a British army numbering in the tens of thousands, supported by squadrons of heavy bombers and rocket firing Spitfires. An average of three Communists are killed, wounded or captured (at a cost of) \$100,000 a day"—with British workers footing the bill.

A Consistent Socialist Course

For the American democratic socialist the only consistent course of action therefore is resistance to our further embroilment in military adventures, and the demanding of an immediate cease-fire in every area where fratricidal war rages, and of immediate disarmament and abolition of conscription by all nations. If the massed will of the people could compel the Western powers to adopt this sane course now—even in the absence of the simultaneous overhauling of our domestic economic and social order needed to dig up the very roots of war—the effects would be heartening and

the reverse of an open invitation to Communism to take over. The first reaction in fact would be a great wave of relief rolling around a globe that now wonders whether it wants to be liberated the Korean way, at the price of almost total destruction of its cities and industries, with millions left huddling in ruins or adrift on wintry roads, and with the Communists in the end in possession of the charred remains.

A second effect would be to electrify into new life those democratic elements now torn between unpleasant alternatives who would take the lead in one country after another in unceremoniously dumping the whole crushing burden of arms. And efforts would be abandoned to remilitarize nations like Japan and Germany, once passionately accused of innate militarism but now "surprisingly" pacifist. But what is more significant, such disarmament, by undercutting the organs that prop up the status quo at home and abroad, would not only go a long way toward frustrating the build-up to World War III but also aim a demolishing blow at the socio-economic evils which standing armies are designed in part to defend and perpetuate. Imperialism, and with it the seeds of Communism in the East, would be inconceivable without the military. And in the face of a unilaterally disarmed "free world," it is highly doubtful whether propaganda about "protecting the motherland from fascist aggression" could marshal the Soviet masses willingly to attack other countries.

An effective anti-war program, however, is possible only with the existence of an anti-war movement that does more than go on record for peace. It must be made up of members who individually renounce war, regardless of the consequences to themselves. The weakness of "pacifistic" parliamentary social-democracy was that its followers, when drafted, marched meekly off to fight social-democrats of other lands. A movement made up of individually sworn and dedicated war resisters who will not budge from their opposition to war, under threat of imprisonment or shooting can begin to be one of the most revolutionary forces in the world. It would make supreme at all times the human values that motivate revolt and too easily get lost in the passions and strategic considerations that accompany mass movements.

How Pacifism Has Worked •

Modern history already has witnessed one such movement on a national scale. Under the leadership of a lawyer by the name of Mohandas Gandhi, India fought for freedom in a manner so humane and so radical that intellectuals all over the world—Einstein in Germany, Rolland in France and Russell in England—quickly saw the hope it offered a war weary world. Here was an organized equivalent to military action, with trained volunteers and campaigns of organized action—only no weapons, no killing, no distorted propaganda or hatred. In forty years a nation of 400 millions shook off a centuries old conqueror with a minimum of bloodshed or even bad feeling.

Many nevertheless felt that nonviolent methods could be successful only with semi-democratic governments that had to watch public opinion at home. With the growth of fascism in the thirties, a number of well-known pacifists

(Russell, Einstein, Van Paassen) yielded to the necessity of force. Determined groups of war resisters in Europe, however, stuck to their beliefs even in the face of Nazi attack and occupation. Reporting on the resistance movement in Norway, Diderich Lund, chairman of the Norwegian section of the War Resisters International, observed: "A non-responsive attitude consistently carried through without weapons would have made a considerable impression on the Germans. On Norwegians themselves it would have had a greatly stimulating effect" in contrast to the discouragement that followed military defeat. "Where the struggle was taken up wholeheartedly with intelligence and readiness to sacrifice, it was possible to carry it through to complete victory. The Germans were helpless in the face of serious resistance. In most of the areas of public life the struggle was carried through openly, and where this was the case the results were the best."

It was obvious to every observant Norwegian that thousands of German soldiers opposed the occupation but feared to be branded traitors. In spite of this the average Norwegian adopted a hostile attitude toward the Germans he met—but at the same time obeyed orders and assisted the German war effort. His attitude should have been, Lund stresses, friendliness toward the individual German and refusal to cooperate with the Nazi system. Had this policy been carried out by more than the few thousand pacifists in Norway, it would have had considerable success even in the face of a war situation elsewhere.

Proposed Methods to Attain Peace and Freedom

The fascist challenge, as it was, had basic internal weaknesses—the limitations of the cult of racial superiority, the unsolved economic tensions repressed by force, the natural revulsion against its pedantic brutality. The Communist critique of Western capitalism is so much more thoroughgoing that a nonviolent strategy would have to be accompanied by sweeping changes in the "free world's" domestic and international economic and political life to be able to cope with it. The money and effort released by abolition of arms and conscription would need to be immediately channeled into a broad-gaged program of internationally administered and non-exploitative economic help to the under-developed areas of the world, accompanied by the elimination of colonialism and power politics and the creation of effective world government under law. While there have been isolated instances where capitalists, as in Israel, have underwritten financially a socialist society, the chances of this country's subscribing to the kind of program that would be adequate to stem the Communists are extremely remote. The conclusions we are forced to, therefore, are the reverse of optimistic. Nevertheless in the name of a humanity once again offered up as victims to the Moloch of war we must raise our voices in horror at each involvement of our country in mass fratricide, point to the better way and enlist all within sight in the common cause of war resistance and world peace.

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Sex, Class and Family in Russia

A Study of Social Relations in a Police State

PRESENT-DAY FAMILY legislation in Russia reveals a purposeful attempt on the part of the Russian policy-makers to strengthen the family as a social institution. This paper purports to outline a few of the social consequences of this legislation for various strata in the population and for the total societal system. Research in this area will provide considerably more useful information on the Russian social structure than some of the current attempts to explain the Russian regime in terms of the child-rearing practices of its citizens.¹

The family as an institution is being strengthened in the Soviet Union because of three factors.

1. The decision-makers desire an increase in the birth rate. Russian industry is still very imperfectly mechanized, and the sheer quantity of labor must make up for low productivity of the individual worker. Productivity is so low, indeed, that even forced labor yields economical results, so that squandering of labor power brings about ever present hunger for more labor.² Military demands are also compelling in this respect.

2. The family can act as an effective counterweight against social mobility, as a stabilizer of status. The family, through transmission of skills, connections, and wealth, serves to insure inheritance of social status from parents to children.

3. The Russian policy-makers now realize that the authoritarian family acts as a "transmission belt" for the inculcation of the authoritarian norms of the total society. They apparently feel that this task was not sufficiently well performed by the extra-familial institutions for socialization.

These purposeful actions on the part of the policy-makers serve to strengthen the ruling strata while simultaneously they create strains and stresses in the social system which they did not foresee. At the same time the functional consequences of many recent policy decisions create new areas of conflict within the system.

Official Nazi ideology in the early years of the Hitler regime stressed the need to rebuild the traditional paternal-

istic structure of the German family. The ideology of the "three K's" (*Kueche, Kinder, Kirche*), which relegated the woman to the household and made her a good breeder, could in part be implemented in practice during the first years of absorption of unemployment.³ In later years the demands of war production led to the gradual disappearance of this slogan, owing to a conflict between the needs of production and the subservient role of the woman in the household. Some Nazis then argued very logically that the family should be broken up completely. Furthermore, the Nazis also experienced great difficulty in reconciling their official family policy with the overriding aim of total control of the individual by the state. As Max Horkheimer states very well: "Although (the National Socialists) exalted the family in ideology as indispensable to a society based on the 'blood' principle, in reality they suspected and attacked the family as a shelter against mass society. They looked on it as a virtual conspiracy against the totalitarian state."⁴ The attempt of the Nazi state to claim a monopoly of loyalty conflicted with official family ideology. As a rapid increase in the birth rate was one of the key objectives of Nazi policy, the state attempted to remove the taboo on illegitimate children, thus contradicting the officially stressed sanctity of the family which was supposed to serve the same end. Reichsminister Frank revealed this contradictory attitude in one and the same speech, when he first defended the illegitimate child by stating that "everything is legal that is beneficent for the German people," only to continue: "National Socialism will surround the primary cell of the community of the people with all kinds of guarantees and legal protections."⁵

Similar to Nazi's Approach

The situation faced by the Russian decision-makers is in many respects similar to that of the Nazis. Breeding is highly encouraged. Taxes for spinsters, bachelors, and families with less than three children are exceedingly steep, whereas mothers receive a nonrecurring government payment of 400 rubles upon the birth of the third child, 1,300 upon the birth of the fourth, with the premium gradually increasing to a premium of 5,000 upon the birth of the eleventh child. Furthermore, monthly allowances of 80 rubles for the fourth child to 300 rubles for the eleventh and subsequent children are paid by the government. There

¹Soviet society exhibits a continual shift toward more rigid stratification and the solidification of a ruling class which disposes collectively of the means of production and tends increasingly to erect social barriers between itself and the underlying population; vertical social mobility decreases, and ascent into the ruling class becomes more and more difficult (see Alex Inkeles, "Stratification and Mobility in the Soviet Union," *American Sociological Review*, XV [1950], 465-79; N. S. Timasheff, "Vertical Social Mobility in a Communist Society," *American Journal of Sociology*, L [July, 1944], 9-21; David Dallin, *The Real Soviet Russia* [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944;] Leon Trotsky, *The Revolution Betrayed* [Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Doran & Co., 1937]).

²See David J. Dallin and Boris Nicolaevsky, *Forced Labor in Soviet Russia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944).

³For Nazi family policies see, among others, Clifford Kirkpatrick, *Nazi Germany: Its Women and Family Life* (Indianapolis and New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1938); Alfred Meusel, "National Socialism and the Family," *Sociological Review* (British), XXVIII (1936), 166-86, 389-411; Max Horkheimer (ed.), *Autoritaet und Familie* (Paris: Librairie Alcan, 1936).

⁴In Ruth N. Anshen (ed.), *The Family, Its Function and Destiny* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1949), p. 374.

⁵Quoted by Meusel, *op. cit.*, p.186.

are also various decorations for "good breeders"—the "Motherhood Medal" for mothers with five to six children, The "Order of Motherhood Glory" for mothers of seven to nine children, and the title of "Heroine Mother" for mothers who have given birth to ten children.⁶

Yet Russia cannot permit the labor power of half the population to be "wasted." Every conceivable effort is made, on the contrary, to use as much womanpower as possible within industry and agriculture. The curve of employment of women has been going up virtually without interruption since 1929. In 1934 almost 32 per cent of the Soviet labor force were women. During the war, women comprised the majority of the labor force. More recent data indicates that 47 per cent of wage and salary-earners in all spheres of labor in 1947 were women.⁷

Decline of Living Standards

The living standard of the Russian workers has considerably decreased since 1928. The simplest way to increase the family's total wage income so as to offset the effect of falling real wages was to have more members of the worker's family join the labor force. According to official Russian statistics, the number of dependents per gainful worker in workers' families decreased from 2.46 in 1927 to 2.05 in 1930, to 1.75 in 1932, and to 1.59 in 1935.⁸ The legal working day, which was six to seven hours until 1940, is now considerably longer. Moreover, one to three hours of overtime are permitted; the standard work week is forty-eight hours; a working woman, therefore, stays away from her home for at least ten hours a day.⁹

While *Kueche*, *Kinder*, *Kirche*, are perfectly compatible ideals, the three K's plus *Fabrik* are not.¹⁰ The attempt to reconcile the rival demands upon the woman's time by building crèches, day camps for children, etc., is not made to overcome the contradictions stemming from rival definitions of the woman's role. Public child care keeps the child away from the family and thus weakens traditional family ties.

The new emphasis on the family also clashes with general economic conditions within Russia. To establish a stable family life, housing conditions must be such that they make possible at least a minimum of family privacy. Yet, Russian housing conditions always have been appalling and have further deteriorated since the war. In spite of this, in all five-year plans because of the primary concern with

construction of houses has received a relatively low priority a rapid expansion of a modern productive apparatus. In 1932 the average urban dweller had only 20 square feet of living space. In Moscow in the same year a family of five had, on the average, two rooms, with not over forty square feet. All recent reports stress that housing conditions have considerably deteriorated since.¹¹

Stable Family: A Bureaucratic Luxury

The objection that members of the Russian family spend more time outside the house—in clubs, cafeterias, etc.—may be valid, but this would be only an added reason why the Russian planners will find it difficult to legislate a stable family into existence. The Western urban family, though no longer a productive unit, has maintained—in part, at least—its character as a unit of common consumption.

Housekeeping also is a quite different affair for the Russian housewife than for her American sisters. Efficient cooking and housekeeping devices are almost completely lacking except in the small upper stratum. A Russian study of time required for housekeeping which was conducted in the thirties showed that a woman wage-earner can devote less than a quarter of the time to the care of children than a full-time housewife can. The former spent 470 hours in preparing food; the latter, 997. The former spends 110 hours mending the family clothes; the latter, 228.¹²

One arrives at the starting conclusion that the economic basis for a stable family life, such as is required by the new Soviet ideology, can be found only among the families of the upper strata. The top bureaucrat can allow himself the luxury of a stable family life and of a Victorian morality. He has enough housing space, his wife does not have to work full time, his household equipment is more adequate and modern, and he can engage domestic help. To maintain a family that comes up to the official standards is a leisure-class activity.¹³

Inconsistent Attitude to Illegitimacy

Establishment of a stable family unit as required by the Russian decision-makers encounters difficulties within the social structure, arising from the contradictory pressures of other institutions. Since Soviet legislators, propagandists, and ideologists generally belong to the upper socio-economic strata, they tend to ignore the socio-economic context in which the "common man," or, in this context, the "common woman," must move.

The Russian decision-makers seem to suffer from a contradictory attitude toward illegitimacy similar to that

⁶Text of the Family Law of July 8, 1944, in Rudolf Schlesinger (ed.), *The Family in the USSR* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1949), pp. 367 ff.

⁷*Pravda*, March 8, 1948, quoted by Solomon M. Schwarz, "The Living Standard of the Soviet Worker," *Modern Review*, II (June, 1948), 285. Cf. Judith Grunfeld, "Women's Work in Russia's Planned Economy," *Social Research*, IX (1942), 22-45.

⁸Schwarz, *op. cit.*, pp. 272-85.

⁹*Ibid.*, p. 278; see also R. Maurer, "Recent Trends in the Soviet Family," *American Sociological Review*, IX (1944), 242 ff.

¹⁰At least not in a society which is characterized by low productivity and low standard of living. For a suggestive statistical treatment of similar problems in the United States see John D. Rurand, "Married Women in the Labor Force," *American Journal of Sociology*, LII (November, 1946), 217-23.

¹¹....Mildred Fairchild, "The Family in the Soviet Union," in Bernhard J. Stern (ed.), *The Family, Past and Present* (New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1938).

¹²Dallin, *op. cit.*, p. 193.

¹³Data on domestic services in the occupational statistics would be a most revealing index of the newly acquired privileges of the upper strata—if they were published. But Russian statistics included these data only for very few years, and each year showed an increase in domestic workers, whereupon these records were discontinued (*ibid.*, p. 174).

of the Nazis. Early legislation had done away with all legal distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate children,¹⁴ thereby departing from the almost universal habit of discrimination against illegitimate children. With the strengthening of the family, the attitude toward illegitimate children has changed. Children of unmarried adults must now carry the mother's, not the father's, name, and the unmarried mother can no longer hold the father responsible for the support of the child. The new Soviet code has adopted the principle of the Code Napoleon: "La recherche de la paternité est interdite."

On the other hand, in order to foster an increase in the birth rate, the Soviet state now assumes support to children of unmarried mothers until the age of twelve and, in addition, allocates to them the regular assistance granted mothers with three or more children. Thus, childbearing out of wedlock might become a regular "profession," and the unmarried mother will be, under certain circumstances, definitely better off economically than her married sister.¹⁵ We have here another instance in which measures primarily designed to boost the birth rate actually contradict the aim of stabilizing family relations and also interfere with the supply of "womanpower." This case is all the more startling, since measures for support to unmarried mothers and measures to stabilize marriage were enacted in the same law of July 8, 1944. The "Heroines of Socialist Motherhood," even if their children are born out of wedlock, may make a significant contribution to the rise of the birth rate; but they will tend not to enter the labor force. If motherhood becomes a profession and if the legislator makes no discrimination between motherhood in or out of wedlock, one of the main props under the new family-strengthening legislation would seem to be removed at the same time as it was built.

The official explanation for the decree banning abortion in 1936¹⁶ was that (a) it was to combat the "light-minded attitude toward the family and toward family obligations" and that (b) abortion was detrimental to the health of the women undergoing the operation. A Russian author defending the new law probably comes closer to the truth when he states: "Mass abortions resorted to for egoistic reasons are not to be tolerated. The Soviet state cannot countenance the fact that tens of thousands of women ruin their health and delay the growth of a new generation for socialist society."¹⁷

Apologists of the Russian regime suddenly discovered that the rate of abortions during the years when abortion

was legal was such that it seriously threatened the birth rate. A few years before, they were diligently engaged in defending the then official attitude which legalized abortion and adduced facts to the contrary. They were right *then*. Legal abortions did not threaten to reduce the birth rate to the western European level,¹⁸ but a further increase would, of course, be realized if abortion was outlawed.

Abortion is the most uneconomical means of preventing birth. If it was so widely resorted to by Russian women, at least in the cities, this was probably because contraceptives were not easily available. We do indeed learn from various authors that this is the case.¹⁹ No wonder, then, that abortion, when legal, was extensively practiced at least among urban women; no wonder either that after the imposition of the ban the number of registered births in nineteen sample cities increased from 33,796 for July-November, 1935, to 68,511 for the same period of the following year.²⁰

Reintroducing "Class Legislation"

In a totalitarian society in which mechanical means of contraception are scarce or unavailable, the birth rate will respond much more directly to the abolition of legal abortion than it will in a society in which contraceptives are accessible and where, moreover, the police system is less equipped to prevent illegal abortion on a mass scale.

The relatively high abortion rate in the cities during the twenties and thirties could easily be brought down by increased popularization of birth-control measures, if the aim had been the preservation of women's health. But Schuman is correct when he states: "Chronic labor shortage calls for more babies. Children are most numerous and most likely to grow into productive citizens where family life is stable."²¹ He might have added that the upper strata are accustomed to the use of contraceptives and have the means to practice it; but the lower classes in this planned society are denied the means of planned parenthood. The law against abortion is indeed a rank example of what the Communists used to call "class legislation."

An American reporter overheard girls who were discussing the publication of the new family legislation say to

¹⁴Fannina W. Halle, *Women in Soviet Russia* (New York: Viking Press, 1933), p. 154.

¹⁵Schlesinger, *op. cit.*, esp. pp. 402 ff.

¹⁶This decree was the only law in the recent history of the Soviet Union that was submitted to public discussion before promulgation. Test votes were taken in factories and women's meetings, and the official press carried a number of letters pro and con. They showed heavy majorities against the law, at least in urban centers—whereupon the discussion was called off and the law promulgated by decree of December 27, 1936. For the text of the law, as well as the text of some of the published discussion, see Schlesinger, *op. cit.*, pp. 251-79; cf. Maurer, *op. cit.*

¹⁷S. Wolfson in an article in *Pod Znamenem Marxizma*, quoted by Schlesinger, *op. cit.*, p. 310.

¹⁸The annual birth rate in those years was about 37 per thousand, while it was considerably lower in most European countries. In Moscow there were between 20 and 30 abortions to every 100 births in the early twenties, while the number in Berlin in those same years was estimated at 54 (see Halle, *op. cit.*, pp. 143-44; Schlesinger, *op. cit.*, p. 175). The population of European Russia increased from 112 million in 1914 to 129 million in 1936, despite the exceedingly heavy losses during World War I, civil war, and the great famines.

¹⁹Halle (*op. cit.*, p. 134) states: "For the time being preventives are short in the Soviet Union; the demand for them considerably exceeds the supply." Milton Hindus, writing about a later period (in Anshen [ed.], *op. cit.*, p. 119), says: "Birth control remained legal but was frowned upon. Literature on the subject vanished. . . . Physicians were not forbidden to impart the necessary information to patients, but they were urged to use their influence to dissuade women from preventing childbirth."

²⁰*Izvestia*, December 5, 1936, quoted by Frederick L. Schuman, *Soviet Politics at Home and Abroad* (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1946), pp. 338-39.

²¹*Op. cit.*, pp. 338-39.

each other: "Well, the new slogan means for women: children and not career."²²

The Russian press still proclaims that the Soviet Union is the only country in which equality of the sexes has been realized. But such equality becomes a myth once a woman is called upon to become a breeder of as many children as possible without the means of restricting the number of births. Under such conditions, equality of opportunity in employment must also become a myth.

In this connection a far-reaching change in the system of education must be mentioned. Many observers have reported the great achievements of the Soviet educational system during the first years of the regime. This coeducational system was in great part responsible for helping millions of Soviet women to reach intellectual equality with men. But since 1943 coeducation no longer exists in the urban schools of the Soviet Union. Professor Eugene Medynsky of the Lenin Pedagogical Institute, writing in the *American Sociological Review*,²³ attempted a rather lame rationalization by stating that coeducation hinders the adaptation of the school program to the differences of physiological development of boys and girls; but he lets the cat out of the bag by adding that it also hinders the differentiation for the training of boys and girls for practical activity. As Lauterbach points out, *Izvestia* is considerably more frank when it states that, though boys and girls must have access to all professions and should be trained for them, girls must be educated to be loving and capable mothers and rearers of children, and that schools for girls must also develop femininity, modesty, and a sense of the great worthiness and honor of women.

The abolition of coeducation may also be connected with the emphasis on military training for boys, but the main reason seems to be the desire to have "a system by which the school develops boys who will be good fathers and manly fighters . . . and girls who will be intelligent mothers competent to rear the new generation."²⁴

Solidifying Class Distinctions

Once women are regarded primarily as mothers of future Soviet fighters, it is indeed inevitable that the standard of girls' schools will gradually be lowered, so that women will be handicapped in their attempts to compete with men in professional and other better-paid careers. The state still needs womanpower in industry but seems to have decided that, while the upperclass woman does indeed belong in the home, the lower-class woman does not belong, at least, in the better-paid positions.

The abolition of coeducation is an attempt to strengthen the upper-class family by removing the element of competition for occupational status between husband and wife. The gradual introduction of clearly defined sex roles is intended to remove all "invidious comparison" between husband and wife and to make the wife subservient to the husband. The woman cannot be dispensed with in the labor

force, but at least she seems no longer needed in the prestigious and economically rewarding professions. In the lower classes, on the other hand, the difference in education for men and women gives the men a slight chance of social mobility, in a society in which upward mobility becomes increasingly difficult.²⁵

Divorce legislation is a crucial index for evaluating the changing social position of women in Soviet society.

We can assume the facts of the case to be fairly well known. The earlier Soviet legislation, especially the Code of Laws on Marriage, Family, and Wardship, adopted in November, 1926,²⁶ established complete juridical equality between factual nonregistered marriage and registered marriage and made dissolution of the latter very easy. The state merely registered the dissolution of marriage, which was based on the free decision of the partners according to the decision of the supreme court that "for a court to concern itself with the conduct of either party in a divorce case would imply an utterly false interpretation of Soviet law." When no mutual agreement was reached, the fact of the dissolution was communicated to the other spouse within three days; if the address was unknown, notice in the pages of *Izvestia* at a nominal fee was all that was required.

Medieval Attitudes Revived

The new Family Laws of July, 1944—published without any previous discussions—abolished the institution of *de facto* marriage and stated that thereafter only registered marriages would be recognized by the law. The new procedures for divorce are equivalent to the medieval pillory. The notice of divorce action must be advertised in a local newspaper at considerable expense. Compulsory entry of divorce is made in the home passports of man and woman. The proceedings take place in an open court, the People's Court, whose only task is to attempt to reconcile the couple, and where both parties must appear before proceedings can begin. The claimant has the right of appeal to the next higher court, which may or may not dissolve the marriage; and subsequent appeals to still higher courts are possible. But the fees are such that a divorce has become a luxury which the average citizen cannot possibly afford. It varies from 600 to 2,100 rubles (the average monthly earnings of the Soviet wage-earner have been estimated around 500 rubles at the beginning of 1948,²⁷ and many unskilled workers earn considerably less).

In August, 1944, the Russian press reported that, during the first month following promulgation of the new law, not a single petition for divorce had been filed throughout the

²⁵It is certainly not accidental that in recent years such magazines as the *Soviet Woman*—a kind of Russian *Ladies' Home Journal*—have made their appearance. These magazines feature articles on such topics as "Wrinkles Are Appearing—How Can I Prevent Them?" This is evidently an appeal to upper-class women; but it would have been horribly unthinkable twenty years ago, when the ethos of work still completely dominated all appeals to women (Waclaw Solsky, "The Soviet Press," *Modern Review*, II [June, 1948], 288).

²⁶For the text of the code and Russian discussions of its principles see Schlesinger, *op. cit.*, pp. 81-168; cf. Halle, *op. cit.*

²⁷Schwarz, *op. cit.*, p. 281.

²²Richard E. Lauterbach, *These Are the Russians* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1945), p. 249.

²³*IX* (1944), 287-95.

²⁴M. Tsulmer in *Soviet War News*, quoted by Schlesinger, *op. cit.*, p. 393.

whole U.S.S.R.;²⁸ according to a Russian author quoted by Schlesinger, statistics "show a rapid fall in the number of divorces."²⁹ One can well understand Monsignor Fulton Sheen's appreciation that "the family is higher in Russia than in the United States, and God, looking from heaven, may be more pleased with Russia than with us."³⁰

I know of no reports on the reception of the new divorce laws among the Russian population and specially among women; it would seem safe, however, to assume that the reaction of the Russian girls overheard by Lauterbach and quoted earlier is not untypical. It is superfluous to comment in detail on the consequences for the social position of women brought about by the practical impossibility of getting divorced. Any textbook on the family contains all the requisite arguments and data.³¹

Yet in this sphere also it seems that the Russian planners have been unaware of some of the consequences of their recent moves. The new laws will almost automatically lead to a significant increase in "free love" and concubinage, that is, the very things that the new legislation intended to combat. As divorce becomes almost impossible, many prospective couples will postpone marriage, preferring nonlegalized sex activities, especially since the state assumes the financial burden for illegitimate off-spring. Had the Russian planners studied the sad experience of the Catholic church in Latin America, for example, they might have been wiser.

Moreover, in a country like the Soviet Union, where there is a high rate of enforced geographical mobility, where sudden transfers of workers from Moscow to the Urals are a frequent occurrence, easy divorce seems to be almost inescapable. If it is nevertheless impossible, the separation of partners will lead to customs which must conflict with the law. While such a conflict may have serious consequences even in a democratic society, it might lead to intolerable difficulties in a totalitarian society which is precisely built on the assumption that all activity of the individual must be controlled by the state. If the individual develops a "private sphere" outside of legislative and police control, this amounts to the weakening of one of the keystones of totalitarian structure.³²

Uncontrolled sex relations deprive the ruling strata of society of important means of social control. A society which moves toward rigid hierarchical organization will

therefore be concerned seriously with regulating and channeling sex relations.

The history of the Soviet state shows an uninterrupted line of development from a minimum of interference with sex relations to an almost puritanical horror of unregulated sexual activity. The parallelism between this changing attitude toward sex and the increasing concern with rigid stratification need be no further elaborated.

The theories on "free love" of the first years of the Russian revolution are sufficiently well known not to require special elaboration here.³³ Lenin himself was concerned over the disruptive effect of "free love" as it was then preached and practiced among the younger generation, especially during the civil war period; other Bolsheviks shared this concern. Thus Kalinin, addressing the Comsomol in 1928, says: "Is it really permissible . . . that a man should marry six or seven times in the course of ten years? Mustn't there be responsibility between man and woman?"³⁴ Yet William Henry Chamberlin reports in 1929: "Despite these occasional admonitions from comrades of the older generation, 'free love' is still the rule rather than the exception among the city youth. Sex in Russia is a matter-of-fact affair, equally removed from the traditional sanctities and inhibitions of monogamous marriage and from artificial voluptuousness."³⁵

The New Puritanism

However, since the middle thirties, all media of mass communication in Russia try to instill strict sex mores. Russian spokesmen stress that "love is an act very different from simple biological relationship. Free love is a revolting practice, unworthy of Soviet society. 'Variety' must be provided by the wife herself, not by changing partners. Promiscuity leads to degradation. The monogamous family has a better chance under socialism than under capitalism. Successful physical relationships between partners are not the most important thing. Under full communism, the family will even grow stronger and more stable. . . . The sanctity of family ties is a fundamental bond which knits society into an indivisible whole. . . . Sound society is unthinkable without a sound, economically secure family."³⁶

Free love not only creates fortuitous associations which, by their very nature, are not subject to police control; it also may foster spontaneity in human relationships and human personality which is incompatible with the discipline demanded in a totalitarian society.

Just as all other family legislation, so the restrictions on sex activity serve to strengthen the authoritarian family. It is not possible here to go into a social-psychological analysis of the contributions that the authoritarian family structure with its accompanying sex restrictions can make

²⁸Arthur Koestler, "Soviet Myth and Reality," in *The Yogi and the Commissar* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1945), p. 169.

²⁹Schlesinger, *op. cit.*, p. 380.

³⁰Quoted by Lauterbach, *op. cit.*, p. 248.

³¹Hindus (*op. cit.*, p. 124) excellently summarizes the situation, at least as far as the legal norm is concerned: "For the present. . . freedom of action in sex and family life in Russia is as dead as the private ownership of the means of production."

³²It is not true that easy divorce procedures before the 1944 law led to significantly higher divorce rates than in the United States today. William Henry Chamberlin reports in his *Soviet Russia* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1931), pp. 381-82, that there was in 1927, e.g., a ratio of about 1:4 in the proportion of divorces granted to marriages registered; this is roughly the ratio in this country today.

³³See, e.g., Halle, *op. cit.*, pp. 109-37.

³⁴Quoted by Chamberlin, *op. cit.*, p. 327.

³⁵*Ibid.*

³⁶See, e.g., Alexander Werth, "Love and Marriage in Russia," *Nation*, April 24, 1948; Schlesinger, *op. cit.*; cf. Alex Inkeles, "Family and the Church in the Post-war USSR," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CCLXIII (1949), 33-44.

to the authoritarian society,³⁷ but it seems fairly well established that his contribution is considerable.

However, the Russian decision-makers are unable to make the facts of the situation fit the desired objectives. Stringent legislation to insure the sanctity of marriage ties will in actual fact lead to an increase of free love. The state, by its very interference in the life of its citizens must necessarily undermine a parental authority which it attempts to restore. Merton has pointed out that "social structure exerts a definite pressure upon certain persons in the society to engage in non-conformist rather than conformist conduct."³⁸ Will the Russian decision-makers be able to come to grips with the unanticipated consequences of their actions?

Report—both nonfiction and fiction—on the earlier periods of the Soviet regime are replete with accounts of revolt of son against father, of the shaking-off by the young of the authority of the parents. In the early years of the regime the authority of the state and of the party decidedly took the side of the young against the old generation. Children were commended for denouncing the "counter-revolutionary tendencies" of their parents; parades of children against excessive drinking and other "anti-social" behavior of their fathers were common occurrences. The Communist movement fought the family as an enemy of the new social order, a bulwark against change, a seedbed for antistate tendencies.

In the middle thirties this policy also was completely revised. Trotsky's quip that the stabilization of the Russian family runs parallel with the stabilization of the ruble is indeed quite perceptive. As the hierarchical structure of society became stabilized, the child also had to be fitted more tightly into the social framework. The family is still considered a "bulwark against change" as before, and as such it is being strengthened now. The control function of parental authority and the strategic position of the parents for the inculcation of authoritarian norms are recognized and officially supported.³⁹ The legislator now sides with the parents, approving their attempts to uphold their authority.

Yet this strengthening of parental authority meets with serious obstacles, and a conflict between different forms of social control tends to arise. The totalitarian state aims at direct control over the individual from cradle to grave, from kindergarten via Comsomol and school to job. Only in this way can it hope to ascribe status directly to every individual in the system. On the other hand, no complete equivalent for the parental inculcation of authoritarian norms seems to be available, and the role of authority in the family is officially being stressed again. But then authority of the family must clash in many areas

³⁷For discussion of this relation see especially Horkheimer, *op. cit.*, and the work of Erich Fromm, especially *Escape from Freedom* (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1941).

³⁸Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (Glencoe, Ill.; Free Press, 1949) pp. 125-26.

³⁹For an excellent discussion of this problem in Western society see Kingsley Davis, "The Sociology of Parent-Youth Conflict," *American Sociological Review*, V (August, 1940), pp. 523-35.

with the authority of the state. The Nazis also glorified the family, at least in the earlier period of their regime, yet they also competed with the parents for the loyalty of the children; they approved only a family in which all members were subservient to the state. This finally led to a situation graphically depicted in a joke then current in Germany: "What is the ideal German family? It's a family in which the father is a member of the party, the mother member of the Association of Nazi Women, the daughter belongs to the Association of German Girls and the son is in the Hitler Youth—they meet once a year at the Nazi in Nurnberg."⁴⁰ Nazi policies for family and youth attempted to strengthen the paternalistic family and at the same time attacked and weakened it. We see no reason why the Russian policy-makers should find it easier to escape these contradictions.

Paternalism in a Police State

In totalitarian society, as Meusel says, all authority finally derives from the highest political power; the head of the family possesses authority over the children not because he is their father but because he is their leader. Whereas in feudal society political power was patterned on a family model, an exact reversal takes place in totalitarian society. Totalitarian regimes intensify the dependence of the family father upon the coercive power of the state and impress awareness of this dependence on the consciousness of the child as he enters very early into direct contact with the coercive forces of the state which shape the father's life.⁴¹ The Russian child will find it difficult to accept a parental authority which—at least in the lower strata—seems to be completely devoid of actual power of decision.

The Russian state makes an effort to synchronize a revived paternalistic family with a revival of a paternalistic school system. A new Code of Rules for Soviet Schools was adopted in 1943.⁴² Some of the rules are: "Obey without question the orders of school principal and teacher. . . . Sit erect during the lesson period. . . . Rise as the principal or teacher enters or leaves the room. . . . Be polite to elders, respectful to school director and teacher. . . . Obey parents and assist in care of little brothers and sisters. . . . For violation of these rules, the pupil is subject to punishment, even to expulsion from school."

But what if "the care of brothers and sisters" interferes with Comsomol activities? Who is to be obeyed—the parent or the Comsomol leaders? If it is true, as Maurer states, that "increasingly the Soviets have come to regard the family as the hub where all other spokes of activity tie in,"⁴³ it would seem, however, that Comsomol, Young Pioneers, and Little Octobrists are equally if not more important hubs. If Russia wants to build up the authority

⁴⁰Quoted by Meusel, *op. cit.*

⁴¹*Ibid.*, esp. p. 406. Our discussion at this point is essentially an application of Meusel's brilliant analysis to Russian conditions.

⁴²See William M. Mandel, *A Guide to the Soviet Union* (New York: Dial Press, 1946), p. 226.

⁴³Maurer, *op. cit.*

of the family and yet does not relinquish direct state control over the child, the child must be torn between conflicting demands and cannot have the secure position that either predominant familial or predominant state authority could provide.

So far we have not considered the effects of class position on the position of the child in the Russian social structure. As Russian society moved farther away from an initial relative equality in class position, as the hierarchical structure of society hardened and vertical mobility decreased, the educational system had to be transformed. In early Soviet society free public education at all educational levels prevented rigidity in stratification. But free public education no longer exists in the Soviet Union.

Education -- If It Can Be Afforded

Since 1940 a fee of 50 rubles (\$10.00) a year is required in high schools. The fee for secondary schools amounts to from 150 to 200 rubles; for universities, from 300 to 500 rubles.⁴⁴ If we remember that the average monthly income of a wage-earner is 500 rubles—it was about 340 rubles in 1940, when free public education was abandoned—it is easily apparent that the social and economic status of the family again has become a crucial determinant of the future of the child. Higher education becomes the privilege of people who can afford it. There are scholarships and stipends, of course, but these are awarded upon conditions that often are harsher than in capitalist countries. Moreover, they are granted only to students in technical or specialized secondary schools; students in academic secondary schools—normal gateways to higher education—are granted no stipends. Hence students from poorer families tend to gravitate toward technical schools, while the upper-class child has a considerably better chance to pursue a higher education.

The decree of 1940 only further reinforced a trend which began earlier. Schwarz gives the following percentages showing the decline of the proportion of manual workers and their children in higher education:⁴⁵

	1933	1935	1938
Universities	50.3	45.0	33.9
Secondary schools	41.5	31.7	27.1

The percentages for industrial colleges, gateways to key managerial positions, are even more revealing:

	1938
Manual workers and their children	43.5
Peasants and their children	9.6
Bureaucracy—specialists and their children	45.4

Up to one million children whose parents cannot afford the fees for secondary schools, on the other hand, are annually conscripted to four years of compulsory labor service.⁴⁶ They are given vocational training for six months

⁴⁴Mandel, *op. cit.*, esp. pp. 224 and 234; cf. Inkeles, "Stratification and Mobility in the Soviet Union," *op. cit.*, pp. 473-76.

⁴⁵Solomon M. Schwarz, "Heads of Russian Factories," *Social Research*, IX (1942), 323-24.

⁴⁶Inkeles, "Stratification and Mobility in the Soviet Union," *op. cit.*, pp. 473-75.

to two years and are then required to work four more years wherever directed.

Hence, the degree of authority of the parent depends upon his social position: if the father is made to pay for the schooling of the son, the latter will be less inclined to disregard the father's authority. The children of lower-class families, on the other hand, are taken away from the family into the custody and control of the state.

The limiting of educational opportunities means a shift away from an open class system to a structure in which ascribed status gains over achieved status. This may be adequate for stabilizing a hierarchical social system, but the price to be paid may be very high. Can a society as poor in qualified human resources as the Soviet Union afford to waste potential human resources in order to assure status to its ruling strata?

The new educational policy serves to assure inheritance of social status through transmission of skills and connections. This is in tune with the revival of the principle of inheritance, as laid down in the Soviet Constitution of 1936, which assures transmission of wealth from parents to children, thus canceling the early Soviet measures which abolished inheritance by law or will and all life insurance.⁴⁷ The 1936 constitution legally re-established inequality at birth. Inheritance has been legalized again, life insurance reinstalled, and the right of unrestricted disposal of property by last will guaranteed to each individual. Well-to-do citizens are encouraged to buy policies from the State Insurance Trust, the minimum premium being fixed at 5,000 rubles.⁴⁸

The upper-class family has assumed again a most important status-ascribing function. But what repercussions will this have on the attitudes of millions of lower-class youngsters whose loyalty was in part due to the open opportunities which the regime provided in its first period?

In conclusion, we may say that the family policy in Soviet Russia serves to stabilize the upper class. But in other strata it meets with stresses and strains which may well prove to impair the smooth functioning of the total system.

LEWIS A. COSER

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⁴⁷After the death of a person, his mobile and immobile property became state property, with certain exceptions in the case of farm property.

⁴⁸Koestler, *op. cit.*, pp. 148-49.

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The Screening Program-A Threat to Labor

The Problem of Freedom and Security in a War Economy

TOTAL SECURITY in a war economy is not a novel governmental procedure. By definition, a government will do all within its power to preserve itself. Such power in the United States has been limited by the Constitution and by the ballot it guarantees. It has also been limited by the growth of free associations of peoples, who have used their united strength to influence government decision through the power of the ballot. One of the most useful of such associations in America has been the free union movement.

Now, before it has realized its full potentialities (for good) the organized labor movement under the stress of war, faces the danger of not only losing its freedom, but of becoming the subservient partner of the government in eliminating the remnants of its own militancy. This danger lies in the security screening program which is being applied with greater and greater vigor to governmental agencies and industry in an attempt to remove any person potentially capable of revealing information about his job.

Freedom and Security

Before we can decide whether we are for or against the security screening program rapidly expanding throughout industry, we have to review some of our fundamental assumptions. We have to know what tools can still be used to seek the attainment of our principles and objectives. Equally as important is the knowledge of the forces standing in our way, and the weapons available to overcome these forces.

I believe the principles to which we are dedicated are epitomized in the one word, "freedom." To those of us who are socialists, freedom presupposes political and industrial democracy; it also presupposes economic and physical security. These factors of universal democracy and universal security have always seemed to us not only compatible but concomitant.

The anti-socialists, on the other hand, have always held that security is anathema to freedom; that universal security can only be attained through a condition of universal slavery. They have, therefore, contended that economic security is an individual endeavor and an individual responsibility. Although far from purists in this contention, they have generally looked askance upon political interference with the economic anarchy they advocate. It is not surprising, therefore, that when industrialists, who have always believed that economic security is the antithesis of freedom, accept the necessity for total military security, they also accept without too much question the apparent necessity for military security in industry through security screening. And accepting this, they are not much concerned with the preservation of the democratic processes, if that is possible, in the carrying out of the screening program.

They are not much concerned because they do not see much relationship between security and democracy. More realistically, they are not very much concerned because the security screening does not immediately hamper their program of personal aggrandizement. It is a rare case where a manufacturer cannot get clearance for the particular specialized worker he wants. It is rare both because of the traditional lack of political participation on the part of the typical American specialized worker and industrial expert, and because of the control of the screening program by industry or industry-minded people.

The Weak-kneed Labor Leadership

It is somewhat surprising that the organized labor movement, has with a few notable exceptions, supinely accepted the security screening program as a matter of course and has voiced very little concern for the preservation of the democratic processes in the government's prosecution of this program. This acceptance does not arise out of ignorance of the probable consequence as the labor movement has been warned, through experience, that their key men, their most militant men, will be systematically excluded from industry.

The case that deserves to become the classic example, because of its simplicity and early timing, is the experience of the United Automobile Workers local at the Bell Aircraft Plant in Buffalo, N. Y. That this example will not acquire the stature in labor annals of the "Mohawk Valley formula" is almost a foregone conclusion and a reflection of the perspicacity of labor's present leaders.

The screening program at Bell Aircraft, insofar as it affected the union structure, began as an outgrowth of the 1949 strike. This strike was long, bitter, and violent, marked by injunctions, conspiracy charges, and the arrest of strike leaders miles from the picket line on trumped up traffic charges who were then held on exorbitant bail. Its techniques ran the gamut from helicopter borne teargas bombs thrown by the sheriff to prayer meetings at the plant gate by the union. The strike was finally settled by arbitration. One of the conditions of the arbitration was that the union should not insist upon the reemployment of any of the strikers who were held by the Army-Navy-Air Force Personnel Security Board to be poor security risks. Six of the strikers, including some of the strike leaders, were so found. The union, abiding by the terms of the arbitration, acquiesced in their dismissal. Some of the six took an appeal on their own and one of them gained clearance and re-employment.

There is no reason to believe that the UAW was overly aroused by these firings. The local for years had been torn by three factions; two of them "left-wing" but none of them Stalinist. The union officials might reasonably believe that elimination of some of these men might reduce the

intra-local strife. In any event, while the union aggressively fought through the courts the conspiracy convictions of its regional director and local officers, it took no positive action on behalf of the screened men.

A year went by and in December 1950, came the Jim Schuetz case.

Schuetz was tool room steward, chairman of the steward body of the local, chairman of the Educational Committee and Delegate to the CIO Council. He was very active in the 1949 strike and militant in his responsibilities to his union. He was screened out by the Army, which restricted him from "work on or access to" classified contracts. As a result, he was fired.

What are the charges against him? Not that he is sympathetic to the Communist Party because he has always been an outspoken anti-Stalinist. Not even that he is one of the Attorney General's "subversives" as he is Erie County chairman of the Socialist Party. No, Schuetz was out of the plant because, according to the Army, he "lacks the integrity necessary to work on or have access to classified contracts." His integrity was enough for him to work through the major part of World War II on government contracts at Bell Aircraft, where he has built up ten years seniority. His integrity was high enough for him to see five years of service in the U. S. Navy and gain two honorable discharges.

His integrity surely could not have been in question. He might be a good guy for Bell Aircraft to get rid of, however, if it wants a docile labor force. Local 501 called the firing of Schuetz on Army orders the initiation of "a union busting program of very wide scope." This is a mild understatement and the employment of lawyers to handle the security appeal seemed a completely inadequate way for a "militant" union to cope with this direct attack upon it. Schuetz's eventual reinstatement through personal negotiation between Walter Reuther and top Defense Department officials added nothing to the solution.

Examples of Labor's Screening Program

Despite the legal defense of Schuetz by the UAW, there is no indication that the union or the labor movement generally is aware of the full potency of the screening program. Certainly, labor officials have neither opposed the program (with the exception of the Seafarers International Union, AFL and a very few others) nor have they aggressively sought to control it. On the contrary, a number of unions have welcomed the program as working to their short-range advantage.

The National Maritime Union CIO has attempted to use the Coast Guard screening program to purge all opposition to the administration of Joe Curran (affectionately called "Papa Joe" in the *Pilot*). At the 1950 union convention, the first recorded vote was on a legionnaire "all-out Americanism" resolution, which had been so carefully rigged that endorsement of it was an implied endorsement of Curran. The names of those who refused to vote or who voted in opposition were published in the *Pilot* with a charge impugning their loyalty. Loyalty to whom was not stated. NMU men who have been preliminarily screened off ships get no help from the union. Fortunately,

even the Coast Guard is learning something about maritime union politics and, after early faltering, is not putting much credence in the resolution vote.

Jim Carey's International Electrical Workers—CIO is satisfied when the government screens from the industry local leaders of its CIO-ousted UE competitions. The future of the labor movement and democracy would be better served if Carey came to the aid of some of his opposition.

Different Agencies With One Method

Exactly what is this security screening program? Walter Gellhorn has written a book, *Security, Loyalty, and Science*, about it. It is a good book and a fairly long one but far from even a *factual* presentation of *all* the ramifications of the program. Different agencies have entirely different procedures and criteria governing their actions. Government employees face the Loyalty Boards and the Attorney General's Subversive List. They may also face the Atomic Energy Commission's Personnel Security Review Board or the Army-Navy-Air Force Personnel Security Board. They might face all three. If they do, they face entirely different criteria for clearance. The only thing they can be sure of is that in all cases they face subjective judgments beyond their control or refutation.

Look at the criteria governing just one of these boards—the Industrial Employment Review Board, that handles appeals from persons who have been barred from classified employment in private industry. Access to military information classified confidential shall be refused to individuals who the board has reasonable grounds to believe are "emotionally unstable" or who are lacking in "the integrity, discretion, and responsibility" essential to the security of the information. One of these may be the only charge. Trying to think up an answer and proof to the contrary could make anyone emotionally unstable. How prove this specialized "essential integrity"—To search one's soul for incidents on non-integrity, to confess them, and to try to explain them seems the only defense. Yet to stoop to this may well destroy one's true integrity.

The ingrained response of a socialist to the security screening program business is to reject it as wholly bad in concept and impossible of becoming procedurally acceptable. Maybe this is so but that decision is not so patly come by if the status of the struggle for political and economic democracy is viewed from a world perspective. Individual injustices in America under such a program can grow to a point where all workers face it's threat.

There is still time for unions to become aware of the dangers of this program, which, if it continues to develop, will destroy them as representatives of the workers and reduce them to instruments of the governmental will. The unions can still act to see that the program is not expanded, that procedures are corrected to regain for the individual the presumption of innocence and the dignity of his own beliefs, and that the individual worker is protected against the acts of even his own union.

ROWLAND WATTS

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The Legal Basis of the Garrison State

The Juridical Treatment of Conscientious Objection

SLOWLY YET RELENTLESSLY the United States is being transformed into the Garrison State. In full bloom (or decay) the Garrison State is governed by the specialists in violence. These, of course, include the military, but since modern warfare is an extremely complex technological phenomenon, we must add to them the engineers, the physical scientists, and the social scientists also. The latter have the task of manipulation: the human beings who happen to inhabit the Garrison State must be molded into conformity, accommodation, and allegiance; and those within the rival state must be molded contrariwise. No profession or skill escapes transformation; each becomes specialized in those aspects directly pertaining to violence.

In such a situation the conscientious objector is at best an oddity, an anomaly, and more likely to be conceived of as—a traitor. But before we consider his role, let us complete our sketch of the social framework within which it will occur.

The Garrison State is characterized by a distinctive form of economic organization, the *permanent war economy*. Stability of this economy is predicated upon the continuance of a level of crisis high enough to justify great expenditure on rapidly outmoded equipment for inflicting (or "protection from") violence, and on the continuous stockpiling of materials for strategic reserves rather than for use. Given the full development of the permanent war economy, it is possible that plant and equipment will be drafted in the same manner as manpower has been in the past.

Initially only males will be conscripted into military service. However, we may anticipate an eventual extension of such conscription to females. They have, of course, served on a voluntary basis so far, but in Great Britain conscription of women has occurred.

Eventually, individuals will be conscripted not only for service in the traditional military services but also for all varieties of employment related to the institution of war. As H. D. Lasswell has expressed it:

In the garrison state there must be work—and the duty to work for all. Since all work becomes public work, all who do not accept employment flout military discipline.

Given the Garrison State and compulsory labor on behalf of it, it is extremely likely that conscientious objection will continue to exist as a social problem. As compulsory labor will encompass far larger numbers of citizens than did the draft for military service in the past, and as it is to be anticipated that women will be drafted for compulsory labor in the same manner as men, the state may well have to deal with a larger number of conscientious objectors than it did in the last war. Thus, the problem of the conscientious objector becomes one of peculiar significance to our society, and for more reasons than are immediately apparent.

First, the manner in which the problem of the conscientious objector is handled will afford an index of the extent to which the State still acknowledges a respect for the individual and his right of conscience. If the State is willing to tolerate a challenge to the institution of war—and in the Garrison State war is, indeed, the health of the State—it is extremely likely that the State will grant some rights in spheres not so important to it. Thus, to the extent to which those concerned with democratic values are able to maintain recognition of the right of conscientious objection, to that extent they are likely to be able to maintain other liberties highly prized by them.

It follows from this that in the early stages of the Garrison State not only should, and will, those who have a belief in democratic values be concerned with the problem of conscientious objection, but also the administrators of the Garrison will give the problem considerable attention. Since the conscientious objector will not have been completely eradicated in the early stages of the Garrison State, the administrators will face a sizeable morale problem arising out of the fact that in the garrisoned United States will have evolved from a democratic state whose ideology contained broad assertions concerning inalienable rights of the individual. Thus, there will exist individuals who have internalized the ethic of the earlier democratic era and who feel considerable concern about the invasion of civil liberties. These individuals, the atavistic democrats, will be using the problem of conscientious objection as a prime index of the extent to which liberties are

A Portent of the Future

Setting themselves up as final arbiters of their own rights, they deserted their duties in the work of national importance to which they had been assigned by lawfully constituted authority. They ask this court to reverse their conviction. . . for no better excuse than would justify in wartime a deserting soldier to be shot.

It is long past high time that able-bodied young male citizens of the United States, who claim that their religious convictions prevent their taking up arms in defense of the nation which guarantees them religious freedom, should learn that they cannot flaunt to the extent of disobedience of the law their exemption from military service.

(Kramer vs. United States, 147 F. 2d 756, 758, 6th Cir. 1945.)

being maintained. The garrison administrators may well decide to secure the support, or tolerance, of these atavists, and thereby facilitate the functioning of their state, by continuing to recognize the conscientious objectors. The question is one of price. If there are only a few conscientious objectors, their recognition is a cheap price to pay in order to reassure the atavists. But, at that point where the administrators feel that too many individuals will become conscientious objectors, the category will be abandoned and conscientious objectors will become "traitors" and "enemies of the state," to be dealt with accordingly. Hence, the problem of the conscientious objector is of importance, not only to the objectors themselves, but also to the garrison administrators and the atavistic democrats.

A Gauge of Legal Principles

Another reason for the peculiar significance of the treatment of the conscientious objector is that the manner in which this problem is handled will be indicative of the extent to which the jurisprudential principle of individual responsibility in war, perhaps the most important legal principle evolved in World War II, is regarded as an operative legal principle to be applied not only in those states which lose wars but also in those which are victorious. This results from the fact, as Justice Jackson asserts, that the Charter of the Nuremberg trials recognizes that the doctrines of superior orders and acts of state will no longer protect individuals who commit criminal acts during the conduct of a war. Indeed, membership in an organization which is found guilty of crimes indictable under the Nuremberg Charter may of itself make the individual guilty because of his abdication of moral responsibility. In the words of Justice Jackson:

The Nazi party, under the "Führerprinzip," was bound by an iron discipline into a pyramid, with the Führer, . . . at the top and broadening into a numerous Leadership Corps, composed of overlords of a very extensive Party membership at the base. By no means all of those who may have supported the movement in one way or another were actual Party members. The membership took the Party oath which in effect, amounted to an abdication of personal intelligence and moral responsibility. This was the oath: "I vow absolute obedience to him and to the leaders he designated for me." The membership in daily practice followed its leaders with an idolatry and self-surrender more Oriental than Western.

The question may well be asked as to how far this matter of individual responsibility can be carried. Judging from the *Yamashita* case a military tribunal is to be permitted extreme latitude in inferring a relationship between ostensible leadership and actual perpetration of the criminal act. Also, it must be noted that a wide variety of activities may bring one within the proscriptions of the Nuremberg Charter. Thus, statesmen, military leaders, diplomats, and businessmen may all be guilty of participating in the planning of aggressive war. Similarly, medical men and members of the judiciary may be guilty of war crimes. There would appear to be no reason why the principle enunciated would not be applicable to all varieties of scientists and planners who work for a war effort which, by ex post facto determination, proves to have been aggressive or unjustified. However, there is a suggestion of

some limitation of the principle of individual responsibility. It has been said that it would not apply to a mere conscripted private in a firing squad: he, Justice Jackson asserts, could hardly be expected to hold an inquest into the validity of the execution. With this possible exception, the conclusion seems inescapable that the individual must be constantly on his guard lest change in the administrative structure of the state change, in turn, his position from one of innocence to guilt. For example, many civil servants and administrative officials in Germany were transferred into the security police, found at Nuremberg to be a proscribed organization. Such individuals were liable to be found guilty of membership in an organization declared by the Tribunal to be criminal.

Dilemma of the Individual

From this discussion it should be clear that *the principle of individual responsibility has been firmly implanted in the international law of war and that the individual has a legal duty not to partake in criminal acts relating to war.* The individual acts at his own peril when he participates in any way in a war undertaken by his nation. It is his responsibility to determine whether the war is justified or aggressive, and to cooperate or oppose accordingly.

It remains to be seen whether this principle will be held to be operative in our domestic community, as it is now in the world community, whether the state will permit the individual to act as he insists he must. Of course, it is quite possible that references to this body of international law as binding upon members of the domestic community will be brushed aside, as have been, for example, reference to treaties renouncing war in earlier attempts by conscientious objectors to act in conformity with enunciated principles of policy in the United States.

It can be asserted with confidence that if these principles are to be regarded as operative within the United States many of the assertions made by members of our judiciary regarding conscientious objectors will, of necessity, cease to be good law. One can hardly proclaim it the duty of every individual to assume responsibility for his own actions in a war and, at the same time, castigate the individual who would assume such responsibility. Yet this is exactly what was done on innumerable occasions during the last war.

Many examples could be cited. In one case, an objector was so shocked by the dropping of atomic bombs in Japan that he felt it his duty to cease to cooperate with a state which used such devices. Accordingly, he left the camp for conscientious objectors to which he had been assigned. For this exercise of personal responsibility the objector was imprisoned. One may wonder what becomes of personal responsibility when objectors are referred to in the following manner:

If half the young men would decide to violate some law or refuse to abide by some rule of law of which they disapprove, we would have anarchy. The purpose and effect of such an attitude would be so plain that it would be impossible not to conclude that such citizens are at heart traitors to their country.

(Hopkins, J., *Ex parte Billings*, 46 F. Supp. 663, 668; Kan. 1941. *Isfluch & Kan.* 1942).

Elsewhere on this page appears the statement of another court which castigated individuals who have attempted to assume that responsibility which now appears to be called for by international law.

If these "traitors," "flaunters of the law," and "deserters" are not permitted to persist in their position as a matter of right, we may, indeed, conclude that the war crimes trials were rites for the exculpation of tribal guilt rather than serious attempts to enunciate new principles of law to apply in the world community.

The Legal Apparatus for Authoritarianism

From this cursory survey of the problem it should be apparent that the problem of conscientious objection is no mere matter of some few thousand individuals who manifest a particular form of deviant behavior. Its significance is heightened when we examine it in connection with the treatment received by the American citizens of Japanese extraction in the last war. Examining these two problems together we are driven to the conclusion that in the United States today we have a respectable body of legal authority upon which to base a full-blown authoritarian order.

In speaking of the implications of the Japanese exclusion cases, Professor Rostow of Yale Law School has stated:

... (1) protective custody, extending over three or four years, is a permitted form of imprisonment in the United States; (2) political opinions, not criminal acts, may contain enough clear and present danger to justify such imprison-

ment; (3) men, women and children of a given ethnic group, both Americans and resident aliens, can be presumed to possess the kind of dangerous ideas which require their imprisonment; (4) in time of war or emergency the military, perhaps without even the concurrence of the legislature, can decide what political opinions require imprisonment, and which ethnic groups are infected with them; and (5) the decision of the military can be carried out without indictment, trial, examination, jury, the confrontation of witnesses, counsel for the defense, the privilege against self-incrimination or any of the other safeguards of the Bill of Rights.

Add to these the principles which have emerged in the law of conscientious objection: the fact that the state may discriminate among its citizens on the basis of religious belief; that civilians may be ordered to work in labor camps from which they have no right to leave; that civilians may be required to work without compensation; that the military may control civilians in such labor camps. One discerns a frightening fact: *American jurisprudence has imbedded in it today principles of law suitable only for a totalitarian state.* Certainly in the face of the emergence of such principles in the permanent crisis state, citizens of this democracy can no longer afford to view the problem of conscientious objection with equanimity. In essence, *the problem of conscientious objection is the problem of the survival of freedom in these United States.*

RICHARD W. RABINOWITZ

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For a Conscientious Objector

Where lies the evil? In ourselves
in part, most near to change;
by curing it we cleanse the world
(project of thought) that way
perfection and a world of saints
we do not have! — How to start?
With The Immediate. Living in a sphere
of shame supposes for the free
great suffering: now in this land
the free are suffering.

— Entered the poster room, said
"There's something the Conscription Act
has not made provision for."

"What?" They cried. "He answered 'Me'."
Charles has new homage in his words;
by being what he is, aspires
thousands of years, shadowing a life
full of the fervor of a hybrid
plant. Nothing can kill the electricity
of A Will (as he sat in the dock)
an indistinctly-charged coil
yet from which ebbed
cycles of planned change.

"You are a child" They said. "We'll give
you several weeks to change
your mind." — Then, jail.

HOWARD GRIFFIN

William Faulkner: Artist in Dilemma

Sin, Society and the Southern Tradition

MAXWELL GEISMAR, in his *Writers in Crisis*, acutely points out that there is a great deal of significance in William Faulkner's juxtaposition of the Negro and the female. Although agreeing that a proper analysis of the juxtaposition is important in understanding Faulkner, I disagree with Geismar's conclusions in regard to the whys and wherefores of the combination. Geismar, viewing Faulkner as something akin to a literary Senator Bilbo, depicts the artist as threatening "the entire western hemisphere with the rape of the Negro." His juxtaposition is explained away very simply: Faulkner's "great hatred" is modern industrial society. He is discontented with two main figures in this society — the female (who is now degraded, no longer the sacrosanct Southern lady) and the emancipated Negro (the savage, as Faulkner feels, for whom the Southern lady was sacrificed, "the degenerate who will dominate the civilization which freed him.") He therefore unites the two products of the "great hatred" and "spawns out of this modern union the colored degenerate who is, to reign supreme, the moronic emperor of the future."

What Geismar does in this criticism is to paint Faulkner in our traditional concept of the Southerner, thus completely overlooking the complex psychological motivations and contradictions in him. The Negro is more to Faulkner than a blight upon the white South (a South for whose ante-bellum traditions Faulkner, undoubtedly, has a strong attachment); the Negro is a personality for whose suffering he feels guilty, both personally and as a part of the white South. The female is more than a decadent product of modern society. She is a personal psychological problem of William Faulkner's. To treat the female as being Calvinistically damned is to remove the necessity of explaining her *raison d'être* in human terms, and to treat the Negro in the same way takes the responsibility for his plight in the South out of the reach of human hands. We shall discuss how Faulkner, juxtaposing the two, rationalizes the guilt complex which has sprung from his contradictory attitude toward the Negro. My aim here is to further explain the contradiction and its many facets, and perhaps by so doing to add something to current explanations of 'what makes Faulkner tick.'

The Female "Fury" as a Destructive Force

Two of Faulkner's major works, (*Absalom! Absalom!* and *Light in August*) and a few of his short stories, are dominated by sexual relationships between Negro men and white women. The theme is evidently important in Faulkner's thought pattern. In order to understand the significance of a relationship between what Maxwell Geismar calls the "twin furies," it is necessary to first examine each "fury" separately.

Faulkner's females are predominantly destructive forces in the sense that they are the agents through which

men (both Negro and white) meet their downfall. The sex of the female is so overpowering and so all-pervading that it is impossible to escape the impression that in talking about the female, Faulkner is talking about a personal complex by which he is haunted. In "Mistral" somebody says:

You know: girls: They are not anything, then they are everything before your eyes. No not eyes: it's the same in the dark. You know it before they do; it's not their becoming everything that you dread: it's their finding it out after you have long known it: you die too many times. And that's not right. Not fair. I hope I never have a daughter.

In "Hair":

There's not any such thing as a woman born bad, because they are all born bad, born with the badness in them. The thing is, to get them married before the badness comes to a natural head.

And in *Intruder in the Dust*:

... he was too young yet to escape from the world of women for that brief respite before he escaped back into it to remain until the hour of his death.

The male is doomed to drown in a sea of female-ness. The corrupting female is corrupting on two levels. She is, on the one hand, a being who has been inherently evil and overpowering since the beginning of time. Lena Groves and Mrs. McEachern of *Light in August*, Narcissa Benbow of *Sartoris* and Eulalia Bon of *Absalom! Absalom!* for instance, (although all three are entirely different types of personalities), are "eternal woman" in the sense that no change in surrounding can possibly affect the type of destructive power which they have over the men with whom they come in contact. The second group of women, Temple Drake, Narcissa Benbow (now a new Narcissa) and Little Belle of *Sanctuary*, Miss Burden of *Light in August* and Charlotte Rittenmeyer of *The Wild Palms*, while naturally possessing the morbid woman-seeds by Faulknerian definition, have their "bitchery" developed specifically and pointedly by modern society. They are the college girls,

with that identical cool, innocent, unabashed expression which he knew so well in their eyes, above the savage identical paint upon their mouths. . . .

and Charlotte who, in desperately trying to escape our civilization, is, to Harry, the perpetual symbol of the civilization, a woman from whom sex is spiritually absent (in the form of "sweetness and light"), although it is screamingly physically present — Charlotte who has more masculine qualities than has Harry. It is therefore ironic that Harry should choose Charlotte as a partner with whom to escape from his society, since Charlotte is completely a representative of that society.

In the second group, too, we can place Elly of "Elly" and Caddie Compson of *Sound and Fury*. They are the

virgins for whom losing their virginity was the only means of finding an absolute (albeit a negative one), the only way in which they could assert their individual will in the modern Jefferson which threatens to drag them down with it to the all-pervading Southern doom.

The Omnipotence of Female Sinfulness

No matter in which of the innumerable ways we find the woman destroying the man in Faulkner, we realize that the destruction, through the physical sex of the woman, takes place with the act of sin. It is Puritan-like sexual taboo which is constantly being disobeyed in Faulkner. In *Light in August* he constantly refers to "God's abomination of womanflesh," to woman as being placed on earth as an irresistible agent with which to attract sin. *Woman-sinning* is a Faulknerian word. This Puritan concept of the sin inherent in sex seems to be a personal phobia of Faulkner's. Without it he couldn't possibly exaggerate the importance of the female as a destructive force to the point of making her practically omnipotent. Perhaps his description of Quentin Compson's 'incest' in the appendix to *Sound and Fury* explains it:

Quentin III: . . . who loved not the idea of the incest which he would not commit, but some presbyterian concept of its eternal punishment.

Faulkner never attempts to rationally explain the immense significance of the sex of the female, probably because it is an intense emotional, rather than a rational, idea for him. And so he relieves himself of the necessity for having to explain it by considering the female a Calvinistically damned being, an evil created on earth by God as part of His design, like the 'Jezebel' in *Light in August*.

The Suffering Negro "Fury"

Of the second "fury": We realize that Faulkner is drawing (in Joe Christmas, Lucas Beauchamp, Charles Bon, etc.), intensely sympathetic pictures of Negroes who are victimized by white society, and are suffering. They are all really Joe Christmas

jabbing his shovel into the sawdust slowly and steadily and hard, as though he were chopping up a buried snake ("or a man," Mooney said). . . .

Christmas who

could see it like a printed sentence, fullborn and already dead God loves me too like the faded and weathered letters on last year's billboard God loves me too.

They are all reacting to the same stimulus: Joe Christmas when he kills the spinster because she prayed over him, Charles Bon when he corrupts Henry Sutpen, Lucas Beauchamp who "don't want no field nigger pictures in the house."

These are not men who act in a vacuum. Their actions are completely and sympathetically explained by Faulkner as stemming from a repressive white society. And it is as a member of that society that Faulkner feels the guilt of the South. The significance of his numerous references to the mass Negro as patient and enduring, as the cross which the white South has to bear, etc., is that the over-bearing Negro presence is the unrelenting physical symbol of the white guilt. . . a guilt intensified because

the Negro is completely cognizant of it. In *Intruder in the Dust*, when it seems that Lucas will be lynched for a crime he didn't commit:

They were acting just as Negroes and whites both expected Negroes to act at such a time; they were still there, they had not fled, you just didn't see them — a sense a feeling of their constant presence and nearness. . . not crouching cringing shrinking, not in anger and not quite in fear: just waiting, biding since theirs was an armament which the white man could not match nor — if he but knew it — even cope with. . . this land was a desert and a witness, this empty road is postulate of the deliberate turning as with one back of the whole dark people on which the very economy of the land itself was founded, not in heat or anger nor even regret, but in one irremediable invincible inflexible repudiation, upon not a racial outrage but a human shame.

The Negro, like the female, is Calvinistically damned. Miss Burden's father says, in *Light in August*,

Remember this, Your grandfather and brother are lying there murdered not by one white man, but by the curse which God put on a whole race before your grandfather or your brother or me were ever thought of. A race doomed and cursed to be forever and ever a part of the white race's doom and curse for its sins. . . the curse of every white child that ever was born and that ever will be born. None can escape it.

And again, as in the case of the female, damnation by an untouchable source takes the problem out of the reach of human hands.

Faulkner's Ties to the Old South

There are so many aspects of Faulkner to be considered in analyzing the significance of the juxtaposition of the Negro and female, that if we seem to be flitting from one element to another it is only because they all play a part in the background of the juxtaposition. Let us consider Faulkner's nostalgic feeling for the ante-bellum South. Benjy's association of Caddie with trees and rain is one aspect of this. Faulkner's allusions to the wonders of elemental nature are made with an air of longing for that which once was, but can no longer be. It certainly cannot exist in the modern mechanized Southern society. It would only be in the old agricultural South that such communing with nature would be possible. This is not to say, of course, that Faulkner approved of the slave economy upon which the gentility of the planter class was based. On the contrary, he states in *Absalom! Absalom!* that it was based upon 'moral brigandage.' However, by attaching such great value to a phenomenon which cannot exist in today's society, he is (since he finds at least that positive value in the slave society, while he finds nothing but negative values in modern society) accepting the society in which the Negro is held in bondage in preference to the one in which he is free.

We know that Quentin Compson commits suicide because he cannot adjust to modern society. Sending Quentin to Harvard is abortive because "the iron New England dark" is representative of the civilization which has spread down to throttle the genteel tradition of which the Compson ancestry was a part, a tradition from which Quentin finds it impossible to disentangle himself, thus making it impossible for him to live in a society in which it no

longer has a place. We get the feeling that Quentin would not have committed suicide in the ante-bellum South. It is important that Faulkner, at least by implication, tells us that his character *would* have been able to adjust to the plantation society; none of his characters are ever able to adjust themselves to modern society. The Reverend Hightower, who has voluntarily become a sort of pariah in Jefferson, could conceivably exist quite peaceably in the ante-bellum South.

It is because Faulkner assigns the only positive values we find in his work (the ability of the individual to adjust to society, and the beauty of primitive nature) to the ante-bellum South, that we realize he has nostalgic desires toward that civilization of which his own ancestry was so much a part. We also cannot escape noticing the even embarrassing lushness of scene and nobility of character he paints of the ante-bellum aristocracy in *Sartoris* and *Unvanquished*. And it is this feeling of Faulkner for the "Southern heritage" which, because it necessarily involves an acceptance of a slave society, contradicts what we discussed earlier as his strong sympathy for the Negro as a victim of the white South. This contradiction on one level results in a philosophical contradiction as well.

Human Perfectability Versus Original Sinfulness

The conflicting philosophies are the Calvinist versus the humanistic concept of the basic nature of man. The humanistic concept (of man being ultimately perfectable, without the interference of divine guidance) lies at the root of the Faulkner who objectively views, and strongly criticizes, the baseness in the nature of the Jefferson townspeople who are responsible for the suffering of the Negro. The polemical *Intruder in the Dust* expresses a faith in the expiation of the South's guilt, when it speaks of

... man... conceptible of pity and justice and conscience even if only in the recollection of his long painful aspiration toward them toward that something anyway of one serene universal light.

If the humanitarian philosophy is connected with one aspect of Faulkner (his sympathy with the Southern Negro), it, coupled with the contradictory aspect of which we spoke earlier, the nostalgia for the old South, is what gives rise to the Calvinist philosophy expressed so often throughout his work. It is only through talking about an order in which freedom-of-the-will cannot be exercised, an order in which the Negro has been damned from the beginning,

... the curse which God put on a whole race before your grandfather or your brother or me were ever thought of...

that Faulkner can at least partially alleviate the guilt complex which arises from his "Southern heritage" overshadowing his sense of justice, for after all, what can be done in the face of God's wrath?

I believe it is the intense guilt complex, and the attempt to alleviate it, which is at the base of Faulkner's juxtaposition of the Negro and the Female. The white female, whose sex is the agent of miscegenation, most outstandingly in *Light in August*, is responsible for spread-

ing the "curse" (God's curse of the existence of the black race, which must be borne by the whites) in a more intense form, because she is *physically* spreading the black curse into the white race. The juxtaposition in this sense serves the purpose of using the female as an earthly cause of the intensification of the South's all-pervading problem. She is the diabolical female who, usually sinning to spread the evil, 'with hate loves and cohabits.'

The Universality of Female Vindictiveness

And the juxtaposition is particularly meaningful in this sense: Faulkner regards the female as a personal, universal cause of the lessening of man's statute. She is Charlotte and the pregnant woman in *The Wild Palms*, who cause Harry and the convict — for they are really the same person — to escape from the world of women into the safety of prison. She is nagging Belle Sartoris Benbow, whose husband, Horace, is tired of carrying home dripping packages of shrimp once a week for ten years. She is Lena Groves, who inspires the remark, "But what woman, good or bad, has ever suffered from any brute as men have suffered from good women?" And to Joe Christmas, she is Mrs. McEachern, whom he wouldn't tell that at night he escaped from his bedroom window by a rope; the waitress, who he wouldn't tell where he got the money which he gave her; Miss Burden, whom he didn't tell he was making whiskey on her grounds; to him she signifies that he was "doomed to conceal always something from the women who surrounded him." And he regards the Negro as the mass, Southern cause of the same thing. In *Intruder in the Dust*, Faulkner says, "Folks don't start lynchings by daylight because then they would have to see one another's faces." And Lucas Beauchamp, who has been adjudged not guilty of a crime for which he was almost lynched, was "now tyrant over the whole county's white conscience." When Faulkner talks of Peter Grimm slashing Joe Christmas' loins; of the three years of the white boy's youth spent in impotent anguish at the symbol of the Negro, Lucas Beauchamp, spurning his money; of the beast-like qualities which McLendon displays in "Dry September" after having taken the Negro, Will Mayes, on a "ride" to kill him, we feel that he is blaming the Negro as being an inescapable source of destruction to the higher human qualities of the white Southerner. Thus, what better juxtaposition for Faulkner, than the scourge of the individual man (the female) and the scourge of the South (the Negro). Put them together as twin furies, Calvinistically damned and powerful, and the most important aspects of Southern manhood (and of William Faulkner) are accounted for as being victimized by the pre-determined combined furies.

Negro Victims of Female Fury

Finally, what better reason for juxtaposing the Negro and the female than to use the female as the greatest agent of the Negro suffering. She is the primogenitive source of creation, therefore the female womb is the original earthly cause of the suffering Negro's existence. It is the fault of the white female that the mullatoes, Joe Christmas and Paul, of "Elly," suffer, for her "abomination and bitchery" have given birth to them. And in a personal sense,

many of Faulkner's Negroes meet their final downfall through the agency of woman: It is because of his relationship with Elly that Paul is killed. (Paul, indeed, whose answer to Elly's plea is "I never marry them," is indicative of the ice-like defense he has built up against suffering caused by women.); Will Mayes is killed because of the lies told by Minnie Cooper; and Joe Christmas, who dies because he killed Miss Burden for praying over him had realized much earlier:

It was the woman: that soft kindness which he believed himself doomed to be forever victim of and which he hated worse than he did the hard and ruthless justice of men.

And so Faulkner's personal fury, woman, eats into the other fury—she is the more powerful of the two. By making the Negro the victim of a pre-damned female, isn't Faulkner lifting the guilt for the Negro's suffering from the shoulders of white Southern manhood?

Values Debilitated by Modern Society

The third force in Faulkner's cosmos—modern society—is one which makes the juxtaposition even more fitting. For it is particularly within the modern, industrial South that the female plays the role she does in the life of man in general, and the Negro male, specifically. If we spoke earlier of the female as being an omnipotent force, we meant it only in relative terms, for modern society is, in Faulkner's world, the *final* despoiler of all in it which he values. The mechanized society has produced the mill workers and the mechanics of Jefferson, the dull-eyed men who, when they are through with the day's work, stand in front of the barbershop and sit on the steps of the courthouse. They are the Klansmen, who *must* hate Negroes, because that one method of *white-man* assertion helps alleviate the doom of being just one more exactly-alike robot in an industrial civilization. The civilization has two specific relationships to the female. First, by obliteration of all else that Faulkner considers as human values (thus forcing him to create the result-people who inspired Andre Gide to remark that Faulkner's characters have no soul) the society makes the value of sex, and therefore the power of the female, much greater.

Second, modern society is the only force powerful enough to overcome and further corrupt the female. Only once, in all of Faulkner, does any one thing overpower the female: in *Sanctuary*, when Popeye completely corrupts Temple Drake. Temple, being Faulkner's female, had the seeds of that corruption already in her, but it takes Popeye to bring this inner potential to external flower. And, as Malcolm Cowley so acutely points out, Faulkner leaves no doubt in our mind that Popeye is the symbol of modern industrial society. He fits in with the traditional picture of the bourgeois, capitalist society, divorced from esthetic appreciation—he was the man who "made money and had nothing he could do with it, spend it for, since he knew that alcohol would kill him like poison, who had no friends and had never known a woman." He is described in mechanical terms. His eyes "looked like rubber knobs." His tight suit and stiff hat were all angles "like a modernistic lampshade." In general, "he had that vicious depthless quality of stamped tin." Thus, Faulkner uses modern

society as an additional cover-up for the guilt complex by considering it the cause for the suffering of the Negro at the hands of the white South; and for his suffering at the hands of the now completely corrupted female. In this sense, modern society has intensified the reasons for the juxtaposition—the female is more vicious, and the Negro exerts a stronger hold upon the white South.

Thus so we have a picture of a guilt complex and various attempts, notably the juxtaposition of the Negro and female, to rationalize the guilt. It is difficult to escape the sense of desperation in Faulkner's attempts to pull together the conflicting elements within him; and the Faulkner who is trying to adjust to the modern Southern society, for which he essentially feels a repulsion, is truly the Quentin Compson who answers Shreve's

"Why do you hate the South?,"

with,

"I don't hate it". . . I don't hate it he thought, panting in the cold air, the iron New England dark; I don't. I don't! I don't hate it! I don't hate it!

MARGARET LEVI

Margaret Levi is a graduate student at Brown University in the Department of American Civilization.

Done

And again a morning
And again an evening
And yet another morning
And still another evening
So turns the mill
Of daily living —
Oh, grainless mill!
Turns empty, in vain;
The song is done.

The weeks slip by
And the years they flee
Full of tedious nothings,
Full of endless wars.
The nonsensical rattle!
And the useless crosses!
And all our babble
Presages just one thing:
The song is done.

— HELMUT HIRSCH

(From *Amerika, du Morgenroete; Verses einer Fluechtlings* 1939-1942. Copyright 1947 by the Willard Publishing Company. Translated from the German by Felix Singer).

Spotlighting the Nation's Campus

Temple - Ithaca - Chicago

Loyalty Oaths at Temple

REGISTRATION FOR THE February-June semester at Temple University unexpectedly confronted students with the following statement, requiring their signature:

"Attendance at the University is a privilege and not a right. The University reserves the right, and the student concedes to the University the right, to require the withdrawal of any student at any time for any reason deemed sufficient to it and no reason for requiring such withdrawal need be given."

This was, in its effect upon what students believed to be their scholastic right of free inquiry, a change from a previous statement in the back pages of the university catalogue, not a contract, reading to the effect that students may be expelled for "serious irregularity of conduct."

Literally hundreds of students felt that, perhaps, their legal "rights" had not actually changed, but the clause calling for no hearings, etc., was too much, ethically speaking. Remarks such as "signed under protest" were written on many forms. A number of students signed only when they were told they could not complete registration without signing.

Surprisingly, many radicals accepted the new statement almost without question, as an unavoidable part of the well-planned anti-left hysteria of the day. The off-campus YPA took immediate action, coming out with a poorly worded, generally ill-conceived petition, prominently displaying the words "donated by YPA."

Soon thereafter radicals organized in the Socialist Club, a grouping of Socialist Party sympathizers, unaffiliated Third-Camp socialists and *Monthly Review*-type communists, corrected their earlier passivity.

Individual Socialist Club members began a barrage of letters to the *Temple News*, whose editor, a member of SDA, had come out apologetically in favor of the new statement. The YPA was criticized by the Socialist Club for taking premature, unilateral action; its petition disappeared from circulation.

The Club then passed a resolution condemning the new statement and moved to call a student protest meeting. Leaders of campus NAACP, SDA and other groups promised attendance at a caucus to plan the protest meeting.

Student Senate Protests

Meanwhile, in spite of the pleas of the *News* editor, a lameduck Student Senate condemned the statement 18-1 and set up a committee to have the policy changed. This

seemed like old times to a Senate which had begun its term by condemning the Mundt-Ferguson Bill, but had done little the rest of the year except debate dates of class dances, and kill NSA's effectiveness, such as it was, on campus.

At this point the Temple administration realized a faux pas had been committed. It attempted to pull its chestnuts out of the fire and at the same time split student strength and thus save parts of its statement.

Dean of Students A. Blair Knapp, enforcer of student policies, called a press conference. Admitting to questioners that he would make no legal changes, he promised an ethical switch. Students will now have to sign a statement saying they "have read" (do not necessarily agree with) the original catalogue wording. The offensive language has been removed—the iron fist is velveted.

Realizing the impossibility of continuing the fight without liberal support, the Socialist Club, dropped the campaign after a fruitless caucus meeting of campus leaders. Liberals vaguely mumbled something about pressing for student-administration committees on discipline "sometime in the fall." The university's "compromise" had gained it a California-like round.

Meanwhile a Co-ordinating Committee Against Senate Bill 27, the so-called Pechan Loyalty Oath Bill still pending before the Pennsylvania State Legislature, was formed by representatives of the Socialist Club, liberal groups, and several student members of the off-campus YPA. The bill, also opposed by large numbers of teachers and businessmen in this area, has been amended several times but still retains the oath-signing feature. A student protest meeting in early May was poorly attended, but if the Legislature does not slip it over on us during the summer, the committee will meet again to carry on the fight.

The American Legion has meanwhile come out with charges of un-American and subversive activities at the Penn State College, which have been denied by President Milton S. Eisenhower, brother of the General. The Legion's state convention promised investigation of "reds" in education; liberal educators are opposed to the threat almost to a man and whether anything will come of it is doubtful.

So far the solid front of liberal educators against hysteria has been most encouraging in this area. If student groups keep up their activity, academic terror may be postponed for some time yet. However, the state legislature is not composed of educators. One house has passed a bill outlawing the Communist Party in this state.

MARTY MARTEL

Marty Martel is a student at Temple University.

Ithaca Assembly

THE WORLD ASSEMBLY of Youth, the Western counterpart of the Stalinist International Union of Students, held its first World Conference this Summer at Ithaca, New York. Meeting from August 5th to 16th, delegates came from all over the world. Yet the paralysis of the West, and the lack of imagination of the capitalist-dominated countries was well illustrated by this gathering of young people who could scarcely gather up sufficient energy to make any kind of impression in the public press, in contrast to the wide publicity given to the Stalinist Peace Festival being held concurrently in Berlin.

At first, it seemed symbolic that the American and English-speaking delegates sat on the right, and the African and Asian delegates on the left. It was a meaningless circumstance, however, because the delegations were uniformly timid and uninspired.

There were a few isolated high points at the plenary sessions. One was a speech by a South American delegate—an observer only—with a stirring denunciation of economic imperialism. The compromise resolution finally passed “tactfully” avoided these harsh terms. A good resolution on a WAY technical assistance project was passed. It is a bold plan for WAY, achieved after much argument and discussion. Considering the groups who will be obliged to carry the project out, however, optimism must be curtailed. The only other good resolution in the entire two week meeting was a denunciation of discrimination in all countries of the world. If carried out, the action projects connected with this proposal may be very heartening.

A Generally Insipid Affair

In general, the entire World Assembly of Youth lacked the spirit or imagination usually found in young groups. The reason lies partly in the composition of the groups making up WAY. The Western representatives were predominantly upper class. Britain, for example, where a labor government is even in power, still sent a good majority of Tories and Liberals. And the African and Asian delegates were even more class-restricted. Many of them were actually employees of the colonial powers and therefore not free to represent the interests of their own people. All of this springs inevitably from the kind of groups, i.e. Boy Scouts, YMCA's, etc. which form the backbone of WAY.

Thus, the majority of resolutions passed were meaningless phrases about the United Nations Bill of Human Rights, the main topic under discussion. The resolutions and action projects of this document were so non-controversial that most were passed overwhelmingly with little or no discussion on the meaning of the resolution. The situation was so ludicrous that a photographer taking movies of a vote requested the president to have a few vote against to make the picture look genuine!

Afraid to Take a Principal Position

A bit of life came when an English socialist introduced a test vote on whether the Assembly meant the pious words it was saying—in this case about freedom of movement. The resolution denounced the West Berlin government for

refusing visas to students who wished to attend the Berlin Peace Festival, although pointing out the nature of the Festival. After numerous attempts to prevent the resolution from reaching the floor, the Assembly finally voted by a tremendous majority to substitute the words “Conferences of 1951” for the words “Berlin Peace Festival.” Again it was afraid to call a spade a spade.

An interesting sidelight on the Assembly was the pay of the interpreters. Although hundreds of thousands of dollars had been spent on the Assembly, the workshop and forum interpreters were given minimum expenses only, and told that the small salary that they had been promised was only an unauthorized opinion. Somehow it seemed a sad test of the Assembly that they would underpay even their own workmen. After much bad feeling and confusion, however, at the end of the Assembly the interpreters were actually paid the tiny salary “because some had demanded it so they would have to pay all.”

The spectacle at Ithaca demonstrated a profound lack of imagination and courage on the part of non-Communist youth today. As one delegate said, “If we youth are afraid to even take a principled stand on the important issues of our day, no wonder our governments act as they do.” After Ithaca indeed, no wonder.

MARY COLEMAN

Mary Coleman is a former student at the University of Chicago who is now organizer for a labor union. She attended WAY as one of the American delegates.

Notes from Chicago

WITH THE ELECTION of a Republican-dominated legislature, Illinois has experienced a revival of the legal witch-hunting of two years ago. On January 23, State Senator Broyles introduced four bills aimed at virtually abolishing freedom of political belief.

In response, the student government of the University of Chicago called for the organization of an All Campus Civil Liberties Committee (ACCLC) to fight the passage of these bills. The committee grew rapidly to reach a membership of 100 delegates from practically all campus organizations and residence halls. These delegates represented a majority of the 6500 students on campus with the Young Republicans being the only political group which refused to join.

The committee worked under the Hutchins banner, . . . “the policy of education is better than the policy of repression . . .”, and with the haunting memory of an investigation of the University of Chicago in 1949 by the former Broyle's Subversive Activities Investigating Committee. It began operations with considerable internal friction and hostility, resulting from the wide range of political opinion contained within it. Surprisingly, (to some), this soon gave way to a working unity and spirit of co-operation.

A considerable contribution to this unity was made by about a dozen delegates friendly to the viewpoint of the Politics Club. As a force independent of both the liberal

majority and a vociferous minority of Stalinists and fellow-travellers they pushed successfully for a number of changes in the rules proposed for the organization by the more conservative elements. This was done without in any way catering to the desires of the Stalinists to exploit the campaign against the bills for their own purposes. The steering committee of the ACCLC further contributed to unity by inviting representatives of minority political views to help prepare testimony and to travel with the Springfield delegation on its lobbying trips.

Soon after the formation of the ACCLC, Representative McClintock introduced into the Illinois State Legislature several bills which were substantially the same as the Broyles bills. These bills were reputedly drawn up by the legal staff of the American Legion which solidly backed the bills and Representative McClintock.

The Students Plan of Action

Now fighting two sets of bills, the ACCLC worked along several lines:

1. Spreading information about them on the U. of C. campus and keeping the student body alerted to the threat they presented to academic freedoms.
2. Distributing a petition against the bills (later presented to the legislature).
3. ACCLC members worked with other organizations fighting the bills.
4. Sending students to the State legislature at Springfield to observe the hearings on the bills, lobby and give testimony against them.

On March 6 the ACCLC sent approximately 40 students to Springfield, to the House Military and Veteran's Affairs Committee hearing on the first of the McClintock bills. Most of them went to observe and report back to campus organizations. Some of these students were given the job of lobbying and the chairman of the ACCLC was elected to testify before the Legislative committee against the bill. Fourteen other organizations testified that day, with the only proponents being three representatives of the American Legion.

The better arguments of opponents revealed:

1. That many people would be smeared and their reputations irreparably damaged with no chance to answer charges.
2. A "fear" atmosphere would be created, harmful both to academic freedom and free speech.
3. Labor organizations and non-communist liberal movements might be damaged by having their strength and source of income revealed under investigative procedures.

Hysteria No Alternative to Hysteria

Along with these arguments, others were presented which catered to the prevailing anti-red hysteria. Thus, the CIO-PAC representative suggested as an alternative that the money used for the investigation be devoted instead to shipping subversives back to Russia! Many of the opponents agreed that "something should be done" about the Communists, but that the proposed investigation was not the proper procedure. Others argued that existing laws against criminal syndicalism were sufficient to deal with any "Communist conspiracy."

Just after this hearing Senator Broyles withdrew his original bills and substituted an exact duplicate of Maryland's Ober Act. Evidently, he feared that McClintock and his bills were getting more "popularity" than his own and was anxious to get back on the McCarthy bandwagon.

The broad opposition mustered against the Broyles-McClintock Bills did not prevent their passage. It did, however, influence Illinois governor Stevenson to veto them when they reached his desk. And in a period of hysteria, this is an encouraging note for students who must continue to voice their views in the right places and at the right times.

JOHN ROSS

John Ross is a student in the College of the University of Chicago. He is a member of the editorial committee of Anvil and Student Partisan.

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Philip Wylie: Preacher vs. Society

Reviewing America's Opponent of Momism and Advertising

THERE ARE VARIOUS stages in an individual's progress towards social awareness; the first important one is the realization that the society in which one lives is not what he would like it to be, not even, indeed, what it is generally considered to be. This awakening, which usually occurs during adolescence, is a painful one. It entails a shift of loyalties, a rearrangement of values, and an unhappy necessity for cynicism and distrust.

Philip Wylie is the spokesman for those who suffer this phase. His writing contains some of the most out-spoken denunciations of various aspects of America that have appeared in print. He attacks, venomously and hyperbolically, whatever has come to his attention and is in the slightest degree worthy of such attack. He takes the Cinderella myth to pieces; he beats mom. He pulverizes the ideas and values of businessmen and denudes the Church of its protective robes. He decries the common man and blasts advertising for its cheap and hypocritical pandering.

It would seem that there are many things which deserve such a trouncing, and Mr. Wylie is certainly not to be blamed for experiencing his rude awakening in such a vigorous and outspoken manner. However, it is to be regretted that Mr. Wylie has been experiencing this primary political phase for a long time now, and shows few signs of ever advancing very far past it.

This is regrettable because of his remarkable abilities as a writer and the large audience he has won on the basis of his adeptness at articulating criticisms which many before him have only felt. His following is to be found mainly among young students who find expression of their feelings and release of hostilities in his numerous works, which loudly proclaim him to be for the good and welfare of all.

The Demi-Gods Are Laid Low

Philip Wylie expresses his views in some of the most vigorous and colorful prose to be found in English letters. His vocabulary is tremendous and he handles it masterfully. His sentence structure is powerful and rhythmic, enhanced by a choice usage of such crudities as "big-wigs," "boobies," and "decrepit half-wits" to label demi-gods whom he wishes to dethrone with a vengeance. Mr. Wylie is clever enough to use the pronoun "we" in his denunciation of the American people rather than the more superior and antagonizing "you." The net result of his skill with the language is dogmatic and unqualified, giving the impression that the writer is an omniscient but not unfriendly steamroller which will leave in its wake clear and fallow fields in which to start afresh. Unfortunately, however, after Mr. Wylie's rampage of destruction, he has no clear idea of what to do with his wasteland.

That is precisely what makes Philip Wylie's role one of a preacher, a man who warns that Ninevah shall be

destroyed and begs the individual to reform and live a good and righteous life. There have been many such preachers, from Isaiah to Plato to another vitriolic writer named Jonathan Swift, whose own formulation of the problem reminds one of Wylie's approach: "Man is potentially a rational animal; he has not used his reason. Therefore things are in a mess, and man, having failed, is evil and has produced evil things." The preachers we always have with us, and have had for a good number of centuries. The fact that they are always in the offing implies to us that they have not been entirely successful in their exhortations and that we must look for other reasons than man's incorrigible propensity to irrational behavior for the present state of affairs.

The Destructiveness of Momism

Let us examine one of Mr. Wylie's favorite tirades: the one against Mom. His presentation of her is in the nature of a caricature, somewhat faithful, but exaggerated. She is selfish, greedy, crude and superficial. It is to be noted that his description fits only that group of middle-aged women in our population who are reasonably well-off, and not those who, despite modern contraptions, still have very little free time to devote to making fools of themselves. And then, one may ask, why all the hullabaloo? Granted that these women are time-killing parasites, what then? If Mr. Wylie's aim is to have everyone living life to the fullest and best, he is unassailable, but, if, as it seriously appears, he attributes a large part of the world's ills to the actions of these women, he is in very deep waters indeed. One of his most startling statements on this subject is all-inclusive, and attributes a malicious intent that is, if not hair-at least, eyebrow-raising.

Satan. . . whispering into the ears of girls that the only way they can cushion the shock destined to follow the rude disillusionment that they are not really Cinderella is to institute momworship. . . . The pretty girl then blindfolded her man so he would not see that she was turning from a butterfly into a caterpillar. . . thus the women of America raped the men, not sexually, unfortunately, but morally. . . In a preliminary test of strength, she also got herself the vote and. . . the damage she forthwith did to society was so enormous and so rapid that even the best men lost track of things. Mom's first gracious presence at the ballot-box was roughly concomitant with the start toward a new all-time low in political scurviness, hoodlumism, gangsterism, labor strife, monopolistic thuggery, moral degeneration, civic corruption, smuggling, bribery, theft, murder, homosexuality, drunkenness, financial depression, chaos and war. Note that.

We note it indeed, and with wonder, for it is an impressive list. However, we cannot take this feminist theory of history seriously, and hope that the author of it does not either. Certain of his other statements, though, in regard to the commonness and undesirability of the common man and those who have peopled America ("The melting pot

has turned into a cesspool") make one wonder just where this self-styled super-lover of democracy is heading. He is kind enough to tell us: "If all the people understood themselves, they'd live according to their understanding, and be well, wise and happy, if not particularly wealthy." Although in Mr. Wylie's dream world everyone owns helicopters and summer homes in Ceylon, the proper play of instinct is to him *the* factor in happy living, and materialistic considerations are of no importance. "... Goods are incidental to goodness; they cannot be identified with goodness; a dominant concern with goods always blights goodness and leads the way back to despair." Mr. Wylie is not a sociologist, and would not claim to be one if under duress, but one wishes that he would bring some measure of observation and understanding to his sociological criticisms, instead of relying so heavily on his interpretations of Jung.

Falls Short in Criticism of Advertising

The methods and manners of American advertising are another large target for Mr. Wylie's blundering attacks. He says that he is not against advertising, but merely wishes that it would reform a little and be less hypocritical about reality. This is ridiculous. Advertising is one of the biggest paying businesses in the country. The men who run that business know what they are doing, and what they are doing pays. To say that you are for advertising but you wish it were different means nothing; advertising did not set out to be an honest or aesthetic medium of communication, it set out to sell soap under the present system of production for profit. If one is for the theory of advertising, one must accept what has been proven profitable. If what has been proven profitable is distasteful, one must either be blind to it or accept it as part of the present economic system. But Mr. Wylie, however much he may criticize the mechanics of capitalism or the men who run it, completely ignores the causes for these ills. He equates democracy with capitalism and considers any other "ism" to be merely quack medicine. He states categorically, "Until and unless you find out pragmatically what instinct is, and what its laws are, no theory of government or system for living will be anything but a set of compulsive simulations of instinct." And yet he holds tightly to the status quo; only *other* theories than capitalism, apparently, are included in the above statement, for he defends it to the limit, attacking only its leaders, its methods, and its results.

It is interesting to note that, while Mr. Wylie sees evil where only inevitability exists, he attributes pure and good motives to the power plays of imperialist countries. He pictures America's participation in World War II as something in the nature of a holy crusade to save the world for democracy, and her subsequent activities in Europe and Asia as the results of an altruistic and benevolent desire to see everyone healthy, wealthy and wise.

Wylie's Absurd Conclusions

He speaks in one place about "the immense and self-evident discrepancy between what some men would like to be and what most men actually are." It is to be regretted that the insight that led him to this observation went no

further, and he never saw the "immense and self-evident discrepancy" between what America's leaders say this country is and what actually exists. As a result, Mr. Wylie reaches some absurd conclusions:

America began with the idea of giving to every man an equal chance. The noble thesis that the majority of common men, properly informed, will judge every problem rightly was the philosophy of saying that knowledge of the truth would set men free: each man, and all men. In action, it meant that individual human beings would strive incessantly to become more conscious of reality and would put obligations to others ahead of their own ambitions.

That is democracy. . . The apparent handicap of democracy is inefficiency. . . the uproar in our free press, the fumbling of our Washington bureaucracy, the conflict of our laws, and the disagreements of our leaders are results of democratic behavior. . . "

Fumbling, conflict and disagreement in Washington the result of a surfeit of democracy! Has the Reconstruction Finance Corporation been bogged down by the cumbersome of a plebiscite among its office workers? Is the wage-price freeze unsettled because Eric Johnston wishes to consult the people? Can Mr. Truman's high-handed action in Korea be charged to inefficiency resulting from "democratic behavior"?

It is unfortunate that such a talented and prolific writer as Mr. Wylie does not consider social forces. In his narrowness of vision he sees this only: a democratic ideal, the individual's present failure and future hope. He attaches only one string to his dream of happiness and prosperity for future generations: man must realize himself and live according to his understanding. Mr. Wylie is the voice crying in the wilderness, he is the harbinger of spring, he is the preacher.

In the Conclusion to *Generation of Vipers*, Philip Wylie takes on an unaccustomed self-deprecatory air, which if well-considered and sincere, might have impelled him to a little re-evaluation.

"It has been fairly fancy of me, I know, to write so long and noisy a book just to say that if we want a better world, we will have to be better people."

"That's all I've said, of course."

That's all he said. It was indeed very fancy.

PRISCILLA READ

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COMING IN FUTURE ISSUES

American Liberalism

by C. Wright Mills

Sydney Hook, a political portrait

by Vincent Mann

Is Collective Security a Road to Peace?
— a Debate

Student Federalism Today

From the Student's Bookshelf

FROM HERE TO ETERNITY

by James Jones

Charles Scribner's Sons, 1950

THIS LONG, SPRAWLING, teeming naturalistic novel forms an extended compendium of life among the "30-year men" in the pre-Pearl Harbor army. In its conception, the author, James Jones, has set himself a formidable task. He has sought to present a representative picture of the tight little world of the peacetime army and to assemble a large and varied cast of characters through whose thoughts and actions this rather separate universe is viewed.

Philip Rahv has written that the recent American naturalistic novel generally falls into one of two categories, either the documenting of an institution, region or class, or the novel protesting against a social evil. The two are often merged with one quality predominating. *From Here to Eternity* is largely a documentation of life in the standing army, for its minor-key theme of the individual against the impersonal, bureaucratic system is largely buried under the microscopic mass of detail and is unclearly defined.

The soldiers we watch and listen to are mostly recruited from the ranks of the homeless vagrants "on the bum" who drift into the service because jobs are few or because they sense a big war coming and expect to get involved sooner or later. They are tough, crude men whose speech is punctuated with usually unprintable epithets and whose mental and emotional reactions are on an elementary level. These are the sort of people who stalk through the pages of numerous proletarian novels of the 30's, the restless, uprooted lower class youth shaped by the depression years, brought together by the accident of wearing the same uniform.

Jones' Method of Verbal Photography

Mr. Jones approaches his material via the well-worn path of naturalism. He records in tremendous detail the physical surroundings, the appearances of people and their thoughts and conversations. His method of unselective verbal photography is not dissimilar to that used by the better American naturalists and he achieves most of their qualities, both bad and good. This literal, unimaginative regurgitation of the whole minutiae of army existence generates a kind of enervating power. Mr. Jones' world is realized with a sense of immediacy; the reader feels like an unobserved partici-

pant as he watches its leisurely, laborious construction.

It is in his rendering of speech, that Mr. Jones contributes much that is truly his own; here, his use of naturalism pays artistic dividends. Endless conversations flow outward with an unhampered spontaneity and an immense, uninhibited gusto. Here is the authentic speech of the American soldier in all its monosyllabic banality and its muted violence and braggadocio. Nothing else in the novel is so alive, so well executed or so suggestive and illuminative of character.

From Here to Eternity is an ambitious and adventurous work for a first novel. Had Mr. Jones aimed less high, had he been content to work more exclusively in the usual domain of the naturalist, his book would have been more satisfying. But Jones has not stopped at the conception of character as essentially determined by environment; his leading figures have a confused and limited self-awareness, endowed as they are with a brooding introspective self-consciousness. The author is unable to bridge the gap between the outer lives of his soldiers and their inner monologues. There is much inadequate writing here, full of stylistic gaucheries, indefinite generalized musings and hollow Wolfean verbiage.

Strength and Weakness of Novel

An immaturity of approach is revealed in the introduction of an undercurrent of philosophy that has little relation to anything in the novel. Jones' concern with the peace-time soldier as an isolated island imprisoned in his tower of incommunicable loneliness is inappropriate to his portrayal of these characters as overly introspective individuals. This lessens the credibility of the novel. Mr. Jones' superior gifts as a novelist are tightly entwined with his equally large faults and given the form he has chosen to cast his narrative in, they continually clash with one another. *From Here to Eternity* is deficient in structure, it limps along badly with scenes of action alternating with long sections of interior monologue.

James Jones writes with mingled anger and compassion; anger against the excesses and injustices of a system and compassion for the desires, defeats and suffering of his people. He rises above the level of reporting in communicating these aspirations for a better life, for an alternative to this continual sense of emptiness that obsesses his soldiers, both officers and enlisted men. And when he treats the passion of Prewitt, his leading character, for bugling, his feeling that this alone may give life dignity and meaning takes on the essence of the

sort of poetic intuition and perception that one asks of the novelist.

Prewitt's destruction by the system he both loves and hates is drained dry of meaning and significance before its climax. This is because there is no clearly stated understanding of why or what Prewitt is rebelling against, beyond his stubborn refusal to compromise his personal moral code. Rebellion tends to feed on itself and to exist outside the social situation. Prewitt and his fellow rebels in the stockade, with the exception of Malloy, the articulate and conscious non-conformist, do not know the meaning of their actions and do not grow into understanding or self-knowledge. Perhaps this is their deepest tragedy, that they cannot comprehend why or against what they fight.

From Here to Eternity has most of the faults of this method of rendering experience. It is far too long, and greatly weighed down with excessive details. It has a soundness and validity mainly on a superficial level. Mr. Jones only dimly perceives the central concern of the novelist, the relating of man to himself, to his fellowmen, and to the world around him. His perceptions are of a plodding, literal kind that fail to illuminate the quality and meaning of experience.

J. Wilson Wright.

MAKE LIGHT OF IT

THE COLLECTED STORIES OF
WILLIAM CARLOS WILLIAMS

Random House, 1950.

THE PROSE OF William Carlos Williams could never be said to suffer from an unnatural elegance of syntax or tone; there are no sustained grammatical wonders and he could not be associated on this basis with those three great masters of the dependent clause: Henry James, Marcel Proust and Lady Murasaki Shikibu, author of the monumental *Tale of Genji*. Yet Williams is to be thought of in relation to the last-named more than any other writer for another reason—both the pediatrician from Paterson and that eminent lady from the most glittering days of Fujiwara splendor have the extraordinary genius of intuiting the fictive vision under the narrative surface of everyday life. What the fictive vision is, precisely, is the esthetic perception of the design, the sensuous contour of pure narrative.

Williams tells a story as an essence—at least in his earlier stories, for a distinction is to be made when we come to the anecdotal later work. The following passage, concerning one of his characters, illustrates his basic approach: "In my eyes his last twenty-five years are the purest. The first forty or fifty must be sketched but the last are the clear and the fine." No matter what the time-

span or the type of material, the author is always orientated to "the clear and the fine."

Moral Meaning of William's Stories

Of the first group of stories, titled "The Knife of the Times," this is particularly true; in nearly every story the narrative is governed by the strongly defined actions of human beings that most clearly outline the shapes of their souls. There is the married woman with many children who spends twenty years wooing her girl-friend of childhood and finally achieves success; the youth who grows up to sleep with hundreds of women but never gets one to fall in love with him; the two boys who sneak off to the barn; the rural lady with an excessive Cupid's-Club correspondence . . . each story reveals not merely the purity of Dr. Williams' art but also what, for this reader, is the final moral meaning of his work: a meaning strikingly Murasakian: that there is in most human beings, despite social conventions and personal guilt, an irrepressible and somehow irresistible force that makes them fulfill themselves.

The fact that Dr. Williams often associates this force with the libido should not astonish. The Japanese court lady of the tenth century made the same connection in her subtle account of Genji's varied loves. But this force can also be dissociated from the libido, as shown by three other stories; one about a happy hermit, another about a little girl who won't, won't WON'T, be examined by the doctor, and another about a boy who tramps and hitch-hikes from Montreal to Scranton on a dollar. It is the terrible strength and beauty of sheer will-power that amazes Williams and brings him close to the irrational and poignant vitality of the human race. And his statement of the great value of this is always in terms of poetic substance. Here is the conclusion of the story about the hitch-hiker who lived on water and soup:

As he was standing there speaking the last words I noticed the material of his trousers, a heavy red-brown woolen of a much better quality than any but the wealthy possess in this country.

The casual association of a boy's spirit with the quality of his clothes, where such an observation is not expected is that kind of poetry-in-fiction which Allen Tate defined in his important essay, *The Hovering Fly*.

Style and Language

To rely on the simplest artistic devices, as does Dr. Williams, requires the sturdiest prose of maximum suggestiveness if stories so short as his are going to

rise above the anecdotal. Dr. Williams possesses that prose. For example, the opening sentence of the story about the married ladies' slow romance (referred to above) evokes a whole world: "As the years passed the girls who had been such intimates as children remained true to one another." The phrasing is pricelessly compact; it makes a statement of the class, education, sensibility and character of the two heroines and yet includes a certain intangible irony. Dr. Williams is incredibly skilled at making complete wholes by such economical means as the phrasing and cadence of one sentence. Notice the maximum novelty of effect drawn from the cliché "true to one another."

This author's language is his secret, and to start quoting in this way is to be tempted to go on and on. And yet strangely enough—though not strangely at all, for genius is naturally eccentric—Dr. Williams abandoned his narrative muse in most of his later stories in order to present anecdotes indirectly through the conversation of the people he tends as a physician. To anyone familiar with Williams' poetry, the reason for this is self-evident. For many years now it has been his artistic aim to use the speech of his region of New Jersey as a poetic dialect. He hopes that one day a way may be found to scan this "local" rhythm. I should say that not his theory is wrong, for it is the same one so important in the work of Dante and J. M. Synge, but that the way New Jersey people speak is inadequate for this purpose. Moreover, listening and recording with love and care the idiosyncrasies of the speech about him, Dr. Williams has sacrificed certain merits of his fiction on the altar of his poetry. In return, he has gotten the extraordinary verbal skill of the long poem, *Paterson*, which also has some of the more picturesque qualities of his fiction. But what I, for one, should prefer to see now is a return to the simple but all-efficient narrative genius of "The Knife of our Times," unique in our literature for that special quality to be described best as "Murasakian."

CHARLES THAYER

SHERWOOD ANDERSON

by Irving Howe
Sloane Press, 1951

AN IMMEDIATE indication of the quality of Irving Howe's *Sherwood Anderson* is the breadth of the material — aesthetic, literary, cultural and social — critically ranged within its short span. Howe's book assumes extra value in that it reasserts by competent demonstration that the best criticism is that which not only appreciates literature and literary values but appreciates them to the extent of awareness of their

connection with other human motivations and activities.

Howe begins with the fact that Anderson is no longer being "read" as contrasted with the spontaneous success his writings had during the twenties and early thirties; a contrast heightened by the tremendous admiration expressed for his work by other artists such as F. Scott Fitzgerald ("a wonder"), Hart Crane ("America should read this book [Winesburg] on its knees. It constitutes an important chapter in the Bible of her consciousness") and Gertrude Stein ("... the only American who knows how to write"). Anderson has been reduced to a "stage" in the development of every serious student of American literature.

Howe sets himself the problem of determining the reason for Anderson's present literary disfavor and the degree to which a reassessment of his work justifies it.

Howe develops an expanding syllogism which culminates in Anderson as symbol of the minor artist's fate in a culturally inhospitable society, a fate to which the artist himself — in this case, Anderson — necessarily, if unwittingly, contributes. But before this culmination, there is the detail which supports and leads to it; detail which has its own interest. There is primary biography: Anderson's relation to his parents ("The boy Sherwood loved his mother without qualification in a way he could never love his father, yet he identified with his father in a way he never could with his mother") and the women he married ("In effect [D.H.] Lawrence had his Frieda, and Anderson several wives").

There is the Chicago of the "Little Renaissance," the *Little Review*, and self-conscious bohemia, a background the limitations of which Anderson never fully understood and was almost never able to transcend. There is the jazz and radicalism of the twenties and thirties, the old Masses and Anderson in and out of the Stalinist camp; and there is Anderson "discovering" the factory and his fraternal feelings for mill workers during the bitter period of initial attempts at unionization in southern mill towns.

There is textual analysis, too, the proudest and most prominent of which is the chapter, "The Book of the Grotesque," an analysis of *Winesburg* in which Howe begins by dissociating Anderson's masterpiece from realism and arrives at a discussion the book's structure and meaning in choreographic terms.

As a critic of Anderson, Howe is at least as severe as he is sympathetic, but rather than feeling that an injustice has been done to Anderson one feels that maybe, after all, he would be worth looking into again. And that would not have been the most bitter pill for an author to swallow.

HAROLD VALLER

The Film Brought Into Focus

CINEMA AND SOCIETY: Comments on Zinneman

IF FILM MAKERS use their medium to tell stories, they should tell good stories. Hollywood films have developed primarily into a means of telling stories with a high fantasy component, aimed at the adolescent. It may be true (although less true than pretended) that the movie audience "gets what it wants." But that audience is by no means the only possible audience. The disappearance of adults from the theatres appears to be a continuing trend, and the industry has so far done very little experimenting with pictures that might attract the more mature portions of the populace back to the theatres.

Now and then, however, films appear which have a close bearing on recognizable human problems, and present human motivations without marked distortion. Two films directed by Fred Zinneman (*The Men* and *Teresa*) have been remarkable in this respect.

Both are story films, with an emphasis on character that is not often found in U.S. productions. (Zinneman is a European; *The Search*, which preceded *The Men*, was produced in Europe.) Now if we ask that films deal with real problems in a mature way, we mean two sorts of thing: the plot should involve types of behavior which are of some importance in human emotional life, and the characters should be consistently motivated. This does not mean that the fabrication of films about adolescents is bad — but the persistent avoidance of adult problems, and the persistent portrayal of adults as adolescent in goals and reactions, is bad. The belief has somehow grown in this country that being adult is either dull or unnatural; films attempting to present adult situations have been characterized as "too sombre," too "unhappy" or "sordid," or too thought-provoking. The idea seems to be that thinking itself, or serious reactions of any sort, are drudgery; preferable is a sort of mindless frivolity and an absence of thorough attention to anything.

Comparison of Two Films

The Men dealt with a paraplegic veteran and the precarious adjustment he made to the facts of his life. *Teresa* shows the beginnings of a solution to the emotional troubles of a mom-ridden veteran. It might be asked. What is the difference between depicting gangland, which few individuals inhabit, and depicting the world of paraplegics, which probably even fewer inhabit? Obviously on this level there is very little differ-

ence; honest pictures have been made about both types of subject. But the types of behavior which exist in the real world can be presented schematically and fraudulently, or dramatically and truly, in the sense of emotional veracity. A film can depend on a "twist"; it can use plot gimmicks; it can titillate desires, provide scapegoats, etc. On the other hand, it can present human problems without blinking; it can refuse the miraculous solution; and it can suggest that even real problems can be solved, though it means the intelligent direction of effort and a lot of pain and work.

In *Teresa*, of course, Zinneman has taken a subject which is by no means esoteric. The son's neurosis is unusual in no sense whatever; just the opposite, it obtains wherever "their mothers' sons" live. Consequently *Teresa* has perhaps more evident topical value than did *The Men*, which raised the general problem of impotence, and resolved it in clinically satisfactory terms. (The relation of clinical truth to dramatic truth is by no means direct; but a sort of unconscious veto exists to invalidate unsound dramatic treatments. Furthermore, clinical soundness, if well presented, seems to pack them in.) In *Teresa*, which is probably the more important of the two, the story is built around a slow transformation of character. (In *The Men*, it was built in the same way upon the modification of a goal.) The pace of the film has reportedly seemed slow to U.S. audiences, who are accustomed to schematic plot development and reliance on stock characters. But it is gratifying to see that the action in *Teresa* has been handled with such discretion. A Hollywood-type treatment might easily have transformed the basic situation into an excuse for violence. The son, torn by conflict, could have smashed up a car, had a fight with his father, or gotten drunk and shot up a bar for comedy effect. But Zinneman refuses to sidestep. If a problem exists in the hero's life, a solid resolution can be achieved either by his adjusting to the inevitable conditions of the problem (*The Men*); by his resolution of the problem; or by his death and thus the dissolution of the problem. Resolution of the second sort is ordinarily accomplished in American films by luck or by outside initiative; it is rare for a hero to set to work and solve his own problems — when he does, they often turn out to be spurious, or else merely mechanical, as in the detective thriller. In fact, if the hero is a character through whose behavior a dramatic resolution for a problem confronting him is found, the hero has practically ceased to appear in U.S. productions. But Zinneman has heroes. In *The*

Men and *Teresa*, they are both young men, but neither is portrayed as a "consumer type." It is, in fact, difficulties in productivity which disturb them. It is important to realize the distinction due Zinneman for making two successive films which broach this matter; it is consistently ignored in Hollywood work, where characters tend to be invisibly supported, employed in sinecures, or employed in jobs which seem to have no importance in their lives.

Resolution of Problems

Perhaps it would also be valuable to speculate on the resolution which the hero's situation might receive in a conventional film. The mother, for example, might realize the error of her ways — this is a very likely alternative in Hollywood terms. American mothers are really good as gold underneath, as a friend might explain over the back porch railing; in the morning, mother would kiss her son chastely on the forehead and he would stride off with his wife (avoiding the tin cans) into the dawn. Or, on the other hand, the father might get an executive position through an old school chum, whereupon the son would identify properly with him and begin to go up in the world. But Zinneman sticks to probabilities. Mother and father do not reform; the situation between wife and mother worsens; the bride leaves, unable to bear it; she takes a job and has the baby. By this time, however, the V.A.'s psychiatric help has enabled Phillip to see some of the real factors operating in his life. He begins to take hold a little, gets a job and a room in a Y.M.C.A. Then, after the baby arrives, he finds a furnished room for the three of them, and the film ends on a quiet shot of them entering the new home. There are no curtains, and a bare bulb hangs from the ceiling; the room is shabby, but it represents a beginning. As in Zinneman's other films, it is a tentative resolution. Life has not been transformed into a bed of roses; on the contrary, the resolution can take place precisely because the characters have faced the refractoriness of life, and have begun to cope with it intelligently and resiliently.

What brings about the resolution in *Teresa*? First, the aid of the V.A. psychiatrist. (One of the film's faults is that we never quite see how Phillip began seeing him.) Second, the alternative opened up by *Teresa* herself, who is never a romantic schoolgirl — she is entirely a wife, though young. Third, the opportunity to live and work in the Y.M.C.A. Fourth, a small heartening move on the part of the father, who hurries Phillip out of the house before the mother can recapture him with a "scene." These contributing factors are not the spectacular dramatic materials frequently used in Hollywood. But they

are recognizable elements in a human situation. They do not require a suspension of sanity to enjoy the film. The film's "self-possession," in fact, is immensely reassuring psychologically.

The Film's Attitude

This brings up the essential question of the film's attitude. It is usual to steer clear of definite stands, in the U.S. industry; attitudes are left implicit, excessively simplified, and they are usually lacking in integrity of thought. *Teresa*, on the other hand, obviously involves a cogent point of view. Zinneman could be said to present his story with several points in mind. (1) War is a huge disastrous thing; in the lives of small men it is a given quantity, like high prices or the possibility of being run down by a streetcar. Its immoral character is very clear — rather than huge shells falling with satisfying rumbles, Zinneman gives us the sinister silence of a night patrol, Italians' horror at wasted food, and twisted family situations. Military men are human: the brutalized; the conflict-ridden; those who achieve some kind of adjustment; and the leaders (Dobbs is far from the glorified miles americanus). (2) But men have other problems; they exist, for that matter, in a world in which war produces only some of many strains. It is by no means a picture-book world. Some things in it, however, can be handled to some extent by wise behavior. Such adjustment does not come by hazard — the passive consumer does not succeed in satisfying positive action. Even adjustment itself is not final. But a kind of stability can be achieved; man, in other words, can control his life. So seldom is this attitude forthrightly displayed in films that its appearance is almost exhilarating.

As cinema, Zinneman's work is quiet and simple, without outstanding technical gambits but with a great deal of unobtrusive skill. He is primarily interested in people, and it is through the acting of the characters that he achieves his main effects. Lighting and camera work, and the use of sound, are carefully calculated for the conveyance of character and the transformations in it.

ERNEST CALLENBACH

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OLIVER TWIST

OFTEN, the dramatic quality of a work of art is enhanced by the unreality of the principle characters. Individuals who are incarnations of good, evil, power or any other vice or virtue hold our attention steadfastly; and when two dimensionless colossi tangle

we hang on, biting our nails. The "good guy" versus the "bad guy" motif may seem too shallow a theme for many of us nurtured at the founts of modern psychology, but it is, nevertheless, the network upon which much of the greatest in world literature has been built.

Dickens rarely created with the fine point. Wielding a thick brush, in broad, grand strokes he produced the unbelievably good, the unbelievably bad, the avaricious and the petty and only infrequently, the human. To say this is not to criticize Dickens, — it is to indicate the direction in which his genius lay. He excelled as a caricaturist and in the production of atmosphere. If many of the individuals that people his fiction are incredible, they are, nevertheless fascinating; and if the atmosphere engendered in his works is too often reminiscent of the Gothic novel, it is admittedly, commanding.

Problems of Screen Adaptation

Oliver Twist is a magnificent cinematic achievement because its adapters were faithful to the genius of Dickens. There are limitations to a caricature, the chief one being an absence of development and growth in response to varied experience; and consequently a thoroughly "real" character may be more gratifying to our intellectual appetite, but scarcely more entertaining. An immeasurable gulf distinguishes a good caricature from a Hollywood stereotype. Filmiland attempts to pass off its fabrications from "never-never land" as the genuine product, but the unreality of Fagin or Bill Sikes does not irritate us. First of all, they are not intended to be genuine characters but magnificent fictions and Guinness and Newton play them that way. Furthermore, they are so much more interesting than a Hollywood version of the villain. Fagin especially, is a complex and intriguing creation (caricaturing does not proscribe complexity, merely alters it as a result of experience).

In adapting a novel to the screen, the film may demonstrate its advantages as an art form in the transcription of atmosphere. Dickens at times is tedious reading. But the film photographers have cut through the luxuriant undergrowth of Dickensian verbiage and have given the film an atmosphere and quality of description which no adulator of Dickens could argue with.

Approximately ten minutes of the film has been cut as a concession to the simultaneously oversensitive and insensitive charges of anti-semitism which have been made against the picture. Ostensibly, the omitted footage contained close-ups of Fagin and sequences in which he appeared. This is unfortunate for the Guinness creation of Fagin is at once an excellent acting achievement

and an enlightening, though disputable, interpretation of the old thief's character.

In the film version of *Oliver Twist*, Fagin is not a completely black villain as his associate Sikes proves to be. He exhibits some warmth toward his "wards" and to this extent alone he is more admirable than most officialdom which treats Oliver and the other children cruelly and brutally. That they feel a sense of allegiance to him is evident from the manner in which they rally to his defense at a critical moment; they considered Fagin a protector from the law.

As Guinness presents the role, the source of Fagin's interest in the children appears to be more than the profit he accrues from their stealing. A suspicion that Fagin has a homosexual attraction for his "wards" is brought into the film, something which the book neither substantiates nor excludes.

IRVING STERN

MACBETH

IT IS SIGNIFICANT that Orson Welles mistook his starting point in his version of *Macbeth*. For Welles, having decided to eschew the more conservative approach of merely putting a stage play onto celluloid (in the case of Shakespeare, less desirable than ever, since even the least imaginative use of the camera is probably conceptually closer to the Elizabethan theatre than the naturalistic theatre of our day) attempts, laudibly I think, to add a strong visual element to the author's dramatic-poetic synthesis. But unfortunately, he makes his attempt under the influence of Sergei Eisenstein.

The Eisenstein influence, as might be expected in this day of the continued burying of *Potemkin*, is chiefly that of the Russian director's last work, *Ivan the Terrible*. Indeed, even a certain comparison is unavoidable since, many of the faults, (and not all of them dramatic faults), of *Macbeth* are originally present in *Ivan the Terrible*: the "theatrical," overstylized castle set, down to the completely unidentifiable entrances. In *Ivan the Terrible* this aspect was at least consistent with the miserable, pageant-like whole, but in *Macbeth* it is to deny the castle any physical reality (whether to be transcended or not is not the question here) and serves only to contribute to a chaotic beginning and to mar many of the subsequent castle scenes, notably the ones of Lady Macbeth's madness and suicide. The "finale" mass marches, in *Macbeth*, led by Macduff and meant to signify an inexorable retributive justice is fine in both idea and detail, but remains, as in *Ivan*, the unintegrated, alien element. Even to a degree the acting uniformly bad in *Macbeth* (with the

exception of Dan O'Herlihy who plays Macduff) for the exaggerated suspiciousness of Banquo and Ross and the atmosphere of "intrigue in the castle", is reminiscent of Ivan and the boyars.

Superior to Other Productions

There is no minimizing this failure to translate to the screen what is probably the most dramatically structured of Shakespeare's last great tragedies. But I think, too, failure that it is, there is more to admire in this production of Welles' than in either of the two Olivier productions of Shakespeare.

It is unlikely that Welles, in imitating Eisenstein's technique was making a conscious choice between the Russian director's retrogressive "linkage" theory of film art and his earlier "montage" theory. Even if the failure of Macbeth were explicable in terms of this choice, Welles, as compared to Olivier makes the bolder attempt at interpreting Shakespeare. And I think, too, that many of the best qualities of Macbeth are to

be found in it as a result of this desire to be artistically bold united with a limited theory in his medium. Certainly, "linkage" — "cuts" employed mainly to keep a story moving — must have appealed to Welles confronted as he was with a Shakespeare he wanted to place before a movie audience. A failure that results can most keenly be perceived in the precipitate rhythms of the whole — Lady Macbeth becoming superfluous and the soliloquies, even when accompanied by a frenetic camera, are too intrusive — but some of the effects Welles achieves are worth remembering: the clay statuette wrought in their boiling pot by the witches which is decapitated at the same instant Macduff kills the real Macbeth; the fight between Macbeth and Macduff; and finally the scene where Macbeth receives news of the army coming against him and he is seen in relation to the stance of the unwilling nobles who are supposed to fight for him.

KENETH STORCHER

The Art Galleries in Review

GIACOMETTI

THE REVOLUTION in painting has achieved the status of an historical fact. Radicals, conservatives and readers of the national weeklies alike recognize that something has happened. While the logic of the development of abstract painting is a matter of concern to the relative few who interest themselves in the rationale of social or cultural history, nevertheless movements have been made to incorporate the new *fait accompli* into the body of art history. (For example, the present direction of painting can be understood as a renewal of interest in the laws and possibilities of the picture plane, a concern common to classical and contemporary painters alike.) Meanwhile, rather more quietly, things have been happening in sculpture.

The Work of Giacometti

The real development of an art form lies in a change in the practical or theoretical use of its esthetic elements. A new concept of color, a new use of space: these are the milestones of art. One had only to see the geometric show at the Matisse Galleries last year to realize that sculpture like painting has shifted its focus. It is in the relationship of the sculptor's basic elements, mass and space, that style is defined. Giacometti is a modern sculptor, working in a personal and rather radical style. Other sculptors, no less modern, use mass and space differently: Moore, Marini, Lippold. I believe, however, that an attempt

to relate Giacometti to the body of traditional sculpture might present some interesting lights on the evolution of modern sculptural problems. For this purpose it is well to have the appearance of his sculpture well in mind.

At the Matisse Galleries one found a room full of figures, almost unbearably attenuated, each very tall, very thin, subtly narrowing and widening hips, waist and shoulders. Of actual mass and three-dimensionality there was almost nothing, just as much depth as the metal needs to contort and knot its surface. Yet the power of these strange figures was undeniable. They had an enormous and brooding dignity that fills a great deal of space. They gave a certain sensation of mass and rootedness without any feeling of bodily form or weight. For the moment I want to avoid the heads and walking figures and concentrate on the rigid, almost gestureless, almost formless pieces. Most of these were single figures though there was a small work which presented a row of women facing the spectator. These, like a few others, were lightly touched with paint, a few lines suggesting faces, breasts and legs on the otherwise nameless silhouettes.

Development of Form

So completely did they impress us with their being that it is with a shock that we realize how little this is sculpture as we know it. Sculpture, once the leavening of architecture seems here suspiciously close to painting. Let us examine more closely exactly what this means.

The history of sculpture is commonly considered to be a development from the bas-relief to a fully three dimensional form in open space. In bas-relief neither the mass nor the space of the sculpture is independent. The mass of the sculpture is the mass of the wall enclosing it. The space which the sculpture must animate is defined by the area of the visible wall. As sculpture emerged from the wall and into open space it tended to retain many of its relationships to architecture. Often placed in close proximity to a building it preserved the limitations and all-over impression of architectural form, as a column or block. More significantly, perhaps, sculptural movements continued to be based on architectural movements. Early sculpture in the round merely meant a more gentle, merging of the forms defining side-front-side while the main movements of the figure were vertically and horizontally recessed from a distinct frontal plane.

Changes from Classical Tradition

The classical tradition weakened and as greater inventiveness was permitted in sculpture and architecture the figures began to stir. Broader, more open movements burst the confining form and diagonal thrusts spiralled the frontal plane. The statue itself came to be placed in more open air, a tendency that continued through the Renaissance to the present day.

The old idea was that sculpture presents an experience of mass. The air around the statue was chiefly thought of as negative space being pushed back where the form expanded. It became a positive part of the statue only in the shallow open places where the volumes moved away from each other, say, in the distance between the hand and the body. Stronger movement of the form into space, as an outstretched arm, immediately sends the space further in, gives it the stronger role of pushing the body back. The interpenetration of air and form thus presented a situation where space and mass took more equivalent roles in the definition of sculptural movement. Perhaps it is significant of the weakened hold of matter on this world that our own day has seen the dominant place in sculpture often given to space instead of mass.

Relation of Sculpture To Architecture

Much of wire sculpture can basically be understood only as the articulation of spatial tensions. Here mass has given way to line, which in turn exists chiefly to relate and define the movements of space. This situation defines the peculiarly modern sculptural problem: to manipulate space in such a way that its structural element becomes sensible: to

keep the aesthetically defined space distinct in the surrounding sea of air. Now the ancient role of architecture as it is related to sculpture is felt more strongly than was possible before. For architecture functioned exactly to solve this delicate problem of isolating spaces: it provided a defined area of space in which sculpture could operate. Only that sculpture which in itself embodies many of the principles and forms of architecture can successfully be placed in totally free and open air. How very few are the statues which are not hopelessly dwarfed by the park and the open square! How belittling and confusing are most sculpture galleries, the pieces jostling each other with autocratic indifference, like strangers in a crowd! The alienation of sculpture from architecture, once heralded as a proud coming-of-age, now appears as a somewhat hazardous partition, involving no small loss of blood to the younger art.

Of the manner in which Giacometti solves contemporary sculptural problems it may be said that some are contingent and personal and some are necessary. Particularly important is his use of the only architectural support sculpture has retained: the base. A part of the sculpture so obscure that its function is rarely noted or understood, Giacometti has exploited the pedestal as the clue to the observer as to the shape and volume of the space that the sculpture is intended to fulfill. If it seems that I am overestimating its role, consider the curious circumstance that the pedestal's apparent analogue, the frame, has often been dispensed with by the painter, while I cannot easily recall any sculpture which was not specifically mounted. Giacometti's sculpture forces a realization of the base's importance, however, more strongly than any analysis could. In his group pieces the base defines a stage-like volume so clear that one can almost see the curtains within which his tragic players stalk. In the single pieces the base, welded to the enormous feet, shoots its real mass upward and lends solidity to the illusory mass of the figure.

Quality of Cubist Painting

I have spoken before of the actual fragility of his figures. Besides the actual mass of the base two other formal factors provide for our contrary-to-fact experience of mass. In the first place, Giacometti's highly agitated surfaces yield a play of light and dark so exciting and intense as to involve one immediately with a sensation of density. This is basically a painter's device. In fact, some of the pieces, particularly a small male head, yield exactly that equality of space, at once flat and three-dimensional that is characteristic of Cubist painting. Giacometti's second bulwark against ex-

cessive fragility is his adherence in the single figures, to the principle of the plane. By holding his real mass rigidly to the vertical and permitting no sway through the space, he guarantees the unity of the gestures across the plane. The figure is felt to expand on a firm plane, which holds the figure no less ef-

ficiently for being vertical or imaginary. Thus, Giacometti, by the sensitivity and imaginativeness with which he employs aesthetic principles can present us simultaneously with his personal vision and the experience of sculpture.

R. WATSON

From the Editor's Mailbag

THE EDITORS,
ANVIL,

Sirs,

I WELCOME YOUR MAGAZINE for its implicit recognition of the anti-war struggle as the only real political issue left in our time. But it is really much more than that. It is a political and—your emphasis—a cultural magazine. It is a recognition of the further significant fact that political movements tend to merge, if they are to be vital incentives, into artistic movements.

Political socialists generally still think—as the Jacobins did—that they can publish their straight programs and theses in their own right. But these presentations leave us cold, unmoved. We insist on imagination, grace, style, as well as truth, sincerity, heroics. . . . And we do not insist on these as bum bohemians or aesthetes; we insist on them as ordinary workers, intent on changing the world. We do this because art has been diffused down, through society. In this age of cheap printing, general education, aesthetic sensibilities have been disseminated over a wider field. Art is now a more everyday matter, a social—a political, democratic matter. Art does not any longer serve the revolution, any more than it serves religion—it is the revolution. Art has emerged, ascended, so that it becomes the religion, the principle, the ethos of our time. But it has also descended to the people, into a position which fills the social-revolutionary arena.

Such a view requires much more substantiation than I can put into a letter. I can only hope to point up one direction in which you, in your article, *The Federation Takes the Floor*, (Winter Quarter, 1950—Ed.) in effect support this view. You point out that ideas are themselves acts, that talking is action. Precisely. And it is concrete, practical, revolutionary action. It is an idiotic dualism which supposes that blood and guts punching has any priority over "mere" eloquence or theorising. Thinking, talking, is simply the use of words; and words are concrete things—swords, tools, levers to lift society. To think, that is arrange these words properly, is finally art—the art of poetry. Shelley was not talking loosely when he called the poet "the unacknowl-

edged legislator of mankind." The real poet has always been fiercely, militantly "political."

But you say, quite rightly, that there is something more concrete to do than talk. It is here that we must consider the application of our words. If we are rabble-rousers, addressing human beings, then we are merely politicians. What we must recognise is that the poet addresses things. His words bear fruit finally in work, in technics as a substitute for war and as the only effective opposition to it.

There is an urgent necessity for us, as workers in the university, to explore newer directions—in aesthetics, in techtonics, in pursuance of the above. But there still remains our struggle against war, this war. And once more I affirm: I welcome your magazine. May it grow and become world wide. And with this hope, although I write representing no organisation, goes also a pledge of sympathy and support from workers and students in Australia who think as we do.

Sincerely,

Harry Hooton,
Sydney, NSW.,
Australia.

Editorial Notice

Anvil and Student Partisan

welcomes letters of comment and criticism. Please indicate whether part or all of your letters may be published in ANVIL.

Articles, reviews and poetry are also welcome, and all contributions will be carefully considered. Although we will attempt to return all unused manuscripts, ANVIL cannot be responsible for the loss of any material.

THE EDITORS

ADVERTISING RATES

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PROGRAM of the NEW YORK STUDENT FEDERATION AGAINST WAR

The primary aim of the New York Student Federation Against War is to organize all students opposed to the war drives of Russian and American imperialism which threaten the very existence of world civilization.

We aim to prevent the polarization of the American student into the reactionary war camps of either Russian or American imperialism.

We are irreconcilably opposed to the totalitarian tyranny which rules over such countries as Russia, her Eastern European vassal states, and Fascist Spain. We advocate the overthrow of these regimes by democratic forces from within these countries and enthusiastically endorse all such forces.

Since we function on the American campus most of the planks in our program must of necessity be more directly concerned with the American scene.

I. Against War Preparations

We oppose all social, economic, and political preparations for war on the part of Russian and American imperialism.

Therefore, we oppose:

1. The 41 billion dollar war budget.
2. The use of atomic energy for war purposes.
3. The North Atlantic Pact and the American subsidization of the military machines of Western Europe.
4. The growing militarism of the American government.
5. Conscription, Universal Military Training and the ROTC.
6. The bolstering of reactionary regimes in Spain, Greece, Turkey and the Asiatic puppet regimes.

Therefore, we favor:

1. Repeal of the draft.
2. Withdrawal of all occupation troops throughout the world.
3. Colonial freedom and the right of self-determination for all oppressed people.
4. Letting the people decide; a national referendum on war.
5. Granting amnesty and restoration of full civil rights to all those imprisoned or who lost their civil rights because of their opposition to World War II.

II. Academic Freedom and Civil Liberties

The assault on academic freedom and civil liberties is a part of American imperialism's preparation for war through methods which resemble the totalitarian techniques of the Russian police state.

Therefore, we oppose:

1. The attempt to straight-jacket the American campus through such legislation as the Feinberg Bill.
2. All forms of racial and religious discrimination among students and faculty.
3. Faculty and administration supervision of student organizations.
4. Loyalty Oaths for students or faculty members.
5. The suppression of political minorities through the use of such legislation as the Smith Act.
6. The McCarran Act.

Therefore, we favor:

1. Effective student government of student affairs.
2. Complete freedom of political expression for students and faculty members.
3. The right of students to organize on campus for their political opinions.
4. The abolition of all government subversive lists, loyalty oaths, and such bodies as the House Un-American Activities Committee.
5. Passage of a Civil Rights program and the repeal of the Smith Act and McCarran Act.

III. Education

1. For a free state university.
2. For a universal free college education.
3. For the right of students and faculty to organize and strike.

IV. Labor

1. The NYSFAW seeks to establish close ties with the labor movement and to actively cooperate with all sections of the labor movement in the fight against the drive to war.
2. We oppose all efforts to destroy the independence of the labor movement, and therefore are in favor of the repeal of the Taft-Hartley Act and all similar legislation.